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# HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

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## NOTES.

VOL. I.

# HISTORICAL MISCELLANIES.

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## NOTES.

VOL. I.

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# MEMOIRS

OF THE

# HISTORY OF FRANCE

DURING THE REIGN OF

# NAPOLEON,

DICTATED BY THE EMPEROR

AT SAINT HELENA

TO THE GENERALS WHO SHARED HIS CAPTIVITY;

AND PUBLISHED

FROM THE ORIGINAL MANUSCRIPTS

CORRECTED BY HIMSELF.

---

SECOND EDITION.

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DICTATED TO THE COUNT DE MONTHOLON.

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# THE FIRST VOLUME

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# MEMOIRS

OF

# NAPOLEON.

## NOTES AND MISCELLANIES.

## SEVEN NOTES

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This work is one of the most important of all that have been published relative to these

* *Traité des grandes Opérations Militaires.*

† Napoleon, speaking of this General in one of his notes on the book published in Germany, by Baron Odeleben, on the campaign in Saxony, says:

"The author of this book is mistaken in accusing General Jomini of having disclosed the intended operations of the cam-

subjects. The following Notes may assist the author in his future editions, and will be interesting to military men.

## NOTE I. (CHAP. XXV.)

### BATTLE OF MONTENOTTE.

I. In April 1796, the Austrian army consisted of forty-two battalions and forty-four squadrons; some of these battalions were 1500 strong. The Piedmontese army, including artillery and cavalry, amounted to 30,000 men. The division of Neapolitan cavalry consisted of 2000 men. These armies contained altogether 80,000 fighting men, and had 200 pieces of cannon. The French army consisted of 28,000 infantry, 3000 cavalry, and 30 pieces of horse-artillery. Total in the field, 31,000 men.

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paign, and the situation of Ney's corps, to the Allies. This officer was unacquainted with the Emperor's plans. The order for the general movement, which was always sent to each of the Marshals, had not been communicated to him; nor, had he known it, would the Emperor believe him guilty of the crime thus laid to his charge. He did not betray his colours, like Pichegru—Augereau—Marmont—and Bourmont; he had to complain of great injustice, and was misled by an honourable feeling. Not being a Frenchman, he was not restrained by any patriotic sentiment."

II. The demi-brigades of the army of Italy did not assume the numbers which they bore in 1815 until the month of June 1796. Before that time they were distinguished by old numbers which are forgotten.

III. At the battle of Montenotte, General d'Argenteau, commanding Beaulieu's centre, had 18,000 men, of whom 5000 were Piedmontese.

IV. At the battle of Millesimo the Austrians had 21,000 men: at Dego they lost 10,000 (of whom 8000 were taken prisoners), 30 pieces of cannon, and 15 standards. The chief of the staff of the army who caused the return of prisoners to be printed, forgot 2000 who had already been taken to Nice; the list of whom had not been remitted to the Adjutant-general, to whose department these details belonged.

V. In the proclamation of the General-in-chief to the army, dated from Cherasco, there is an error of the press: instead of 1500, read 15,000 prisoners.

VI. The cavalry had passed the winter on the banks of the Rhone, but it was in the most deplorable state, and marched in the rear of the columns: it was, nevertheless, very useful in pursuing the enemy, when routed, into the passes; and it was owing to this cavalry that

so many prisoners were made in the early part of the campaign. It was not, however, at that time, able to engage the Austrian cavalry in line; nor was it until it arrived on the Mincio that it first appeared to advantage, manœuvred in the plain, made successful charges and emulated the infantry.

## NOTE II. (CHAP. XXVI.)

### BATTLE OF LODI.

I. Ought the army of Italy, instead of crossing the Po at Placenza, to have effected its passage at Cremona? In moving from Tortona to Placenza, down the right bank of the Po, it left its flank exposed, during a march of eighteen leagues, to the enemy, who, furnished with pontoons, was posted on the left bank: many inconveniences would have resulted from prolonging this march for seven leagues more; and what end would have been attained by it? Placenza, on the right bank, afforded all the resources of a great town to facilitate the construction of bridges; Cremona, on the opposite side, would have remained in the power of the enemy until the passage had been effected. Besides, Placenza is the nearest point on the Po to Milan, whence Cremona is much more

distant, and is separated by the Adda. If Beaulieu had crossed to the right bank of the Adda, and thrown a bridge across opposite Placenza, the French army would have been divided into two parts on the two banks. Flank marches are to be avoided, and when they are inevitable, they ought to be made as short and with as much rapidity as possible.

II. If the French army had possessed a pontoon train, it would have arrived at Milan before the Austrian army; but it lost sixty hours in collecting boats and constructing a bridge over the Po, which gave the enemy's general time to pass the Adda.

III. Colli's corps, which was advancing towards the bridge of Cassano, had not come up. Napoleon was in hopes of cutting it off from the Mincio, which determined him to attack and force the bridge of Lodi. In fact, at the very moment when he carried the bridge, Colli crossed at Cassano, whence he was enabled to retreat without molestation. If the army had been provided with pontoons, it would have passed the Adda on the evening of the battle of Fombio.

Napoleon arrived in person within musquet shot of Pizzighettone: he sent up and down the river to collect boats, and if he could have

procured only eight or ten, he would have passed; even during the night he would have taken up positions on both sides of the Adda.

IV. Beaulieu, in the night after the battle of Fombio, did not attempt to surprise Codogno: he did not even know what had passed in the afternoon, and thought himself still master of Fombio. He came, without the least suspicion, to take up his quarters at Cazal, intending to pass the night there. One of his cavalry regiments, which intended to occupy Codogno, fell in with the bivouacs of Laharpe's division: it was received with a brisk fire of musquetry, and retired precipitately. General Laharpe left his camp, with some officers of his staff, to collect at the nearest farm-houses some information respecting the strength of the corps which had just made its appearance. Returning, an hour after midnight, to his head-quarters by a different road to that by which he had set out, he was fired upon by the sentinels, and thus killed on the spot by the bullets of his own soldiers, who had always been much attached to him, and were struck with consternation at this fatal mistake.

V. General Colli, who commanded the Piedmontese, was an officer of the Austrian army; he did not, therefore, quit the service of the

King of Sardinia after the armistice of Cherasco.

VI. Augereau's division actually passed the Mincio by the bridge of Borghetto: the demonstrations near Peschiera were merely a feigned attack to occupy the attention of General Lyptai, whilst Augereau was manœuvring to cut him off from the Verona road.

VII. There were in the fort of Urbino 800 of the Papal soldiers, instead of 200. This fact is of little importance in itself; it is only noticed here from a regard to truth.

It has been said that the army ought not to have remained on the Adige; that it should have passed the Julian Alps, and advanced on Vienna; but these opinions are very absurd.

After the battle of Lodi, Napoleon received a decree of the Directory, ordering him to march on Rome and Naples with 20,000 men, and to give up his army to Kellerman, who was coming to conduct the blockade of Mantua. Napoleon represented in energetic terms all the disadvantages of this scheme, and offered his resignation, determined not to become instrumental to the destruction of his army. The government recalled its decree: it had been seduced by a temptation irresistible to the revolutionary heroes, that of planting the French

colours on the Capitol, and of punishing the court of Naples for its manifold offences. The conduct of Napoleon towards the King of Sardinia was dictated by sound policy; but such dispassionate circumspection was beyond the comprehension of the statesmen of that period. It was not without difficulty that he made them understand all the importance of maintaining tranquillity in Piedmont; and convinced them that revolutions, revolts, and the fermentation of the passions, always produce disasters; and that tranquillity and security, above all things, were requisite in the rear of the army.

## NOTE III. (CHAP. XXX.)

### BATTLE OF CASTIGLIONE.

I. Too much reliance is placed on the reports of the Aulic Council, which, being defeated, tried to represent matters in the most favourable light. At this period, Wurmser had not less than 100,000 men, 15,000 of whom were in Mantua. The French army consisted of 40,000 men, of whom 10,000 were employed in the blockade of that place; 30,000 formed the army of observation which was to keep in check an army of relief of upwards of

80,000 men. From the 29th of July to the 8th of August, Wurmser lost 40,000 men, 70 pieces of cannon, many ammunition and baggage-waggons, and 15 stand of colours; he relieved the garrison of Mantua, reinforced it with 5000 men, and regained the Tyrol with less than 40,000 men.

II. On the 31st of July, Augereau repassed the Mincio at Borghetto with his own division only; Serrurier raised the blockade of Mantua; collected his division, and proceeded towards Marcaria. In the night between the 31st of July and 1st of August, Napoleon marched on Brescia with Augereau's division, which passed, by neighbouring roads, across a country full of heaths; Massena, who did not remain at Ponte-San-Marco, marched in a parallel direction by the road from Ponte-San-Marco to Brescia; Sauret remained posted on the heights between Lonato and Salo; General Pigeon, commanding the rear-guard of Massena in this march, remained on the lower Mincio with 1500 men, skirmishing from one bank to the other; the rear-guard of Augereau, commanded by Brigadier-general Valette, took up a position on the right bank of the Mincio, at the point of Borghetto, skirmishing with the opposite bank. On the 2d of August, at the first dawn of day, the divisions of Massena and

Augereau faced about, after having driven Quosdanowich from Brescia and the whole plain. Massena went to Ponte-San-Marco, and found his rear-guard, which by this movement had become his van-guard, already fallen back upon Castiglione: it had unnecessarily suffered itself to be forced during the day. Such was the state of affairs the evening before the battle of Lonato.

III. At this battle the Austrians had 30,000 men; they had 18,000 at Castiglione; Lyptai's division formed the van-guard; and General Augereau stood in need of all the vigour of his excellent division, reinforced with the reserve of the cavalry, to gain the battle, take Castiglione, and rout the enemy. Twelve hundred men opposed Massena; at first they took Lonato, and defeated the rear-guard of General Pigeon; but their centre was penetrated, and they were repulsed and driven from the field of battle. On the 5th, the battle of Castiglione took place. General Fiorella, who commanded Serrurier's division, had only 4000 men to make his movement on the rear of Wurmser; for there were in this division 3000 sick, suffering from the fevers of the marshes, whom he could not possibly bring with him, but was compelled to leave at Marcaria, with the sappers, workmen,

ammunition-waggons, and other carriages attached to the besieging train. Wurmser had, besides, nearly 30,000 men, and a very fine cavalry; ours was at that time inferior to the Austrian. The French army contained from 22,000 to 23,000 men, but these were the same troops who had fought at Corona, at Lonato, and at the battle of the 3d; many of the officers had been killed, many were disabled; all that could possibly be done was therefore effected on that day.

V. Wurmser was an old soldier, he had good officers with him, he knew that his plan was too much extended, but he thought himself protected by his great numerical superiority. If he had only possessed forces equal to his opponents, or only a third more, he would not have thus extended his plan. Had he lost so few men at Lonato and Castiglione, as has been asserted, he would not have abandoned the Mincio, but would have maintained himself there, supporting his left on Mantua, and his right on the Lake of Garda: by investing and besieging Garda he would have saved the honour of his army, but he had suffered too severely for this, and found himself under the necessity of retreating into the Tyrol, and of abandoning Italy.

## NOTE IV. (CHAP. XXXI.)

### BATTLE OF BASSANO.

I. Wurmser received a reinforcement of 15,000 men in the month of August: he had still 40,000 of his old army, which had been joined by 10,000 Tyrolians:—he had therefore nearly 70,000 men in the beginning of September. Thirty thousand, including the 10,000 Tyrolians, were destined to keep the Tyrol, under Davidowich; 40,000 to manœuvre by the plains of the Bassanese, and Vicentine, upon Mantua: of this number 30,000 were infantry, the rest cavalry and artillery. Davidowich lost 11,000 men at the battle of Roveredo, of whom 9000 were made prisoners; he had lost some at the action of the Sarca, and he lost more at that of Lavis.

II. At the action of Primolano prisoners were taken from five different battalions; there were, besides the three battalions of Croats, six battalions of the line. The number of prisoners was 4000, and not 1800.

III. The battle of Bassano was more important than is represented; the losses sustained by the enemy were more serious.

IV. The division of Mezaros having arrived before Verona, attacked that city and was repulsed. The place had been strengthened for this purpose; the offensive movement of Wurmser having been foreseen: a demi-lune had been constructed before the gate of Vicenza, and the enceinte had been lined with a great number of pieces of artillery. Kilmaine, who had been ordered to observe the Adige, received from the Commander-in-chief, at the moment when the latter marched upon Trent, instructions very fully detailed, with which he was forcibly impressed. They are curious, and ought to be found amongst his papers: all that took place on the Adige was foreseen. Kilmaine, when he found himself menaced, recalled the garrison of Legnago, and ordered General Sahuguet, who was conducting the blockade of Mantua, to replace it. Mezaros then applied to Wurmser for reinforcements, and particularly for pontoons; instead of which he received orders to retrograde with all possible speed upon Bassano. At Vicenza he met Wurmser himself, who had just been forced from Bassano.

V. This General now found himself driven to the Adige, followed by Massena's division, which marched direct from Bassano upon Vicenza, and by that of Augereau which had just

arrived at Padua. Wurmser had no pontoons, having lost them at Bassano. Of his army of 70,000 men, he had now only 16,000, who were greatly discouraged; if we except 6000 cavalry in good condition, who had not suffered, and were full of vigour. His situation appeared desperate, when three squadrons of cavalry took possession of the ferry-boat of Albaredo, crossed to the right bank of the Adige, cut off the communications of Legnago with the blockade of Mantua, and sabred a few stragglers who carried the alarm into Legnago. According to the custom of the Austrians, this party of cavalry spread the most alarming reports in all directions: they said that Napoleon had perished with his army in the passes of the Brenta; and that Wurmser, with all his victorious troops, had arrived at Mantua.—The commandant of Legnago was a chief of battalion of light infantry: he had 500 men there. His apprehensions got the better of his judgment, he gave credit to all these false reports, and thought he was achieving a noble piece of generalship by evacuating the place, saving his battalion, and rejoining Sahuguet at Mantua. The commander of the Austrian cavalry was soon informed of this; he threw himself into Legnago, and with his three squadrons took possession

of the town and bridge, which latter, though a wooden one, had not been destroyed. This fortunate event altered the situation of the old Marshal; he was no longer in danger of being compelled to lay down his arms; he advanced with all speed upon Legnago, and passed the river; but he imprudently lost a day. Napoleon had just reached Arcole, opposite Ronco, at the moment that Wurmser was entering Legnago: he seized the ferry-boat, and despatched Massena's division across, to take advantage of Wurmser's security: he still hoped to get to the Molinella before the Marshal, and advanced on Sanguinetto, whilst Augereau directed his march from Padua upon Legnago. If the van-guard of Massena had not gone too far to the left, to Cerea, the whole of Massena's division would have arrived at Sanguinetto before the enemy, and Wurmser would still have been compelled to lay down his arms; but the van-guard having blocked up the road to Cerea, and consisting only of 500 horse and 1200 light infantry, and not being supported by the corps of the division which was on the Sanguinetto road, Wurmser cut his way through it, and arrived on the Molinella, where Kilmaine and Sahuguet were in position. They had destroyed the bridge of Castellaro, but had left that of

Villimpenta: Wurmser directed his march thither; the way to Mantua was now open to him. Thus he succeeded in making good his retreat.

At the first gun fired by the van-guard of Cerea, Napoleon, who was on horseback, and was marching more to the right, in the direction of Sanguinetto, comprehended what had happened: he galloped to the spot in order to remedy the evil, if possible; but as he came up, the 4th light regiment was routed; and several thousand cavalry were scouring the plain. An old woman informed Wurmser that the French General had been at her door not ten minutes before; he had, she said, only just time enough to ride off again at full speed. The old Marshal hoped, not without some foundation, that his adversary would have fallen into his power. It is said he recommended that Napoleon should be brought to him alive.

It appears that the author was ignorant of the battle of Verona and the events at Legnago. The loss of the Austrian army from the 4th of September to the 13th, was 30,000 men killed or wounded, and 14,000 men shut up in Mantua, amongst whom were the Marshal, all the staff, the civil list, &c.

## NOTE V. (CHAP. XXXIV.)

### BATTLE OF ARCOLE.

I. At the action of the 6th of November, on the Brenta, Generals Quosdanowich and Hohenzollern were pursued by the division of Augereau towards Bassano: it required an effort to compel them to pass the bridge, and to render the day decisive. Napoleon sent orders to a brigade of reserve to advance; but a battalion of Croats of 900 men, which Quosdanowich had sent to flank his right when he advanced, finding themselves cut off, barricadoed themselves in a village on the causeway leading from Vicenza to Bassano. The brigade of reserve, being received at the entrance of this village with a brisk fire of musquetry, could not debouch: it was necessary to manœuvre and bring up cannon. This village was carried by hard fighting, but the brigade lost two hours, and the night was set in when it arrived opposite Bassano.

II. General Kilmaine, who during the battle of Arcole occupied Verona, had under his command only a body of 1500 men, infantry, cavalry, and artillery.

III. The bridge over the Adige was thrown across opposite Ronco, on the right of the Al-

pon, between the mouth of that river and Verona, and not opposite Albaredo below the mouth of the Alpon, 1st, because the Austrian hussars occupied the village of Albaredo, and, if the bridge had been thrown over there, it would have put Alvinzi on his guard. A surprise was what was chiefly calculated upon, as the enemy had neglected to occupy the marshes opposite Ronco, contenting themselves with having them observed by patroles of hussars, who rode over the dikes twice a-day: 2dly, the French army amounted to only 13,000 men, and could not expect, as matters stood, to beat 30,000 in an open plain where the lines could be deployed; but upon dikes surrounded by morasses only the heads of columns would engage, and numbers would there have no influence. 3dly, Alvinzi was preparing to storm Verona: his head-quarters were within three leagues of that place: it was possible that the moment the French army should march upon Ronco, he would march to attack Verona. It was therefore indispensable that the army should pass the Po above the mouth of the Alpon, in order that no natural obstacle should prevent it from following Alvinzi upon Verona. If it had passed opposite Albaredo, a few battalions of Croats, in position on the right bank

of the Alpon, would have sufficed to cover the march of Alvinzi on Verona: this city once lost, the French army must have been compelled to retreat, in order to rejoin Vaubois at Mantua, and to get there before the enemy.

IV. Why was the village of Arcole evacuated by the French army at the close of the first day?—and why was the same thing repeated at the conclusion of the second? Because the advantages obtained on the first day, though pretty considerable, were not sufficiently so to enable the army to debouch in the plain, and to restore its communications with Verona. It was, however, to be feared that, even during the very day of the battle of Arcole, Davidowich might have moved from Rivoli, upon Castel-Nuovo, and then there would have been no time to lose; the army must have marched all night to rejoin Vaubois the next day on Castel-Nuovo and Villa-Franca, to beat Davidowich, save the blockade of Mantua, and afterwards return, if possible, before Alvinzi should have passed the Adige. Napoleon received intelligence, at four o'clock in the morning, that Davidowich had not moved the preceding day; upon which he repassed the bridge and took Arcole. At the close of the second day he reasoned in the same manner; he had obtained

some advantages, but still not sufficiently decisive to enable him to risk debouching in the plain; it was still possible that Davidowich might have marched against Vaubois; it was still necessary to be in a situation to cover the blockade of Mantua. This very delicate train of reasoning depends upon a calculation of hours, and cannot be comprehended without a perfect knowledge of the relative situations of Verona, Villa-Nuova, Ronco, Mantua, Castel-Nuovo, and Rivoli.

V. It is asked, why the French army did not, on the first day, throw a bridge over at the mouth of the Alpon, in order to debouch in the plain?—or why, at least, it did not take this step on the second day?—Because it had experienced disasters during the eight preceding days; because it consisted of only 13,000 fighting men; and lastly, because it was not until the third day, that some degree of equilibrium was established between the two armies by the successes of the French. Such was the state of things, that, if Napoleon had convoked a council of the generals previously to giving his orders for the third day, to discuss the question whether he should march upon Verona by the left bank, or proceed to the aid of Vaubois by the right bank, every opinion would have

been in favour of the movement by the right bank; and when his generals of divisions received, two hours before day, orders to advance, they thought the movement very bold. As the divisions were beginning to move, the couriers announced that the enemy was in retreat upon Vicenza and the Brenta.

## NOTE VI. (CHAP. XXXVI.)

### BATTLE OF RIVOLI.

I. Clarke had in reality a mission to the Court of Vienna; he was also instructed to negotiate the interests of the minority of the Directory with Napoleon. It would be a great mistake to imagine that he ever presumed to aim at superseding Napoleon. The government was divided, but both parties were equally satisfied with the progress of the affairs of Italy. Besides, Clarke was totally unaccustomed to command;—his mind was chiefly adapted for observation: at head-quarters he was principally employed in making enquiries respecting particular officers, which displeased several of them, and drew on him some unpleasant consequences: he was a man of industry and integrity.

II. The 59th never formed part of the Army

of Italy; but the 57th and 58th served in that army.

III. When Napoleon departed from Rivoli and went to Mantua, he left Generals Massena and Joubert at the former place. In this campaign it was the plan of the Aulic Council that the operations of Alvinzi by Montebaldo, and those of Provera by the Lower Adige, should be independent of each other. Orders had been given to Wurmser to manœuvre for the purpose of uniting with Provera, if Alvinzi should prove successful; and to push his advantages as far as circumstances would admit: but, should Alvinzi be defeated and Provera victorious, Wurmser was to take the opportunity of the two or three days during which he would be master of the course of the Po, and to pass it with all his staff, and all his skeletons of artillery, infantry, and cavalry regiments; he was to march to Rome, join the Pope's army, augment and discipline his levies, and thus oblige the French general to divide his force into two bodies. With respect to Mantua, he was to provision it for two months, if he could maintain the command of the Serraglio long enough for that purpose: if not, he was to abandon that important place, and carry

with him all the artillery and stores he could possibly save into the States of the Pope.

IV. The armies of Alvinzi and Provera were stronger than is imagined; their losses amounted to 30,000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners; of these last the number was 19,000 men.

## NOTE VII. (CHAP. XXXVIII.)

### CAMPAIGN OF GERMANY IN 1797.

I. It was necessary to commence this campaign before the melting of the snows, that the Austrian engineers might not have time to cover the entrances to the passes of the Noric Alps with field-works, and to put Palma-Nuova in a state of defence: and it was also important to defeat the Archduke before he should be rejoined by the divisions of the Rhine.

In order to prevent the French army from passing the Tagliamento, the Aulic Council should have united its army in the Tyrol before the 1st of March, leaving only 6000 men, as a corps of observation, on the Tagliamento. If the French general had then persisted in passing the river, the Archduke would have had it in his power to stop his progress, and might have forced him to retrograde, and to

pass the Lavis, directing his march on Trent, and menacing Bassano and Verona. It would have been impossible for the French army to extend itself on its right, whilst the Archduke continued on the upper Brenta; and the French would have been compelled to carry the war into the Tyrol, which would have been advantageous to the Archduke in three ways: 1st, it would have enabled him to unite his army twenty days earlier; for Inspruck is near the Rhine, whilst Conegliano and Sacile are at a great distance from that river; 2dly, it would have afforded him an advantageous field of battle in a country the population of which was devoted to him, and extremely enthusiastic; 3dly, it would have afforded him the means of concentrating his operations, and of receiving new reinforcements from the army of the Rhine. By this one error of assembling the army in Friuli, instead of the Tyrol, the Aulic Council exposed the capital to the enemy, and decided the fate of the war.

II. The position of the Archduke behind the Tagliamento and in front of Codroïbo, was bad: he ought to have posted himself at Saint-Daniel, securing his retreat by the passes; thence he should have prevented Massena from getting to Tarvis before him. His retreat on

the lower Izonzo, and by the passes of Cividal, was a great error, Massena being already at Tarvis.

III. The division of Guieux did not advance upon the Torre, but upon Udina, Cividal, and Caporetto. The head-quarters were moved successively to Palma-Nuova and Gradisca, with the divisions of Bernadotte and Serrurier: the division of Massena was at Tarvis. It has been asked why the divisions of Bernadotte and Serrurier did not march upon Cividal to support the division of Guieux? Because the Archduke had marched two divisions and his parks by the defiles of Cividal, and the division of Guieux was sufficient to harass them. This corps, on arriving at Caporetto, would continue its march upon Tarvis, its first destination; it would then be lost, and compelled to lay down its arms, as in fact it afterwards was; or else it would descend the Izonzo, on learning that Massena was already at Tarvis, and march to Gorizia, to get into Carniola; in this case it would be requisite to be in force to march against it, to drive it upon Caporetto, where Guieux would have arrived, and to compel it to lay down its arms in the passes of Caporetto. All this chapter requires revision; the movements are not correctly de-

scribed. The Archduke was at the battle of Tarvis. Napoleon preferred Gradisca to Gorizia, as a point of support, because the left bank of the Izonzo commands the right bank as far as the road to Montefalcone.

IV. The instructions of General Joubert required him, after forcing General Kerpen beyond the Brenner, to move to the right, to descend the valley of the Drave, and to rejoin the army at Villach. This movement was regular, because Joubert was not introduced into these operations until after the successes of the army on the Tagliamento, and did not march by his right on the Drave until the head-quarters were at Clagenfurth. Napoleon sent his Aide-de-camp Lavalette to Lienz, and afterwards General Zajonzeck to Spital, with some squadrons of dragoons to meet Joubert.

V. Victor's division was never intended to stay in Romania: it had been sent on the expedition to Rome; and time was requisite for its return. It was to take up a position on the Adige, to form the *nucleus* of a corps of observation against the Venetians. It was at Padua during the massacre of Verona, on the 18th of April. It would have been an extraordinary piece of folly indeed to have left troops in lower Italy.

VI. After the passage of the Tagliamento, Napoleon wrote to the Directory, that on the 15th of April, he should be in Germany, in the capital of Carinthia; that it was, therefore, necessary that the armies of the Sambre and Meuse, and of the Rhine and Moselle, consisting of 140,000 men, should march without delay, and take up a position on the Ens; that on their arrival on that river he would direct the combined movement of the three armies upon Vienna. The Directory replied, that it was about to order its armies of the Rhine to commence operations; that when Napoleon should receive its courier, hostilities would already have commenced. But on the 1st of April he received intelligence, at Clagenfurth, that he must not reckon upon the co-operation of the armies of the Rhine; that Hoche's army might possibly take the field, but that Moreau's forces were not in a condition to pass the Rhine. This information awakened many suspicions in his mind. He had concluded a treaty offensive and defensive with the King of Sardinia; had guaranteed to that prince his dominions; and had obtained from him a contingent of 10,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and twenty-four pieces of cannon. This division, which he would have marched into Germany,

would have secured his rear: every Piedmontese soldier would have been a hostage to him. The Directory, without censuring this treaty, deferred its ratification so long, that the campaign opened before the army could be reinforced with this division of valuable troops. This circumstance was the more vexatious, as these 12,000 men, having been rendered serviceable, might become dangerous. Napoleon had also reason to complain of the influence exercised by the minister Quirini, who knew how to open gates with a golden key, and threw impediments in the way of the settlement of the affairs of Venice. He became convinced of the necessity of making peace, and wrote to the Archduke the letter so well known. All the Paris couriers he received up to the 18th of April, confirmed him in the idea that the armies of Germany would not move. He did not learn their passage of the Rhine until after the signature of the preliminaries of Leoben, which he would not have signed except in Vienna, had he known that the two French armies of the Rhine would take the field; even if they had not been to pass the Rhine until the month of May—that would have sufficed for him.

# NOTES

## ON THE FIRST EIGHT VOLUMES

### OF THE WORK, INTITLED

## SUMMARY OF MILITARY OCCURRENCES,

### OR

## HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE CAMPAIGNS

### FROM 1799 TO 1814.*

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THIS work is written with facility. It justifies its title. A great number of observations have been occasioned by its perusal: in the four following Notes we shall however treat only of what relates, 1st, to the policy of Mr. Pitt; 2dly, to General Moreau; 3dly, to the naval armistice; 4thly, to the different assertions respecting the wars in Egypt.

### NOTE I.—PITT'S POLICY.

VOL. III. PAGE 1, 1800.

"This celebrated minister, said he, speaking of Pitt, faithful to the principles of the old insular policy, admitted of no guarantee so long as France should possess Belgium, and the

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* *Précis des Evènemens Militaires; ou Essais Historiques sur les Campagnes, de* 1799 *à* 1814.

disposal of the maritime forces of Holland, and should retain a position hostile to England.—After the cession of the Low Countries to France, consented to by the House of Austria at the treaty of Campo Formio, the object of the war was lost to the English Government, which exerted every effort to regain it. Mr. Pitt was convinced that to wrest this fine conquest from the French, it was necessary to exhaust the resources of France, and to consume her by carrying into her bosom a war which the long-restrained fury of parties, and the indignation of humbled powers, must render for ever fatal to her, if she should become the theatre of its ravages. The conquest of Italy, and all the advantages gained by the Allies during the campaign of 1799, were insufficient to bring the retrocession of Belgium in question, because these successes were counterbalanced, on the Rhine by the victory of Zurich, and in the North by the failure of the expedition to the coast of Holland. The continuation of the war was therefore irrevocably determined on by the English ministry, before the overtures made by Bonaparte. These gave rise to animated debates in Parliament. The leading Opposition speakers traced the war to its original causes. They attributed its existence, its disasters, its intended perpetuation, to those who wished to establish the immutability of governments, and the irrevocable alienation of the sovereignty, as the fundamental basis of a social compact, for the maintenance of which all powers ought to be tributary for ever. Erskine, Fox, and Sheridan, distinguished themselves in this memorable discussion. In opposition to the doctrine of the governments of modern Europe, they adduced the most powerful arguments that could be drawn from the principles of natural and political rights, the spirit and progress of the age, the examples afforded by their own history, and the change of system in France, which they considered favourable to the reestablishment of peace."

I. 1st, Was it possible for the English minister to reject the overtures which were made to him by the First Consul, in 1800, without rendering himself responsible for the disasters of the war? 2dly, Was such rejection politic and conformable to the interest of the English nation? 3dly, Was war at that time desirable for France? 4thly, What was, under these circumstances, the interest of Napoleon?

Pitt refused to enter into a negotiation, in hopes that by continuing the war he should compel the French to recall the princes of the House of Bourbon, and to restore Belgium to the House of Austria. If these were just and legitimate objects, he could equitably refuse to treat for peace; but if they were both illegitimate and unjust, he rendered his country responsible for all the miseries of the war. Now the Republic had been acknowledged by all Europe: England herself had recognised it in 1796 by empowering Lord Malmesbury to treat with the Directory. This plenipotentiary had successively attended at Paris and at Lisle; he had negotiated with Charles Lacroix, Letourneur, and Maret, ministers of the Directory; besides, the object of the war was not the restoration of the Bourbons. Belgium had been ceded by the Emperor of Austria at the treaty

of Campo Formio, in 1797: England had recognised its union with France by the negotiations of Lord Malmesbury at Lisle. It constituted, by the law of nations, a part of the Republic. To separate them could only be to usurp over, to tear to pieces, to dismember an established state. These two objects were therefore unjust and unlawful.

II. Was this policy of the minister, Pitt, truly conformable to the interests of England? Could he reasonably flatter himself with the hopes of obtaining Belgium, by continuing the war? Would it not have been more prudent to have given peace to the world, and at the same time to have secured the real, solid advantages which he might have obtained? The Kings of Sardinia and Naples, the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and the Pope, would have been restored and established on their thrones; the Milanese would have been secured to the House of Austria; the French troops would have evacuated Holland, Switzerland, and Genoa; the influence of England might have been established in those countries; Egypt would have been restored to the Grand Signor; the Isle of Malta to the Grand Master; Ceylon and the Cape of Good Hope would have strengthened the English power in the two Indies. What

splendid results from the campaign of 1799! These advantages were certain; but as to the hopes to which they were sacrificed, was there even a probability of their accomplishment? In 1799, the coalition had been victorious in Italy, but it had been vanquished in Switzerland, in Holland, and in the East. France had just changed her government. Five persons, disunited, and of no great abilities, were succeeded by a man whose military knowledge and talents were unquestionable; he had been elevated by the consent of the nation: at his name alone La Vendée had already submitted: the Russian armies had commenced their march to repass the Vistula. Lord Grenville himself admitted, that even if the First Consul were willing to cede Belgium, the French nation, *en masse*, would oppose the measure. The object of the war was, then, popular in France. The Courts of Berlin, of Vienna, and of London, were deceived in 1792; *the circumstances were so novel!* But could any thing excuse the statesmen of England for falling into the same error in 1800? It was then probable, that the campaign of 1800 would be favourable to France; that she would reconquer Italy; and, in short, even supposing the success of the campaign to be doubtful, contrary

to all probability, it was at least not likely to fulfil the end which the English ministry proposed to themselves. They would, therefore, have to continue to pay immense subsidies for several years; for they could not expect to wrest Belgium from France without the adhesion of Russia and Prussia, or at least of one of these powers, to the coalition. This political result could not, then, be attained by the campaign of 1800. It was therefore impolitic to risk the chances of that campaign.

III. The interest of the Republic was the reverse of that of England; if France had made peace at that time under existing circumstances, she would have made it after a campaign of disasters; she would have retrograded in consequence of a single campaign: this would have been dishonourable, and would only have encouraged princes to form new coalitions against her. All the chances of the campaign of 1800 were in her favour: the Russian armies were leaving the theatre of war; the pacification of La Vendée placed a new army at the disposal of the Republic; in the interior, factions were overruled, and the chief magistrate possessed the entire confidence of the nation. It behoved the Republic not to make peace until after restoring the equilibrium of

Italy; she could not, without deserting her own fortune, consent to a peace less advantageous than the treaty of Campo Formio.

At this period peace would have ruined the Republic; war was necessary to it for the maintenance of energy and union in the state, which was ill-organized; the people would have demanded a great reduction of taxes, and the disbanding of a part of the army; so that, after a peace of two years, France would have taken the field again under great disadvantages.

IV. War was necessary to Napoleon himself. The campaigns of Italy, the peace of Campo Formio, the campaigns of Egypt, the transactions of the 18th of Brumaire, the unanimous voices of the people for promoting him to the supreme magistracy, had, undoubtedly, raised him very high: but a treaty of peace derogatory to that of Campo Formio, annulling all that he had done in Italy, would have destroyed his influence over the imaginations of the people, and deprived him of the means of putting an end to the anarchy of the Revolution, by establishing a definitive and permanent system. He felt this: he awaited with impatience the answer of the Cabinet of London. This answer filled him with secret satis-

## Note II.—Moreau.

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"But the name of Moreau was more popular, and the nation would have preferred him, if he had aspired to the dictatorship; or, if the noble and secret ambition of becoming the Monck of France could have excited him, he might long before this epoch, by exerting his influence with the army, have got the start of his rival: he possessed in a higher degree the affections of the soldiers—he was better known. He had been every where highly successful—in Flanders, Germany, and Italy, where his retreat before Suwarrow added no less lustre to his name than that which he had made before the Archduke. Moreau had not the mental resolution requisite for such enterprises: in contributing to the elevation of the First Consul, he considered that he was securing for himself the situation of Generalissimo, for which he was better adapted; but such a participation would never have been endured by that brilliant and fierce lover of Glory, who always proved himself jealous of her slightest favours, yet never knew their true value."

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"His plan of operations was not at first adopted by the government: he wished to act by his right wing, and merely to observe Saint-Gothard and the principal passes of the upper Valais, as far as the Grisons: he thought that the first movements of the army of reserve would suffice to disengage Massena; that nothing farther ought

to be undertaken, until the offensive operations against General Kray should have fully succeeded, and disabled him to keep the field; that in the mean time it would be necessary to take great care to avoid weakening the right wing of the army of the Rhine; but on the contrary to support it, by advancing to the spring of the higher vallies, to the opening of the Engadine and the Vorarlberg, a part of the army of reserve, which would there be equally well posted for the purposes of closing the entrance of Switzerland on the side of the Tyrol, in case General Kray should attempt to make a diversion there, or of falling back on the new line of operations of General Melas in Lombardy, and thereby the more effectually covering that of the French army of the Rhine, acting in the valley of the Danube. Bonaparte, on the contrary, was intent only on reconquering Italy and his former trophies: he had, indeed, supplied the army of Moreau, in the first instance, with all the disposable resources, and those which were most necessary to place it, as quickly as possible, in an effective state: whilst he was collecting with difficulty, from great distances, the *personnel*, the *matériel*, and a great number of horses necessary for his own expedition; but he regarded this great army of the Rhine as a mass intended only to paralyze the principal forces of Austria, after the first movements should have broken off all concert between the Imperial army of Germany and that of Italy. It was sufficient, therefore, for the First Consul, that Switzerland should be well guarded, and the chain of the Alps rendered impenetrable. Moreau was to remain in observation, and to detach all his right wing to reinforce the army of reserve in the plains of Lombardy; in order that Napoleon alone might strike the grand blows, on the theatre in which it was his object to gain the most brilliant victories."

General Moreau never commanded in Flanders or Holland; he served in the campaigns of 1794 and 1795, under Generals Pichegru and Jourdan, like Souham, Taponier, Michaud, &c.: he acted as a general in chief, fo the first time, in the month of May 1796, when he took the command of the army of the Rhine; in July he passed that river. Napoleon was then master of all Italy.

The campaign in Germany, in 1796, did little honour either to the military talents of those who planned it, or of the general who principally directed it, and who commanded the main army. 1st, He passed to the right bank of the Danube and of the Lech, after the battle of Neresheim on the 11th of August; whereas, by advancing his line upon the Altmuhl by the left bank of the Danube, he might have united his forces in three marches with the army of the Sambre and Meuse, which was upon the Rednitz, and by this movement he would have decided the campaign. 2dly, He remained inactive during six weeks of August and September, in Bavaria, whilst the Archduke defeated the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and drove it beyond the Rhine. 3dly, He suffered Kehl to be besieged for several

months by an inferior army, within sight of his own, and he suffered it to be taken.

In the campaign of 1799, he at at first served in Italy under Scherer, as a general of division: he there shewed equal bravery and talent at the head of one or two divisions; but when raised to the chief command of the same army, at the end of April, by the recall of Scherer, he continually made mistakes, and shewed no more knowledge of the great art of war than he had evinced in the campaign of 1796. 1st, He allowed himself to be defeated at Cassano by Suwarrow; he there lost the greater part of his artillery, and suffered Serrurier's division to be surrounded and taken. 2dly, He made his retreat by the Ticino, whereas he ought to have retreated by the right bank of the Po, by the bridge of Placenza, in order to join the army of Naples, commnaded by Macdonald, which was on its march towards the Po. Had this junction been effected, he would have conquered Italy. 3dly, From the Ticino he retreated upon Turin, leaving Suwarrow at liberty to march upon Genoa, and to cut him off entirely from the army of Naples. This mistake he discovered in time, and returned with all speed by the right bank of the Po to Alessandria; but

some days afterwards he made the same mistake, by marching upon Coni, and wholly abandoning the army of Naples, and the heights of Genoa. 4thly, Whilst he was marching westward, Macdonald with the army of Naples arrived on the Spezzia: instead of effecting his junction with this general, at Genoa, behind the Apennines, and then debouching united, by the Bocchetta, to compel the enemy to raise the siege of Mantua, Moreau ordered Macdonald to pass the Apennines, and to enter the vale of the Po, to effect his junction on Tortona. The result was what might have been expected: the army of Naples had to sustain, unassisted, all the efforts of the enemy, in the fields of Trebbia;—and then Italy was actually lost.

In 1799, Moreau enjoyed no credit whatever, either in the army or with the nation; his conduct in Fructidor 1797 had disgraced him with all parties. He had withheld in his own possession the papers found in the waggon taken from Klinglin, which proved the correspondence of Pichegru with the Duke d'Enghien and the Austrians, as well as the plots of the intestine factions; whilst Pichegru, under cover of the reputation which he had acquired in Holland, was exerting a great influence over the legislature.

Moreau violated his oath, and his duty towards his government, by withholding such important papers, on which the safety of the Republic might have depended. If his friendship for Pichegru led him into this culpable compromise, he ought not to have communicated these papers at a time when a knowledge of their contents could no longer be serviceable to the state; for, after the transactions of the 18th of Fructidor, that party was defeated, and Pichegru was in chains. The proclamation of Moreau to the army, and his letter to Barthelemy, were a mortal blow, which deprived Pichegru and his unfortunate companions of public compassion—the only consolation which remains for the wretched.

Moreau had no system, either in politics or war: he was an excellent soldier, personally brave, and capable of manœuvring a small army on a field of battle effectually; but absolutely ignorant of the higher branches of tactics. Had he engaged in any intrigues to bring about an 18th of Brumaire, he would have miscarried, He would only have effected the ruin of himself and his adherents. When, in the month of September 1799, the Legislative Body gave a dinner to Napoleon, a great number of deputies declined attending, because Moreau was to

occupy a distinguished place, and they were unwilling to shew any respect for the general who had betrayed the Republic in Fructidor. Such were the circumstances under which these two generals first saw each other. A few days before the 18th of Brumaire, Moreau, having a presentiment that some changes were preparing, placed himself absolutely at the disposal of Napoleon, and told him that an hour's notice would be sufficient for him, and that he would meet him, on horseback, with his officers and his pistols, without farther conditions. He was not in the secret of the 18th of Brumaire. He repaired, on the 18th at daybreak, to Napoleon's house, as did a great number of other generals and officers who had been summoned during the night, and on whose attachment Napoleon had reason to rely.

On the 18th of Brumaire, at noon, after Napoleon had taken the command of the 17th military division, and of the troops that were at Paris, he gave the command of the Tuileries to Lannes, that of Saint-Cloud to Murat, that of the road from Paris to Saint-Cloud to Serrurier, that of Versailles to Macdonald, and that of the Luxembourg to Moreau. Four hundred men, of the 96th, were ordered to march under his command to guard this palace: they

refused to obey, declaring that they would not march under the command of a general who was not a Patriot. Napoleon was obliged to go and harangue them himself, in order to remove these difficulties.

After Brumaire the Jacobins continued active, and sought support in the armies of Holland and Helvetia. Massena was more fit than any other person to command on the coast of Genoa, where there was not a path with which he was unacquainted; Brune, who was then commanding in Holland, was sent into La Vendée: thus all the plots which might exist in these armies were at once confounded. The First Consul had thenceforth every reason to be satisfied with Moreau, until the marriage of the latter, which took place during the armistice of Pahrsdorf, in July 1800.

It would evince great ignorance of the state of public feeling at that time, to suppose that there was any division of authority: the Republic was one—Napoleon, the chief magistrate was the man of France; he was every thing: the constituted authorities, the senate, the tribunes, the legislative body, had respectively their influence; every individual who possessed no influence over these bodies was nothing. Moreau commanded none of the

armies—they were all headed by an opposite faction; Massena, who had just saved France at Zurich, Brune, who had just defeated the Duke of York and preserved Holland, then enjoyed the greatest reputation. Moreau, who, besides the disgrace of Fructidor, had incurred the odium of the defeats of Cassano and la Trebbia, to which the loss of Italy was attributed, was not much in favour; but it was precisely because he was then little esteemed, and that the danger, if any were to be apprehended from the army, could only come from the opposite party, that the Consular government reposed a great confidence in this general; and confided an army of 140,000 men to him, with a command extending from Switzerland to the banks of the Maine.

No discussion took place between Moreau and the Minister at war respecting the plan of the campaign of 1800. Napoleon, in considering the position of France, observed, that of the two frontiers on which the war was about to take place, that of Germany and that of Italy, the former was the predominant—that of Italy the secondary frontier. In fact, if the Republican army had been defeated on the Rhine, and victorious in Italy, the Austrian army might have entered into Alsace, into Franche-Comté, or

the Belgic provinces, and pursued its successes; without the possibility of any diversion, adequate to arrest its progress, being effected by the French army, however successful in Italy: since, in order to establish itself in the vale of the Po, it must have taken Alessandria, Tortona, and Mantua, which would have required an entire campaign;—any diversion it might have attempted to operate on Switzerland would have been ineffectual. From the last pass of the Alps, the entrance into Italy is unobstructed; but oppositions would have been found at every step, in attempting to penetrate into Switzerland from the plains of Italy. If the French army should be victorious on the predominant frontier, whilst that on the secondary frontier of Italy should be beaten, all that was to be apprehended was the loss of Genoa, an invasion of Provence, or perhaps that Toulon would be besieged; but a detachment of the army of Germany, descending from Switzerland into the vale of the Po, would have stopped short the victorious army of the enemy in Italy, and Provence. Napoleon hence concluded that it was unnecessary to send more reinforcements to the army of Italy than would increase it to 40,000 men; and that all the forces of the Republic ought to be assembled in the neigh-

bourhood of the predominant frontier; in fact, 140,000 men were assembled between Switzerland and Mayence, and a second army, that of reserve, was united between the Saone and the Jura in a second line. The intention of the First Consul was to enter Germany, in the month of May, with these two armies united, and to carry the war at one push to the Inn; but the events which happened at Genoa, in the beginning of April, determined him to commence hostilities on the Rhine, before the army of reserve was completely assembled. There was no doubt of success on this frontier; all the efforts of Austria had been directed to Italy. Marshal Kray had an army very inferior to the French in number, and more so in quality, since it contained many troops of the Empire.

The plan of the campaign, as dictated by the First Consul to the Minister at war, and by him forwarded to Moreau, was as follows: To unite the four armies by masked movements on the left bank of the Rhine, between Schaffhausen and Stein; to throw four bridges over the Rhine, and to pass all at once on the same day to the right bank, so as to take the field with the left to the Rhine, and the right to the Danube; to drive General Kray into the de-

files of the Black Forest, and the valley of the Rhine; to seize all his magazines; to prevent his divisions from rallying; to arrive before him on the Ulm; to cut off his retreat by the Inn, and to leave the remnant of his forces no refuge but Bohemia. This movement would have decided the campaign in fifteen days: no circumstances could be more favourable for it—for there cannot be a better cartain for masking movements than a large river like the Rhine: success was infallible. Moreau did not comprehend the plan; he insisted that the left should debouch by Mentz, to which the First Consul would not consent; but the situation of the Republic not having permitted the latter to join the army, he said to his minister, that it would be impossible to oblige a general-in-chief to execute a plan which he did not understand; that Moreau must therefore be allowed to direct his columns at his own discretion, provided that he should have only a single line of operations, and should manœuvre only on the right bank of the Danube.

Moreau opened the campaign by the bridge of Kehl, his left being commanded by Sainte-Suzanne; Saint-Cyr passed the bridge of Neu-Brissach; the reserve passed at Bâle; and

Lecourbe, five days afterwards, passed at Stein. Scarcely had Sainte-Suzanne crossed, when Moreau perceiving that this corps was compromised, caused it to repass at Neu-Brissach. This way of opening the campaign is contrary to the first notions of war: Moreau manœuvred his army in the *cul-de-sac* of the Rhine, in the defile of the Black Mountains, before an army which was in position. He manœuvred as if Switzerland had been occupied by the enemy, or neutral: he did not perceive the advantage which might be obtained from this important possession, in debouching by the Lake of Constance. General Kray, thus warned, united his troops at Stockach and at Enghen, before the French army; he met with no disaster; he would infallibly have been ruined, had Moreau been able to comprehend the propriety of making his whole army debouch by the same passage as Lecourbe. The account of these ill-conducted operations often made the First Consul say: "*What would you have? They know not the secrets of the art, or the resources of high tactics.*"

It is unnecessary to notice the assertion that the First Consul wished to debouch from the mountains of Switzerland into Italy, without making offensive movements on the Rhine:

it is too absurd to need refutation. Far from that, he did not think that a diversion could be effected by way of Mount Saint-Gothard, unless the Austrian army should have been previously vanquished and driven beyond the Lech; for the operation of the army of reserve would have been a singular piece of folly indeed, if, at the moment of its arrival on the Po, the Austrian army of Germany had assumed the offensive, and defeated the French army. If, guided by passion, Napoleon had wished at all events to conquer Italy in the first instance, what prevented him from leaving the army of Helvetia in the situation in which it stood in January 1800, and from sending the 40,000 men with which he reinforced it to Genoa; whereby Massena would have been enabled to advance on the Po. Napoleon well knew that Italy was not the consequence of a victory in Germany, but the corollary of successes obtained on the predominant frontier.

Rewbel, having occasion to converse with the First Consul in February 1800, observed, "You are assembling a fine army on the Rhine: you have all the troops of France there; do you apprehend no danger from intrusting so many troops to a single individual? This con-

sideration of policy always induced me to keep up the two armies of the Rhine and Moselle, and the Sambre and Meuse. Perhaps these consequences are less to be apprehended by you, to whom the soldiers look up as the first general: nevertheless, take my advice, go to this army yourself; otherwise you will experience great inconveniences. I know that Moreau is not dangerous; but the factious intriguers of this country, when they fasten upon a man, supply all deficiencies."

Moreau went to Paris during the armistice of Pahrsdorff, and alighted unexpectedly at the Tuileries. Whilst he was engaged with the First Consul, the Minister at War, Carnot, arrived from Versailles with a pair of pistols, enriched with diamonds, of very great value: they were intended for the First Consul, who, taking the pistols, presented them to Moreau, saying, "*They come very opportunely.*" This was not a thing contrived for effect: the minister admired Napoleon's generosity.

The Empress Josephine married Moreau to Mademoiselle Hulot, a creole of the Isle of France. This young lady had an ambitious mother, who governed her, and soon governed her husband also. She changed his character: he was no longer the same man; he began to

intrigue; his house became the rendezvous of all the disaffected; he not only opposed, but conspired against the reestablishment of religious worship, and the Concordat of 1801: he ridiculed the Legion of Honour. For a long time, the First Consul refused to notice this imprudent conduct; but at length he said, "*I wash my hands of him; let him run his head against the pillars of the Tuileries.*" This conduct of Moreau was contrary to his character; he was a Breton: he detested the English, abominated the Chouans, and had a great antipathy to the nobility. He was incapable of any great mental efforts, but was naturally honest, and good-hearted. Nature had not destined him to play a first-rate character: had he formed some other matrimonial connexion, he would have been a marshal, and a duke; he would have made the campaigns of the Grand Army; would have acquired new glory; and, if destined to fall on the field of battle, he would have been killed by a Russian, Prussian, or Austrian ball: he ought not to have fallen by a French shot.

In the month of October 1813, when several corps of the French army went down from Dresden to Wittenburg, and passed the Elbe, a courier from the head-quarters of the army

of Bohemia was intercepted on his way to England, and all Moreau's papers were taken. General Rapatel, his aide-de-camp and countryman, sent back to Madame Moreau her papers: she was a great *Bourbonist*. She reproached him, in all her letters, with his dislike of the Bourbons, his apathy, his revolutionary prejudices, and his want of taste or talents for intrigue; and she advised him how to conduct himself, to acquire esteem at the Courts of Russia and Austria. To all this Moreau answered, "You are mad, with your Bourbons. We now know them in France only by the harm they have done us. Besides, you know my sentiments; for my part I desire no better than to assist them; but from the bottom of my heart I assure you, I think that order of things is for ever abolished." The Emperor's first inclination was to print this correspondence; but he was dissatisfied with himself for having permitted the insertion of certain phrases, in a bulletin relating to the death of this general. It appeared to him that some expressions of regret which had escaped his lips on receiving the intelligence, ought to have been retained in preference. He thought it unbecoming to disturb his ashes by unveiling his secret sentiments, carelessly written

to his own wife, and in a confidential correspondence.

Moreau had served his country; and his name will figure gloriously in many a page of the history of the Revolutionary Wars. His political opinions always shewed great sagacity; and sometimes Napoleon has been heard to pity his deplorable end. . . . . "*Those women destroyed him!*" Such are the fatal consequences of a weak, irresolute character.

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*Note extracted from inedited Memoirs.*

The First Consul had been holding a Council of Ministers, in the cabinet of the grand apartments of the Tuileries; it was now over. The attendant announced General Moreau, who appeared with a round hat, a blue great-coat, and a cane in his hand. The First Consul advanced to meet him, embraced him, congratulated him briefly, and availing himself very gracefully of the favourable occasion, presented him a very splendid and valuable pair of pistols. Moreau stood a few moments in suspense; then accepted the pistols with marked indifference, and without saying a word. His countenance expressed hesitation, embarrassment, and a kind of disdain, which did not escape the notice of some of the persons present.

## LETTER FROM MOREAU TO BARTHELEMI.

*The General-in-chief of the Army of the Rhine and Moselle, to Citizen Barthelemi, Member of the Executive Directory of the French Republic.*

Head Quarters, Strasburg, 19th Fructidor, Year V. (5th Sept. 1797.)

CITIZEN DIRECTOR,

You will recollect, no doubt, that, on my last visit to Bâle, I informed you that at the passage of the Rhine we took a waggon from General Klinglin, containing two or three hundred letters of his correspondence: those of Wittersbach formed part of them, but were the least important. Many letters are in cipher, but we have found the key to them: the whole are now deciphering, which occupies much time. No person is called by his real name, so that many Frenchmen who correspond with Klinglin, Condé, Wickham, d'Enghien, and others, are not easily discovered. We have, nevertheless, such indications, that several are already known. I had determined not to give publicity to this correspondence; since, as peace might be presumed to be approaching, there

was no danger to the Republic; besides, these papers would afford proofs against but few persons, as no one is named in them. But, seeing, at the head of the parties which are now doing so much mischief to our country, and in possession of an eminent situation of the highest confidence, a man deeply involved in this correspondence, and destined to act an important part in the recall of the Pretender (the object to which it relates), I have thought it my duty to apprise you of the circumstance, that you may not be the dupe of his pretended republicanism; that you may watch over his proceedings, and oppose his fatal projects against our country; since nothing but a civil war can be the object of his schemes. I confess, Citizen Director, that it is with deep regret that I inform you of this treachery; and the more so because the man I denounce to you was once my friend, and would certainly have remained so still, had I not detected him. I speak of the representative of the people, Pichegru: he has been prudent enough to commit nothing to writing; he only communicated verbally with those who were intrusted with this correspondence, who carried his proposals, and received his answers. He is designated under several names, that of *Baptiste* amongst others. A brigadier-

general, named Badouville, was attached to him, and designated by the name of *Coco.* He was one of the couriers whom he and the other correspondents employed: you must have often seen him at Bâle. Their grand movement was to have been effected at the beginning of the campaign of the year IV: they reckoned on the probable occurrence of some disasters on my arrival at the army, which, as they expected, would be discontented at its defeat, and call for its old commander; who in that case would have acted according to circumstances, and to the instructions which he should have received. He was to have nine hundred louis for the journey which he took to Paris at the time of his dismission; which circumstance accounts naturally for his refusal of the Swedish embassy.

I suspect the ***** family of being concerned in this intrigue. The confidence which I have in your patriotism and prudence alone have determined me to give you this intelligence. The proofs are as clear as day, but I doubt whether they are judicial. I intreat you, Citizen Director, to have the goodness to assist me with your advice on this perplexing occasion; you know me well enough to conceive how dear this disclosure costs me:—nothing less than the dangers which threaten my country

could have induced me to make it. The secret is confined to five persons: Generals Desaix, Reynier, one of my aides-de-camp, and an officer intrusted with the secret service of the army, who is constantly employed in pursuing the clue of information afforded by the deciphered letters.

Accept the assurances of my particular esteem and inviolable attachment.

(Signed,) MOREAU.

## NOTE III.—NAVAL ARMISTICE.

VOL. V. PAGE 8.

"As long as there was room for Bonaparte to flatter himself with the hope of dictating a Continental peace without the accession of England, he avoided making overtures which would have flattered the pride of the Court of London; but as soon as the note of Lord Minto, who had insisted on the refusal to ratify the preliminaries of M. de Saint-Julien, was transmitted by Baron Thugut to the French government, the First Consul despatched full powers to negotiate a naval armistice to M. Otto, who was employed at London as commissioner for the exchange of prisoners. This delicate mission could not have been confided to a more intelligent agent, or to one more capable of effecting its objects. It was a new idea, an entirely unusual form of proceeding, which the English ministry had not foreseen, and which embarrassed them greatly: Lord Grenville at first declined treating with M. Otto, unless through the intermediation of secret agents, and seemed to be fearful of the sudden sensation which the overtures would produce, and its effect on public opinion and the funds. The demand of a naval armistice, supported by the specious pretext of a desire to treat with the two Allied Courts on terms precisely similar, concealed the secret intentions of Bonaparte. As his object was to relieve and to preserve the fortified positions of Malta and Alexandria, he wished to assimilate them to those of Ulm and Ingolstadt. Bonaparte persisted in making the naval armistice the condition, *sine quâ non*, of the admission of the English plenipotentiary; and fixed the 11th of September, the day of resuming hostilities in Ger-

many and Italy, as the final term, after which he would himself refuse to consent to it. M. Otto presented, on the 5th of September, proposals, of which the 2nd and 4th articles stipulated for the free navigation of ships of war and merchant-vessels, without being subject to visitation, and for the admission of neutral ships into the ports of Malta, Alexandria, and Belle-Isle."

PAGE 12.

"We considered it expedient to enter somewhat minutely into the details of this first negotiation for a general peace between the Cabinet of London and the First Consul: it was conducted by Lord Grenville with great circumspection, but with a wish for its failure. M. de Talleyrand, who had better hopes of it, acted with extraordinary address. The imperious and dashing policy of Bonaparte, which so long answered his purposes, but at length ruined him, was discovered on this occasion. There was, then, a sufficient difference between the two projects of a naval armistice to rekindle the war. Ought the vain hope of preserving the precarious results of an unsuccessful expedition, and that Egyptian colony, which Napoleon regarded as his noblest trophy, to have outweighed the interests of France, the enfranchisement of commerce, and the repose of Europe?"

France had made pacific proposals in the month of January 1800; her frank and conciliatory advances had been repelled; but scarcely had six months elapsed when Lord Grenville was compelled to recant. Lord Minto, the ambassador at Vienna, handed in a note, in which he declared the wishes of the

Court of St. James's to enter into a negotiation for peace with France, conjointly with Austria. These overtures were not sincere; England only desired to interfere in these negotiations for the purpose of protracting them, and of finding pretexts for bringing back Russia to the coalition. In fact, if England was really desirous of peace, what prevented her from concluding it directly; authorizing Austria, at the same time, to make peace directly on her side?

Did the English present themselves at Luneville, and make common cause with the Emperor, with an intention of sacrificing a part of their maritime conquests to redeem the countries conquered by France in Germany and Italy? The egotism of the Insular policy was too well known for any one to deceive himself with such illusions. It was easy to conclude a peace with Austria; there was a precedent to refer to—the treaty of Campo Formio. A peace with England, on the contrary, was involved in difficulties: the last preceding state of things was that of 1783, and since that time the whole face of the world had been changed. To admit an English negotiator at Luneville was just to put into his hands the materials for weaving a new coalition.

Nevertheless, the Cabinet of the Tuileries, to ascertain the truth of its conjectures beyond the possibility of doubt, proposed to open the negotiations of Luneville with the ministers of Austria and England; on condition, however, that in the mean time hostilities should continue by land and sea, which was conformable to the usage of all ages. The treaties of Westphalia, Utrecht, Aix-la-Chapelle, &c. had been concluded in this manner: the superiority of the French armies was too well established for the intrigues of England to have retarded the progress of the negotiations: every victory would have been a powerful stimulus to force the allied powers to come to a conclusion: accordingly, this proposal was rejected. It was then proposed to admit the plenipotentiaries at Luneville, and to continue the existing armistice, on condition that it should be extended to the sea, in order to place both the allied powers on the same footing with respect to the armistice. Was it, in fact, consistent that, in order to continue negotiations, Austria should require a prolongation of the suspension of hostilities, and that England should insist on being admitted to this Congress, without ceasing to carry on war? If the English ministry were sincere in their protestations,

why was not England to make some slight sacrifices to indemnify France for the loss she suffered by the prolongation of the armistice by land? And finally, if this second proposal was to be rejected, a proposition ought to have been brought forward for treating separately, and at the same time, with Austria and England: with Austria, in prolonging the armistice; with England, in continuing hostilities.

The English minister evinced much surprise, and called the proposal of a naval armistice a strange idea: it was entirely new in the history of the two nations; but at length he admitted the principle. Count Otto, who was in London, carried on the negotiations with Lord Grenville: he soon perceived that, in adopting the principle, England was desirous of evading the consequences, and of drawing up the conditions of this armistice in such a manner as to afford no advantage to France. The three German fortresses which were blockaded were to receive provisions: England consented that provisions should be carried into the three blockaded fortresses of Belle-Isle, Malta, and Alexandria; but Belle-Isle and Alexandria were not in want of provisions: on the contrary, they could have supplied England. The only advantage which France could

have derived from a naval armistice, would have been the reestablishment of commercial relations between all her ports and all her colonies; England refused this, with respect to Malta and Egypt. At last France proposed, as an ultimatum, that in lieu of the raising of the blockade of Alexandria, six frigates, fitted up as store-ships, should be allowed to enter it under a flag of truce; thus a reinforcement of 4000 men might be sent to the army of Egypt. This was a very trifling advantage to compensate that which Austria obtained by the prolongation of the armistice, which allowed her to make use of the numerous subsidies paid to her by England, in levying troops and increasing her means of resistance.

The change which had thus taken place in a few months was nevertheless a matter of satisfaction to every true Frenchman. In January and February 1800, France solicited peace; Lord Grenville replied only by a torrent of invective, indulging in the strangest insinuations; he desired that the princes of that race of Kings.... should reascend the throne of France. He then exhorted the First Consul to establish by proof the legitimacy of his government; and now this same Lord Grenville was soliciting, as a favour, to be admitted to treat

with the Republic; he even proposed to purchase this favour by naval concessions.

The negotiations for a naval armistice were broken off; the fortresses of Ulm, Philipsbourg, and Ingolstadt, were surrendered by the Emperor to France, as the price of a six weeks' prolongation of the truce. In the course of a few months the peace of Luneville saved the House of Austria, and reestablished tranquillity on the Continent; and, at length, a short time afterwards, the ministry signed the preliminaries of London, by which the defeated English oligarchy recognised the democratic French Republic, increased, not only by the addition of Belgium, but by that of Piedmont, Genoa, and all Italy. Yet how many millions had been added to the English debt! Such was the result of the impassioned politics of Pitt.

## NOTE IV.—EGYPT.

VOL. IV. PAGE 106.

"Kleber's talents, which were equal to any elevation, had excited the jealousy of Bonaparte. The firmness and independence of his opinions had cooled their intimacy, and soon extinguished all confidence between them: accordingly no trace of it can be found, either in Bonaparte's instructions to Kleber, or in the letter written by Kleber to the Republican Directory, whose fall he did not suspect to be so near."

PAGE 128.

"Do we not see in the military and political testament of the conqueror of Egypt, the secret conviction and even the confession of a truth which, no doubt, he had never dissembled to himself, and which General Kleber was anxious to divulge for the sake of his own reputation? That is to say, that without the mutual support of sea and land forces, no distant expedition can have any permanent success, or effectual result; no colonial establishment can be supported; and still less in the midst of an innumerable armed population, and of a nation whose eternal enmity is a sentiment inseparable from its religious faith; and with whom, even during the most profound peace and under the most undisputed dominion, as their religion could not be changed, and as they could not be made to comprehend any laws but those consecrated by that religion, and as their manners and customs could not be adopted by their conquerors, it would be impossible ever to amalgamate the victors and the vanquished. The irreparable loss of the French fleet had decided the fate of an army which could no longer be recruited or succoured by the mother country; it was doomed to be destroyed by its own successes. Thus, therefore, Bonaparte,

from the moment of his entrance into the Delta, ought to have abandoned all hope, as at the mouth of Dante's hell. After that disaster, which rallied all the Musulmans, revived their courage, and doubled every difficulty, he could not entertain a momentary doubt of the fatal catastrophe which awaited him; the inevitable wreck of his fortune, and of his glory. But what energy and talent he exerted to sustain the devotion of his soldiers! What activity in his operations! And can we wonder, unable as he was to participate in the hopes and illusions which he diffused around him, that after consuming half his means, he seized the first propitious instant, after his reverses in Syria, and his victory of Aboukir, to fly from inevitable ruin, to dare other dangers, and try higher destinies? The departure of Bonaparte was a clap of thunder, and spread anxiety through every mind: he was at first deeply regretted; but the reputation of Kleber, an officer worthy in every respect of general confidence, and his known solicitude for sparing the lives of the soldiers, dissipated this species of terror, and quickly calmed the agitation and rallied the spirits of the army. The Egyptians, struck with amazement at the results of the battle of Aboukir, regarded themselves as destined to live, in future, under the dominion of the French; they no longer ventured to consider it possible to drive them beyond the Nile. The Mamelukes, still wandering in upper Egypt, were not destroyed. Murad Bey, who had just seen all the hopes which he had long cherished annihilated in a single day, had departed, in dejection, on his return to Girgé. Ibrahim Bey was at Gaza with about 2000 of his men; he impatiently awaited the arrival of the Grand Vizier, of whose grand army 30,000 had already arrived before Saint-Jean-d'Acre. But these numerous masses, impeded by an immense quantity of baggage, advanced slowly."

PAGE 152.

"He had to choose between General Menou, an old and brave officer, but entirely new in command, and General Reynier, whose talents, sufficiently proved in the army of the Rhine, where he had been chief of the staff of the army, inspired more confidence. This choice of Bonaparte's was dictated by passion; he preferred the secret pride, the vain satisfaction of seeing what he called his party, predominant, to the safety of the army, and even to the consideration of his own glory."

PAGE 171.

"Whatever were the motives which induced Bonaparte to undertake this expedition, grand views were mingled with that adventurous spirit which always seduced him from ordinary paths, and beyond the limits of reason. Neither the situation in which he left the interior of France, nor the state of the marine, allowed him to hope for those succours without which the colony and its founder must necessarily perish; as in the times of the Crusades, they must sooner or later have been destroyed by the climate, or by the semi-barbarous people, whom force could not subdue, and whom no tie, religious or political, could attach to the victor. But to strike a fatal blow at the commerce of England, by attracting that of the East into Egypt; to open once more the route of the treasures of the ancient world; to indemnify France for the loss of her western colonies by new and numerous establishments on the coasts of Africa; to restore to the cradle of science and the arts its ancient splendour; to explore a country so rich in grand reminiscences; to secure a place amongst the most illustrious conquerors—what brighter views than these ever seduced the favourites of fortune?"

Vol. VII. Page 197.

"The *sortie* of Admiral Gantheaume's squadron was a project as daring, as the enterprise of conducting it to Alexandria was rash. It was incurring the hazard of surrendering the better part of what was left of the French navy to the English; but this relief might save the colony of Egypt, and hasten the conclusion of a maritime peace. If the squadron should escape the English Channel fleet, it was likely, on entering the Mediterranean, to meet that of Keith; and if it should avoid Keith's, it was not probable that the squadrons of Warren and Bickerton, which were cruising either at the mouth of the straits, or in the canal of Malta and the Libyan sea, would fail to cut off its route, before it could land on the coast of Egypt. It required, then, as much good fortune as talent to accomplish this glorious mission; the French admiral was deficient in neither; the whole of his dispersed squadron met, completely reunited, at Cape Gata on the 10th of February, eighteen days after their coming out from Brest, the English remaining perfectly ignorant of the transaction. Admiral Harvey, who commanded the Channel fleet, was informed of the sortie of the Brest squadron by the frigate which had engaged La Bravoure; but unable to believe that Gantheaume had ventured to hazard entering the Mediterranean to steer among three hostile fleets (nearly thirty ships of the line, and fifty frigates and smaller vessels) he had no doubt that the squadron which had thus escaped his vigilance, during the late gales, had sailed for the West Indies. He imagined that it was intended either to regain Saint-Domingo, or to attack Jamaica: and as this expedition, which had sailed from Brest, might combine with the movements and attempts which had been remarked in other French ports of the Ocean, and a complete security had caused the English to neglect to reinforce their garrisons in the

Leeward Islands, Admiral Harvey immediately detached Sir Robert Calder in that direction, in pursuit of the French fleet, with seven sail of the line and two frigates, victualled for four months, ordering him to crowd all sail to come up with the enemy."

PAGE 101.

" Certain of being preceded by three times his own force, and pursued by Warren's squadron, it became Admiral Gantheaume's duty to relinquish his enterprise; for, had he persisted in following his first instructions, he must inevitably have fallen in with the united fleets of Keith and Bickerton on the coast of Egypt; and he could neither hope to effect a landing in their presence, nor to retreat after disastrous engagement, and to escape Admiral Warren. He therefore considered only how to disengage his squadron from such imminent danger; and changing his route, he made for the coasts of Provence, and succeeded in entering Toulon with the different prizes which he had taken."

PAGE 107.

" Admiral Gantheaume soon received orders to sail again from Toulon: if he should find the port of Alexandria blockaded by the superior forces of Keith and Bickerton, as there was no room to doubt, he was to land the troops to the west of that city, between Tripoli and Cape Ruzai, with the stores of water and biscuit, and to despatch them towards Egypt across the Desert of Barca. This desperate attempt exposed 5000 Frenchmen to perish by famine: for if the English army had effected its landing and united with that of the Grand Vizier, this isolated body, wandering in the desert, would have been cut off from Cairo and Alexandria, and could neither have joined the army of the East, nor re-embarked to return to Europe."

General Kleber had never commanded in chief; he had served in the army of the Sambre and Meuse as a general of division, under the orders of Jourdan. Having fallen into disgrace with the Directory, he was living in obscurity at Chaillot, when Napoleon arrived from Radstadt in November 1797, after having conquered Italy, dictated peace at Vienna, and taken possession of the fortress of Mentz. Kleber followed the fortunes of Napoleon, and went to Egypt with him. He there behaved with equal talent and bravery; he gained the esteem of the Commander-in-chief, who regarded him, next to Desaix, as the best officer in his army: he was also one of the most distinguished for subordination, which surprised the officers of his staff, who were accustomed to hear him censure and criticise the operations of the army of the Sambre and Meuse. He expressed the highest admiration of the fine manœuvre of the battle of Mount Tabor, in which the Commander-in-chief saved Kleber's honour and his life. Some weeks afterwards he was marching at the head of his division to storm Acre; Napoleon sent him orders to join him, not choosing to risk so valuable a life on an occasion in which his brigadier-general could supply his place. When the Comman-

der-in-chief determined to hasten back to Europe, to the aid of the Republic, he at first thought of leaving the command to Desaix; he afterwards intended to take Desaix and Kleber with him to France; but at length he resolved to take the former with him, and to invest the latter with the command. To raise a general of division to the rank of a general-in-chief, would be a singular way of shewing a jealousy of him. It is vexatious to read such an assertion in a valuable work; for, after all, what should engender jealousy in a man who had been victorious in so many battles? and in what respect did he ever evince such a feeling?

The army of Egypt might have maintained, nay, might have perpetuated itself in that country, without receiving any assistance from France; provisions, clothing, all that is necessary for an army, abounded in Egypt. There were military stores and ammunition enough for several campaigns; besides, Champy and Conté had established powder-mills; the army had sufficient establishments to organize a force of 80,000 men; it could obtain as many recruits as might be wanted, especially amongst the young Copts, the Greeks, Syrians, and negroes of Darfur and Sennaar.

The 21st demi-brigade recruited 500 Copts, many of whom were made sub-officers, and received the decoration of the Legion of Honour; there are, no doubt, some of them now in France. But what power was there that could possibly attack Egypt?—The Ottoman Porte? It had lost its two armies of Syria and Rhodes; the battles of the Pyramids, of Mount Tabor, and of Aboukir, had completely exposed the weakness of the Ottoman armies. The Grand Vizier, with his mob of Asiatic rabble, was not even formidable to the inhabitants.—Russia? a mere phantom. The Czar wished the French army to be established in Egypt; it was playing his game, and opening the gates of Constantinople to him. —What remained? England. But it required an army of at least 36,000 men to succeed in such an operation, and England had no such force disposable; and it was evident, since she had succeeded in forming a new coalition, that she would attempt the conquest of Egypt in Italy, Switzerland, or France.

Besides this, the army of Egypt might have received succours from France during the winter; nothing could have prevented it.

The destruction of the Aboukir squadron was a great misfortune; but the loss of eleven

vessels, three of which were very old, was not irreparable. From the month of August 1797, Admiral Brueys commanded the Mediterranean, with forty ships of war; had he thought proper to land 15,000 men in Egypt, he could have done so; he did not, because the war which broke out on the Continent, required all the French troops in Italy, Switzerland, or on the Rhine. In the month of January 1800, immediately after the 18th of Brumaire, any number of men might have been sent to Egypt by embarking them in the Brest squadron, or that of Rochefort; but men were wanted in France to dissolve the second coalition. It was not until after the battle of Marengo, when the state of the Republic was considerably altered, that it began to be thought expedient to send reinforcements to the army of Egypt.

Gantheaume sailed from Brest with seven ships of war, carrying 5000 men. Forty ships were ready to put to sea, the moment a gun should be fired in the Baltic; which would have obliged England to send thither a reinforcement of thirty ships. These forty ships from Brest would have commanded the Mediterranean, during a part of the summer; they would have taken on board the troops necessary for Egypt at Tarentum.

In the month of October 1800, advice-boats, frigates, merchant-ships, frequently arrived in Egypt; European wines and merchandize were very plentiful there, and the army received news from Europe every month. It was impossible to prevent frigates and corvettes from Toulon, Ancona, Tarentum, and Brindisi, from arriving at Damietta or Alexandria, in the months of November, December, January, February, and March. L'Egyptienne and La Justice sailed from Toulon, and arrived in January, after a voyage of ten days: La Régénérée arrived in seventeen days from Rochefort. We must therefore conclude: 1st, That the army of the East needed no succours; 2dly, That it might have remained several years without making new recruits; 3dly, That it might have made as many recruits as it pleased, by selecting Christians, and even Musulmans; and finally, by purchasing negroes from Darfur and Sennaar. Egypt is not a fortress, it is not a barren island, but an immense kingdom with a coast of 120 leagues. To apply the principles which relate to a citadel to so rich and extensive a country, is to mislead one's self and others in the most absurd manner. The crusaders were masters of Syria, for more than

a hundred years; but theirs was a religious war.

The particular instructions which the Commander-in-chief transmitted to General Kleber, and his letter dated from Aboukir, the 5th of Fructidor, which was written just as he was about to embark, and has been printed, are sufficient to explain his projects with respect to Egypt, and to prove his expectations of returning thither to complete the objects of the expedition, and the perfect confidence which he felt that Kleber would establish the colony. Whilst France should be at war, and the second coalition remain undissolved, to remain stationary in Egypt, and merely preserve the country, were all that could be done, and for these purposes either Kleber, or Desaix, was more than sufficient. Napoleon obeyed the voice of France, which recalled him to Europe. On commencing this expedition, he had received a *carte blanche* from the Directory, for all his operations, whether for the affairs of Malta, or for those of Sicily, Egypt, or Candia. He had regular powers to make treaties with Russia, the Porte, the Indian governments and princes; he was at liberty to retreat with his army, name his successor, or return himself, whenever he thought proper.

When he received the intelligence of the murder of Kleber, and found that General Menou, as the eldest officer, had assumed the command, he thought of recalling Menou and Reynier, and of giving the command to General Lanusse. General Menou had every qualification necessary for the command; he was very well informed, skilful in business, and a man of integrity. He had become a Mahometan, a circumstance certainly very ridiculous, but extremely agreeable to the prejudices of the country: some doubts were entertained respecting his military talents; it was, however, well known that he was extremely brave; he had behaved well in La Vendée, and at the storming of Alexandria. General Reynier was more habituated to war; but he was deficient in the most important quality of a chief: excellent as he was in the second rank, he seemed ill adapted for the first. He was taciturn, and partial to silence and solitude: he could not electrify, influence, or lead men at his will. General Lanusse possessed the sacred fire; he had distinguished himself by brilliant actions in the Pyrenees, and in Italy; he had the talent of communicating his sentiments to the two former; but what determined the First Consul to leave matters as they stood, was the

apprehension that the decree of nomination might be intercepted by the enemy's cruisers, and that they might use it for the purpose of sowing division and discord in the army, which had already evinced a tendency to disunion. It was impossible to foresee, at that time, the extent of Menou's incapacity for the direction of military affairs, as he had been a soldier all his life, had read much, had served in several campaigns, and was perfectly acquainted with the scene of action in which he was now placed.

Napoleon had no party in Egypt; he was the head of the army. Berthier, Desaix, Kleber, Menou, and Reynier, were all equally subordinate to him; and even supposing there had been parties, is it likely that petty narrow party views should influence a man who, throughout his administration, always silenced the spirit of party,—whose very first act of authority was to carry the law of the 19th of Fructidor, to fill the ministry, the council of state, and all the great officers of administration with *Fructidorisés*, such as Portalis, Benezech, Carnot, in the ministry; Dumas, Laumond, Fievé, in the council of state; Barthelemy, Fontanes, Pastoret, &c. in the senate? And if the idea is absurd, why is it suffered to disgrace an estimable publication?

Gantheaume sailed from Brest the 25th of January; he passed the Straits the 6th of February: had he continued his route, he would have been at Alexandria on the 20th of February, where he would have found only the two ordinary cruisers; he might have landed 5000 men whom he carried with him, and 1000 men forming the crews of three frigates or corvettes which he would have left at Alexandria; in seventy-two hours he might have landed all his charge, and then returned to Toulon: there was no squadron in the Mediterranean but that of Admiral Keith, of nine ships of war, which was in the bay of Maire, incumbered with the charge of a convoy of 180 sail. Rear-admiral Warren was at Gibraltar, with some dismantled ships; he was not able to put to sea till a long time afterwards. Admiral Calder, with seven sail, had gone in pursuit of Gantheaume to America; so ably had the English spies been imposed upon. In fact the agents of administration for Guadaloupe and Saint-Domingo, with a great number of inhabitants, both men and women, embarked at Brest, intending to go to America. The frigate La Régénérée sailed from Rochefort, passed the Straits the 19th of February, and arrived at Alexandria the 1st of March; which is a

sufficient proof that Admiral Gantheaume, who had passed the Straits on the 6th of February, would have arrived before that time: and it was not till the 1st of March that Admiral Keith anchored at Alexandria and landed Abercrombie's army. General Friant, who commanded at Alexandria, would therefore have had 8000 men to oppose the landing of the English, who must have failed, and thus Egypt would have been saved. The English army and fleets were divided by the war which France and Spain were carrying on against Portugal, and by the quadruple alliance, which required a fleet in the Baltic. After having succeeded in deceiving Admiral Calder, there was nothing more to fear in the Mediterranean.

The French admiral's resolution having thus failed him, he anchored, about the middle of February, in the port of Toulon; after having taken an English frigate and sloop of war: the First Consul was extremely dissatisfied; he ordered him to sail again, but he could not put to sea until the 19th of March. On the coast of Sardinia he fell in with Admiral Warren's squadron, which had been equipped at Gibraltar: it was inferior to his own; but, as it was not his object to fight, he manœuvred with great skill, and during the night altered

his course, and escaped. Warren, finding at daybreak that the French admiral had disappeared, steered for Alexandria, to join Admiral Keith. Gantheaume ought to have made for Alexandria likewise, reconnoitring Mount Carmel or Mount Cassins, and landed his little army at Damietta: instead of which he returned once more to Toulon. The First Consul was still dissatisfied: he made him sail again, with orders to land his troops at Damietta, if he should keep the Syrian coast, or at El Baratoun, in case he should coast the African shore. El Baratoun is a good port, with plenty of water. From thence to Alexandria water and pastures are every day met with; and the admiral would have landed with the 5000 men, two months provisions, clothes, and money. In five or six days march these 5000 men would have arrived at Alexandria. This third time, Gantheaume reached the Egyptian shore on the 8th of June: these 5000 men would therefore have arrived towards the 15th or 20th of June, at the most propitious moment; the reinforcements from England not having reached the English army. In June, General Coote had but 4000 men at the Roman camp opposite Alexandria: Hutchinson, with 5000 men, was

near Gesch. General Menou, strengthened by this reinforcement, could have attacked General Coote with 10,000 men, would have defeated him, and disengaged Belliard from Cairo; the victory was certain. Thus the French admiral had three opportunities of saving Egypt; but he suffered himself to be imposed on by false reports: had he possessed the decision of Nelson, his squadron being light, very fast sailers, and well manned, he might have despised Keith's squadron; he could not have defeated, but he might have escaped it. Gantheaume was perfectly acquainted with the coasts of Syria and Egypt; and the circumstances were unprecedented. All the English fleets were required in the Baltic. A little squadron of light, fast-sailing, well-manned vessels might have undertaken any thing. Three frigates, commanded by Rear-admiral Perée, traversed all the seas between Rhodes and Acre, during the siege of Saint-Jean-d'Acre, frequently communicated within two leagues of Sir Sidney Smith, behind Mount Carmel, and intercepted several ships of the army of Rhodes, on their way to Acre, laden with provisions, guns, and ammunition for the besieged army; nevertheless L'Alceste, La Courageuse, and La Junon, were very ordinary

sailers: if the rear-admiral had had three such frigates as La Justice and La Diane, he would have manœuvred much more boldly; he would have run races with the Tiger and the Theseus, Sir Sidney Smith's two eighty-gun ships.

To resume: the expedition to Egypt was completely successful. Napoleon landed at Alexandria on the 1st of July 1798; on the 1st of August he was master of Cairo, and of all lower Egypt; on the 1st of January 1799, he had conquered the whole of Egypt; on the 1st of July 1799, he had destroyed the Turkish army of Syria, and taken its train of 42 field-pieces and 150 ammunition waggons. At length, in the month of August, he destroyed the select troops of the army of the Porte, and at Aboukir took its train of 32 field-pieces. Kleber allowed himself to be intimidated by the Grand Vizier; he surrendered all the fortresses to him, and consented to a most extraordinary convention, that of El-Arisch. But Colonel Latour Maubourg, arriving on the 1st of March 1800, before Cairo had been surrendered, defeated the Grand Vizier, drove him into the Desert, and reconquered Egypt. In March 1801, the English landed an army of 18,000 men, without horses for the artillery, or cavalry: this army

must have been destroyed; but Kleber had been assassinated, and by an overwhelming fatality this brave army was consigned to the command of a man, who, although competent enough for many other purposes, was detestable as a military commander. The vanquished army, after six months feigned manœuvres, landed on the coast of Provence, to the number of 24,000 men. The army of Egypt, on its arrival at Malta, in 1798, was 32,000 strong: it received a reinforcement of 2000 men there, but left a garrison of 4000; and arrived at Alexandria 30,000 strong. It received 3000 men from the wreck of the squadron of Aboukir, which increased it to 33,000 men. 24,000 returned to France: 1000 had previously gone home as wounded, or blind, in the frigates La Meuron, and La Carrere, in which Napoleon sailed; but a like number of troops had arrived in La Justice, L'Egyptienne, and La Régénérée. The loss, therefore, was 9000 men; of whom 4000 died in 1798 and 1799, and 5000 in 1800 and 1801, in the hospitals and in the field of battle. When Napoleon left the army at the end of August 1799, the amount of its force was 28,500 Frenchmen, including sick, veterans, persons belonging to the depôts, and other non-combatants following the army.

The English army, in 1801, consisted, at first, of only 18,000 men: but it received, in the months of July and August, 7000 men from London, Malta, and Port Mahon, and 8000 from the Indies, who landed at Cosseir, which increased the English force to 32,000, or 34,000. By adding 25,000 Turks to these, it will appear that the allied forces employed against Egypt amounted to nearly 60,000 men. If these had all attacked together, it would, undoubtedly, have been impossible to resist them; but as they came into action only at intervals of several months, victory must infallibly have declared for the French, if Desaix or Kleber had been at the head of the army; or indeed any general but Menou, who, nevertheless, had only to imitate the manœuvre which Napoleon had executed in 1799, when Mustapha Pacha landed at Aboukir. The religious fanaticism, which had been looked upon as the greatest obstacle to the establishment of the French in Egypt, had been tranquillized; all the ulemas and the great sheiks were now friendly to the French army.

Saint-Louis, in 1250, landed at Damietta with 6000 men: had he acted as the French did in 1798, he would have triumphed like them, and would have conquered all Egypt;

and had Napoleon in 1798 conducted himself like the Crusaders of 1250, he would have been defeated. In fact, Saint-Louis appeared before Damietta on the 5th of June; he landed the following day, the Musulmans evacuated the town, which he entered on the 6th; but from the 6th of June to the 6th of December he never stirred. On the 6th of December he began his march, passing up the right bank of the Nile; he arrived on the 17th of December on the left bank of the Canal of Achmoun, opposite Mausourah, and encamped there two months: this canal was then full of water. On the 12th of February 1251, the waters having subsided, he passed this arm of the Nile, and fought a battle, eight months after his debarkation in Egypt. If Saint-Louis, on the 8th of June 1250, had manœuvred as the French manœuvred in 1798, he would have arrived at Mausourah on the 12th of June; he would have found the Canal of Achmoun dry, because at that time the waters of the Nile are at the lowest; he would have crossed it, and reached Cairo on the 26th of June; he would have conquered lower Egypt within a month after his arrival. When the first pigeon carried to Cairo the news of the landing of the infidels at Damietta, the

consternation was general; there were no means of resistance: the faithful crowded the mosques, and passed the days and nights in prayer; they were resigned to their fate, and awaited the French army: but in eight months the true believers had time to prepare for resistance. Upper Egypt, Arabia, and Syria, sent their forces; and Saint-Louis was defeated, put to flight, and made prisoner. Had Napoleon acted in 1798 as St.-Louis did in 1250, had he passed July, August, September, October, November, and December, without stirring from Alexandria, he would have met with insuperable obstacles in January and February. Damanhour, Rehmaniah, Rosetta, would have been fortified; Girch and Cairo would have been intrenched and defended by cannon and troops; 12,000 Mamelukes, 20,000 Arabs, 50,000 Arabian Janizaries, reinforced by the armies of Arabia, of the Pachalic of Damas, of Acre, of Jerusalem, and of Tripoli, flocking to the succour of that key of the holy Caba, would have frustrated all the efforts of the French army, which must have re-embarked. In 1250, Egypt was not in a condition to make so good a defence, but Saint-Louis knew not how to profit by its weakness: he lost eight months in deliberating with the Pope's

legates, and in praying; he had better have employed them in gaining victories.

In the fourth volume (p. 117) is the letter of Napoleon to General Kleber, dated on the 5th of Fructidor, at the moment of his embarkation; a great part of it is correct. Four passages have been omitted, whereby the sense is altered in some material points.

In the same volume (page 128) is the letter of General Kleber to the Directory, dated on the 26th Sept. 1799. It is here inserted, with such observations as will enable the reader to appreciate it.

## LETTER OF GENERAL KLEBER,

## TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORY,

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Head Quarters, Cairo, 4th Vendemiaire,
Year VIII. (26th Sept. 1799.)

CITIZEN-DIRECTORS,

*A.* The Commander-in-chief, Bonaparte, departed for France, on the morning of the 6th of Fructidor, without having previously informed any one of his intentions; he had appointed me to meet him at Rosetta on the 7th. I found there only his despatches. Uncertain whether the General has had the good fortune to reach France, I think it my duty to send you a copy thereof, as well as of the letter whereby he invests me with the command of the army, and of that which he addresses to the Grand Vizier at Constantinople, although he knew perfectly well that this Pacha had already arrived at Damas.

*B.* My first care was to take an exact account of the actual situation of the army.

## OBSERVATIONS ON

## THE LETTER OF GENERAL KLEBER.

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*A.* The Grand Vizier was at the end of August at Erivan, in upper Armenia: he had not more than 5000 men with him. On the 22d of August, it was not known in Egypt that this first minister had quitted Constantinople; had it been known, how little importance would have been attached to the circumstance! On the 26th of September, when this letter was written, the Grand Vizier was neither at Damas nor at Aleppo; he was beyond the Taurus.

*B.* The French army was 30,000 strong at the time of its landing in Egypt, in 1798; therefore,

*Letter of General Kleber.*

You know, Citizen Directors, and you have the means of causing to be laid before you, the state of its force at the time of its arrival in Egypt: it is now reduced to one half, and we occupy all the capital points of the Triangle from the Cataracts to El-Arisch, from El-Arisch to Alexandria, and from Alexandria to the Cataracts again.

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as General Kleber declares that it was reduced to one half on the 26th of September 1799, it must then have consisted of only 15,000 men. This is an evident falsehood, for the statements sent in by all the heads of corps to the Minister at war, dated the 1st of September, make the force of the army 28,500 men, without reckoning the natives. The accounts of the Commissary Daure made the total amount to 35,000 men, including errors, auxiliaries, double rations, women and children: the accounts of the Paymaster Esteve sent to the treasury, stated the army at 28,500 men. What! it will be said, did the conquest of upper and lower Egypt and Syria, sickness, and the plague, cost the lives of only 1500 men? No, the army lost 4500, but it was reinforced, after its landing, by 3000 men from the wreck of the squadron of Admiral Brueys.

Another proof, equally convincing, is, that in the months of October and November 1801, two years afterwards, 27,500 men from Egypt landed in France; of whom 24,000 belonged to the army, the rest were sailors, Mamelukes, or people of the country: now the army had received no reinforcement, except 1000 men who came by the three frigates, La Justice, L'Egyptienne, and La Régénérée, and a dozen cor-

*Letter of General Kleber.*

*C.* It is not, however, a contest with a few hordes of intimidated Mamelukes that we have now before us; we have to fight with and resist the united efforts of three great powers: the Porte, the English, and the Russians.

The want of arms, gunpowder, cast iron and lead, presents a picture no less alarming than the great and sudden diminution of men of which I have just informed you; the attempts which have been made to found arms have proved unsuccessful; the powder manufactory established at Ruonda has not produced, and

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vettes or advice-boats, which arrived during that interval.

In 1800 and 1801, the army lost 4800 men, either by sickness, or in the campaign against the Grand Vizier in 1800, or in that against the English in 1801. Besides this, 2300 men were made prisoners in the forts of Aboukir, Julien, Rehmaniah, in the Desert, with Colonel Cavisier, with the convoy of Djermes, at Marabou; but these troops, having been sent back to France, are comprised in the number of 27,500 who effected their return.

It results then from this second proof, that in the month of September 1799, the army consisted of 28,500 men; including disabled, veterans, sick, &c.

*C.* There was no more want of musquets than of men; it appears by the accounts of the commanders of corps in September 1799, that they had 7000 musquets and 11,000 sabres in the depôt; and from the artillery returns, that they had 5000 new pieces, and 3000 spare pieces in the park: making 15,000 musquets.

Neither was there any want of cannon: there were, as the artillery returns prove, 1426 guns, 180 of which were field-pieces; 225,000 balls, 1100 thousand-weight of powder; 3,000,000

probably never will produce, the results expected from it; the reparation of arms goes on slowly; and to put these establishments in an efficient state, would require funds and resources which we do not possess.

*D.* The troops are naked, and this want of clothing is the more distressing, as it is well known that in this country, it is one of the most active causes of the dysenteries and ophthalmias which are the constant reigning diseases: the first have this year been particularly fatal to our people whose frames are debilitated and worn out by fatigue. The medical officers remark and report constantly, that, although the army is so considerably diminished, there is this year a much greater proportion of sick, than there was last year at the corresponding period.

*E.* General Bonaparte gave orders, indeed, previously to his departure, for new clothing the army; but for this purpose, as for many others, he contented himself with giving directions: and the penurious state of our finances, another great difficulty to contend with, no doubt compelled him to postpone the execution of this useful order: it is time to speak of these finances.

General Bonaparte exhausted all the extraordinary resources in the first months suc-

*Observations.*

of musquet ball cartridges; 27,000 cannon ball cartridges complete; and what proves the exactness of these accounts is, that the English found, three years afterwards, 1375 guns, 190,000 balls, and 900 thousand-weight of powder.

*D.* There was no more deficiency of clothing than of ammunition; for the returns of the magazines of the corps stated that there was cloth in the depôts, and that clothes were making; and in fact in the month of October the army was newly clothed. Besides how could clothing be wanting in a country which clothes three millions of men, besides the populations of Africa and Arabia, and which manufactures cotton, linens, and woollens in such abundance?

*E.* The soldiers had long been paid up; except 15,000 francs of arrears of long standing: the contributions due amounted to 16,000,000, as is proved by the accounts of the Paymaster Esteve, dated the 1st of September.

*Letter of General Kleber.*

ceeding our arrival: he then levied military contributions to the full extent of what the country was able to bear; to have recourse to such means now, when we are surrounded by enemies, would only be insuring an insurrection on the first favourable opportunity. Yet Bonaparte, at his departure, did not leave a *sous* in the chest, or any equivalent article; on the contrary, he left an arrear of twelve millions: this is more than a twelvemonth's revenue in our present circumstances; the pay in arrear for the whole army amounts only to four millions.

*F.* The inundation makes it impossible, at this moment, to recover what is due on account of the year just expired, and which would scarcely suffice for a month's pay; the collection cannot be resumed before the month of Frimaire, and then it will undoubtedly be impossible to attend to it, because we shall be engaged in fighting.

Finally, the Nile being this year very unfavourable, several provinces, for want of inundations, will prove unproductive; a circumstance which it will be indispensable to take into consideration.

All that I have here advanced, Citizen Directors, I can prove by *procès verbaux*, and by the official returns from the different branches of the service.

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*F.* The conduct of this people during the war in Syria leaves no doubt of their good disposition; but they must be protected from all uneasiness on the score of religion, and the ulemas must be conciliated.

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*Letter of General Kleber.*

Although Egypt is apparently tranquil, it is by no means subdued; the people are unquiet, and look upon us, in spite of all our endeavours, only as enemies of their property: their hearts are always open to the hopes of a favourable change.

*G.* The Mamelukes are dispersed, but are not destroyed. Mourad Bey is still in upper Egypt with a force sufficient to give constant occupation to a part of our army: if he were to be left unnoticed by us for a single moment, his troops would increase very quickly, and he would, no doubt, soon attack us in the capital, which, notwithstanding the greatest vigilance, has never ceased to assist him with money and arms to this day.

Ibrahim is at Gaza with about 2000 Mamelukes, and I am informed that 30,000 men of the army of the Grand Vizier, and of Djezzar Pacha, have already arrived there.

*H.* The Grand Vizier left Damas twenty days since; he is now encamped near Acre.

*I.* Such, Citizen Directors, is the situation in which General Bonaparte has left me charged with the enormous burthen of the army of the East: he saw the fatal crisis

*Observations.*

*G.* Mourad Bey, who had taken shelter in the oasis, did not possess a single spot in the valley at that time; he had not a magazine or a boat there; nor had he a piece of artillery left; he was attended only by the most faithful of his slaves. Ibrahim Bey was at Gaza with 450 Mamelukes. How could he have 2000, when he had but 950 at first, and had suffered losses in every engagement in Syria?

There was not a single man of the Grand Vizier's army in Syria at the end of September; on the contrary, Djezzar Pacha had withdrawn his own troops from Gaza, to concentrate them at Acre. There were only Ibrahim Bey's 400 Mamelukes at Gaza.

*H.* The Grand Vizier was not in Syria on the 26th of Sept.; he was not even at Damas, or at Aleppo: he was beyond Mount Taurus.

*I.* This fatal crisis existed only in the General's imagination; and more especially in that of the intriguing men who wished to excite him to quit the country.

Napoleon commenced negotiations with

*Letter of General Kleber.*

approaching. Your orders, no doubt, did not permit him to act otherwise. The existence of this crisis is proved by his letters, his instructions, and the negotiations he has set on foot; it is of public notoriety, and our enemies seem to be as well informed of it as the French in Egypt.

"If, notwithstanding all precautions," said General Bonaparte to me, "the plague should ravage Egypt this year, and you should lose more than 1500 soldiers, (a considerable loss, being wholly additional to the daily casualties arising out of the events of the war,) in that case, I say, you ought not to risk the ensuing campaign; and you are authorized to conclude peace with the Ottoman Porte, even though the evacuation of Egypt should be the first condition of it." (This passage of the letter of the 5th of Fructidor is omitted.)

I point out this passage to you, Citizen Directors, because it is characteristic on several accounts, and indicates particularly the critical situation in which I stand.

What can 1500 men more or less signify, in the immense extent of country I have to defend, being compelled to fight daily at the same time?

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Constantinople the day after his arrival at Alexandria: he continued them in Syria. He had several objects in view: in the first place, to prevent the Porte from declaring war; next, to disarm it, or at least to mitigate its hostility; lastly, to gain intelligence through the intercourse of the Turkish and French agents, who supplied him constantly with information of what was passing in Europe.

Where was this fatal crisis? The Russian army, which was stated to be at the Dardanelles, was one phantom; the English army, which had already passed the Straits, was another: lastly, the Grand Vizier, at the end of September, was still far distant from Egypt. Had he even passed Mount Taurus, he would have had to contend with the jealousy of Djezzar; he had only 5000 men with him, and would have had to form his army in Asia, perhaps to reinforce it with 40 or 50,000 men who had never served in war, and were as little formidable as the army of Mount Tabor: this, then, was in reality a third phantom.

The troops of Mustapha Pacha were the best Ottoman troops: they occupied a formidable position at Aboukir; yet they had opposed no resistance. The Grand Vizier would never have dared to pass the Desert in

*L.* The General says elsewhere, "Alexandria and El-Arisch,—those are the two keys of Egypt."

El-Arisch is a wretched fort, four days jour-

*Observations.*

presence of the French army; or if he had ventured to attempt it, he might have been easily defeated.

Egypt, then, was in no danger, except from the evil spirit which pervaded the staff.

The plague which had afflicted the army in 1799, had carried off 700 men. If that which was expected to ravage it in 1800, had caused a loss of 1500, the disorder must have been twice as malignant as in the former year. In this case, the General, at his departure, wishing to diminish the responsibility of his successor, authorized him to treat, if he should receive no intelligence from his government before the month of May 1800, on condition that the French army should remain in Egypt until the general peace.

But this contingency had not happened; it was not then the month of May, but that of September; there was all the winter to intervene, during which it was probable that intelligence would arrive from France; after all, the army was not afflicted by the plague in 1800 and 1801.

*L.* The fort of El-Arisch, which is capable of containing a garrison of 500 or 600 men, is constructed of good masonry; it commands the wells and the forest of palm-trees of the

ney in the Desert. The great difficulty of supplying it with provisions makes it impossible to garrison it with more than 250 men: 600 Mamelukes can at any time intercept its communication with Quatich; and as, at the time of Bonaparte's departure, it had not above a fortnight's provisions, it would not have required more than that time to compel it to surrender without striking a blow.

None but the Arabs can keep up regular convoys in the burning deserts; but, on the one hand, they have so often been defrauded, that instead of offering their services, they fly from us and conceal themselves; and, on the other, the arrival of the Grand Vizier, who inflames their fanaticism, and lavishes presents upon them, equally contributes to make them abandon us.

*M.* Alexandria is not a fortress, it is a vast intrenched camp; it was, indeed, very well defended by our numerous heavy artillery; but, since we lost that artillery in the disastrous campaign of Syria, and since General Bonaparte carried off all the ship-guns, to arm completely the two frigates with which he departed, this camp is now incapable of making much resistance.

*N.* In short, General Bonaparte deceived

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oasis of that name. It is a vedette, situated near Syria: the only entrance by which any army intending to attack Egypt by land, can pass. Its localities present many difficulties to besiegers. It may, therefore, very fairly be called one of the keys of the Desert.

*M.* There were in Alexandria 450 cannon of all calibres. The 24 pieces which were lost in Syria belonged to the battering-train, and had never been intended to form a part of the armament of this place. The English found there, in 1801, more than 400 pieces of cannon, independently of the guns with which the frigates and other ships were armed.

*N.* The army of Mustapha, Pacha of Ro-

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himself with regard to the effect which his victory obtained at the gates of Aboukir would produce. It is true that he destroyed nearly the whole of the Turks who landed; but what is such a loss to a great nation, which has been forcibly deprived of the finest part of its empire, and to which religion, honour, and interest equally prescribe vengeance, and the recovery of its former possessions? Accordingly, this victory has never for an instant delayed the preparations, or the march of the Grand Vizier.

*P.* In this state of affairs, what is it possible for me to do? what ought I to do? I think, Citizen Directors, that it will be best for me to continue the negotiations set on foot by Bonaparte; even should they produce no other result than the time gained, I shall have cause to be highly satisfied with them. You will accordingly find subjoined the letter which I wrote to the Grand Vizier, sending him at the same time a duplicate of that of Bonaparte: if this minister meets these advances, I shall propose to him the restitution of Egypt on the following conditions.

The Grand Signor shall establish a Pacha there as heretofore; the *Myri* which the Porte has always maintained its right to receive, but

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melia, which landed at Aboukir, consisted of 18,000 men: they were the choicest troops of the Porte which had served in war against Russia. These troops were incomparably better than those of Mount Tabor, or any of the Asiatic troops of which the Grand Vizier's army might be considered to consist.

The Grand Vizier received the news of the defeat of Aboukir, at Erivan, in Armenia, near the Caspian Sea.

*P.* This is well projected, but was afterwards ill-executed; it is a very different thing from the capitulation of El-Arisch.

Any treaty with the Porte which would have produced a cessation of its hostilities, and enabled the army to remain in Egypt, was desirable.

*Letter of General Kleber.*

has never in fact collected, to be abandoned to him.

Commerce to be reciprocally opened between Egypt and Syria.

The French to remain in the country, to occupy the fortified places, and to receive all other duties, as well as the customs, until the government shall make peace with England.

If these preliminary and summary conditions should be accepted, I should think I had done more for my country than if I had gained the most brilliant victory; but I much doubt whether any attention will be paid to these proposals. If the pride of the Turks were not opposed to them, I should have to contend with the influence of the English. I shall, however, in all events, be guided by circumstances.

*Q.* I am aware of all the importance of the possession of Egypt. I said, in Europe, that it would serve France as a centre of motion, by which she might act upon the system of commerce of the four quarters of the world; but for that purpose a powerful lever would be requisite. This lever is a navy. We once possessed a navy; since its loss, all is changed; and a peace with the Porte can alone procure us, as it appears to me, an honourable mode of extricating ourselves from an enterprise which

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*Q.* The destruction of eleven ships of war, of which three were unserviceable, did not in any respect alter the situation of the Republic, which was in 1800 quite as inferior by sea as in 1798. Had she been mistress of the sea, her forces would at once have marched against London, Dublin, and Calcutta: it was to obtain that superiority that the Republic sought the possession of Egypt. It still retained, however, sufficient vessels to send reinforcements to Egypt, whenever it should be necessary

*Letter of General Kleber.*

no longer affords a hope of accomplishing the objects for which it was undertaken.

I shall not enter, Citizen Directors, into the details of all the diplomatic combinations which the present situation of Europe suggests: these are not within my province. In the distressing circumstances in which I am placed, far removed from the centre of action, I can only consult the safety and the honour of the army which I command; happy if with all my solicitude I should succeed in accomplishing your wishes. When nearer to you I shall consider it my highest glory to obey your orders.

I subjoin, Citizen Directors, an exact account of the artillery stores of which we are in want, and a summary of the debt contracted and left by Bonaparte.

Salutation and respect.

(Signed,) KLEBER.

*R.* P. S. At the instant of my forwarding this letter, Citizen Directors, fourteen or fifteen sail of Turkish vessels have anchored before Damietta, awaiting the fleet of the Capitan Pacha, anchored at Jaffa, carrying, I am informed, from 15 to 20,000 land troops. 15,000 are still assembled at Gaza, and the Grand Vizier is on his way from Damas: he sent in, a few days back, a soldier

*Observations.*

to do so. Whilst Kleber was writing this letter, Admiral Brueys, with forty-six men-of-war, was master of the Mediterranean: he would have sent succours to the army of the East, had not the troops been wanted in Italy, in Switzerland, and on the Rhine.

*R.* This postscript shews the agitated state of General Kleber's mind. He had served eight years as an officer in an Austrian regiment: he had fought in the campaigns in which Joseph II. suffered himself to be beaten by the Turks, whose military character Kleber thenceforth always rated extravagantly high. Sir Sidney Smith, who had already occasioned to the Porte the loss of the army of Mustapha Pacha of Ro-

*Letter of General Kleber, concluded.*

of the 25th half-brigade, taken prisoner at the fort of El-Arisch. After having caused all his camp to be shewn to him, he desired him to inform his comrades of what he had seen, and to bid their General tremble. This seems to announce either the confidence which the Grand Vizier places in his troops, or a desire of accommodation. For my part, it would be quite impossible for me to collect more than 5000 men in a condition to take the field; I shall, notwithstanding, try my fortune, if I cannot contrive to gain time by negotiation. Djezzar has withdrawn his troops from Gaza, and marched them back to Acre.

(Signed,) KLEBER.

*Observations, concluded.*

melia, which he landed at Aboukir, came to Damietta with sixty transports carrying 7000 Janizaries, very good troops: these formed the rear-guard of the army of Mustapha Pacha. On the 1st of November he landed them on the beach at Damietta. The intrepid General Verdier marched against them with 1000 men, and took, killed, or drove into the sea, the whole of them: six pieces of cannon were the trophies of his victory.

The Capitan Pacha was not at Jaffa; the Grand Vizier had not entered Syria; therefore, there were not 30,000 men at Gaza. The Russian and English armies had no thoughts of attacking Egypt.

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This letter, therefore, is full of false assertions. It was believed that Napoleon would not reach France; it had been determined to evacuate Egypt; a justification of this proceeding was wanted; for this letter arrived at Paris on the 12th of January. General Berthier laid it before the First Consul; it was accompanied by the reports and accounts of the Commissary Daure, of the Paymaster Estève, and by twenty-eight reports of colonels and chiefs of corps of artillery,

infantry, cavalry, dromedaries, &c. All these returns, of which the Minister at war had abstracts made, presented statements which contradicted the Commander-in-chief. But fortunately for Egypt, a duplicate of this letter fell into the hands of Admiral Keith, who immediately sent it to London. The English minister instantly wrote to prevent the ratification of any capitulation by which the French army should be allowed to return from Egypt to France, and sent orders, in case the troops had already got to sea, to capture them, and bring them into the Thames.

By a second piece of good fortune, Colonel Latour-Maubourg, who left France at the end of January, with the news of Bonaparte's arrival in France, of the 18th of Brumaire, and of the Constitution of the year VIII, together with the letter of the Minister of War, dated the 12th of January, in answer to the foregoing letter of Kleber, arrived at Cairo on the 4th of May, ten days before the term fixed for the surrender of that capital to the Grand Vizier. Kleber now comprehended that his business was to conquer or die; but he had only to march.

That rabble which called itself the Grand

Vizier's army, was chased beyond the Desert without making any resistance. The French army had not 100 men killed or wounded; but killed 15,000 of the enemy, and took their tents, baggage, and artillery.

An entire change now took place in Kleber; he applied himself seriously to the amelioration of the state of the army and of the country; but on the 14th of June, 1800, he fell by the dagger of a wretched fanatic.

Had he been living in the following campaign, when the English army landed at Aboukir, it would have been destroyed; few of the English would ever have re-embarked, and the French would have possessed Egypt.

# SIX NOTES

ON THE WORK INTITLED

## THE FOUR CONCORDATS,*

PRINTED IN 1818.

I. Concordat of 1801.—II. Pamphlets printed in London.—III. Abduction of the Pope.—IV. Council of 1811.—V. Bulls of Institution.—VI. State Prisons.

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THIS work is no libel: although it is not free from erroneous ideas, it contains a far greater number which are rational, and worthy of consideration.

### NOTE I.—CONCORDAT OF 1801.

VOL. II. PAGE 90.

"When Napoleon found himself involved in religious disputes, perpetually increasing in number; when, after having laboured in hopes of conciliating all parties, he found he had only sown the seeds of disorder; when, after having reckoned on the support of the clergy, he discovered that he had created only dissatisfaction and distrust; he began to inquire into the

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* *Les Quatre Concordats.*

causes of a result so different from that which he had conceived his efforts calculated to produce; and meditating over the evil fruits of his inexperience, he discovered with grief the error of which he had been guilty, in meddling with religion in any other character than that of guardian of the freedom of worship, &c."

Napoleon had paid particular attention to religious affairs, in Italy, in 1796 and 1797: this species of knowledge was necessary for the conqueror and legislator of the Transpadan and Cispadan Republics, &c. In 1798 and 1799, he had occasion to study the Koran, and to acquire a knowledge of the principles of Islamism, the government and the opinions of the four sects, and their relations with Constantinople and Mecca. He must have become well acquainted with both religions; for his knowledge of these subjects contributed to gain him the affections both of the Italian clergy and of the ulemas of Egypt.

He never repented of having made the Concordat of 1801; and the sentiments on this subject which have been put into his mouth are false: he never said, *that the Concordat was the greatest error of his reign.* The discussions which he afterwards had with Rome, arose out of the abuse which that Court made of the mixture of spiritual and temporal affairs. This

may sometimes have produced in him a momentary fit of impatience, like that of the lion who feels himself stung by flies: but it never changed his views, either with respect to the principles of his religion, or to that great work which had such important results. He never said, *that his misfortunes arose from his having outraged liberal principles; or from his having offended the people.* All his laws were liberal, even those of the Conscription, and of the State-prisons: the people were never his enemies, in any country; the oligarchies alone were hostile to him;—for his government was eminently popular.

The Concordat of 1801, was necessary to religion, to the republic, to government: the temples were shut up; the priests were persecuted. They were divided into three sects, that of the Constitutionals, that of the Vicars Apostolic, and that of the emigrant Bishops in the pay of England. The Concordat terminated these divisions, and raised up the catholic apostolical Roman church from its ruins. It rebuilt the altars, put an end to disorders, commanded the faithful to pray for the Republic, dissipated all the scruples of the purchasers of national domains, broke the last thread by which the ancient dynasty was still connected with the country, by depriving the bishops who had

remained faithful to them, and by pointing them out as rebels who had preferred the things of this world and their temporal interests to the affairs of Heaven, and the cause of God.

It has been said, "*Napoleon ought not to have meddled with religious affairs, but should have tolerated religion by practising its rites and restoring its temples.*" Practising its rites!—what rites? Restoring its temples!—to what guardians—the Constitutionals, the Anglicized clergy, or the Papist vicars in the pay of England?

The question of suspending for a time the exercise of the right of instituting bishops, conferred on the Pope, was discussed in several conferences during the negotiation of the Concordat. But the Pope had already made great concessions; he consented to the suppression of sixty dioceses, which were almost as old as Christianity; he deprived, by his own authority, a great number of ancient bishops, and consummated the sale of the property of the clergy to the amount of 400 millions, without any indemnity. It was even thought, that the interest of the Republic required that no new stipulations favourable to the Ultras ought to be demanded. It was in one of these conferences that Napoleon said, "*If the Pope had not existed, it would have been necessary to create one for this*

*occasion; as the Roman Consuls, in circumstances of emergency, elected a dictator.*" The Concordat allowed, it is true, a foreign jurisdiction in the state, which might disturb it; but this power was not introduced by the Concordat, it existed from time immemorial. Napoleon being master of Italy, considered himself master of Rome, and this Italian influence assisted him to destroy the influence of the English.

## NOTE II.—PAMPHLETS PRINTED IN LONDON.*

VOL. II. PAGE 249.

"In the progress of his administration of religious affairs two periods, and, if I may be allowed the expression, two different educations may be distinguished. The first was that in which he acted of his own accord, independently of any advisers acquainted with this subject; the second, that in which he formed and consulted an ecclesiastical council," &c.

The pamphlets printed in London, on the discussions between the Courts of the Tuileries and of Rome, are apocryphal: they have never been acknowledged. They were published in the hope of kindling the enthusiasm of the Spaniards, and of all the bigots in Christendom: the inferior clergy hawked them about most industriously. Some of these pieces are wholly false: all the others are more or less falsified. It is to be regretted that they have been admitted into an important work; it would not have been difficult to ascertain their falsehood. 1st, The Court of the Tuileries never promised legations, directly or indirectly, and the Pope never required this as the condition of his journey to Paris; perhaps it may be true that he

* *Pièces imprimées à Londres.*

flattered himself with the hope of obtaining from the gratitude of the Emperor, Romania, in which country Cesena, his native place, is situated; and even that during his stay at Paris, he signified a wish on the subject directly to the Emperor, but very slightly, and with scarce a hope of success. 2dly, How can it be supposed that the institution of a patriarch was requested of the Court of Rome? A patriarch would have had no influence except in France: the influence of the Pope, who was the patriarch of the grand empire, extended all over the world: France would, therefore, have lost by the change. 3dly, Why should the Emperor demand the acceptance of his civil code? Did not the Code Napoleon then govern France and Italy? Did Napoleon need the aid of the Court of Rome, for the purpose of making laws in his own dominions? 4thly, Why should he require the freedom of worship? Was not freedom of worship a fundamental law of the French constitution? Did it then require the sanction of the Pope, any more than that of the minister Marron, and the consistories of Geneva? 5thly, Why should he demand the reform of the bishoprics, which were too numerous in Italy? Had not the Concordat of Italy provided a remedy for this?

Some negotiations, indeed, took place, with respect to the bishoprics of Tuscany and Genoa; but they were transacted in the forms established for matters of this kind. 6thly, For what purpose could the abolition of pontifical bulls for the Italian bishoprics and cures be required? Were not all these matters settled by the Concordat of Italy? 7thly, Why should Napoleon demand the abolition of the religious orders? Were they not already abolished in France and Italy? Had not the sale of their property been consummated and ratified by the Concordats? 8thly, How can it be supposed, embroiled as he was with the Court of Rome, that he should stipulate for the marriages of the priests; which would have been wantonly giving an advantage to his enemies? What was the celibacy of the clergy to him? Had he any time to waste in theological disputes? 9thly, What interest could he have in getting Joseph Bonaparte consecrated King of Naples by the Pope? Had the Pope been willing to perform this ceremony, Napoleon would have opposed it; lest it should be relied on as an act of sovereignty over Naples.

The direct correspondence of the Emperor with the Pope, from 1805 to 1809, has

remained secret: it related only to temporal matters, on which Napoleon did not need the consent or advice of his bishops; but in 1809, when the Pope, relying on a passage of the Council of Lyons, attempted, by the brief of Savona addressed to the Chapters of Florence and Paris, to obstruct the exercise of the functions of capitular vicars during the vacancies of sees, the discussions between the Pope and the Emperor were extended to spiritual matters. Napoleon then felt the necessity of the advice and intervention of the clergy: he established a council of theologians. His choice was fortunate: the Bishop of Nantes, who had been for half a century one of the oracles of Christianity, was the soul of this council: from that period, all the discussions became public.

Fox, conversing with Napoleon, after the treaty of Amiens, blamed him for not having stipulated for the marriage of the clergy. He replied, "*I wanted, and I still want, to pacify: theological volcanoes are to be quenched with water, not with oil: I should have found it less difficult to introduce the Confession of Augsbourg into my Empire.*"

After the coronation, discussions took place respecting cardinals' hats, and about the

Pope's having thought proper to suppress certain points in his allocutions on the organic laws, and respecting penitentiary briefs; also relating to some circumscriptions of the dioceses of Tuscany and Genoa, and some secret affairs relative to the Kingdom of Italy: but the two sovereigns were not directly engaged in any of these discussions; they were always left to the care of the proper chancellors, who treated all these matters with moderation and prudence.

## NOTE III.—ABDUCTION OF THE POPE.

VOL. II. PAGE 415.

"It is of little importance, in the main, who was the author of the scheme of carrying off the Pope. From whatever quarter it came, it is equally odious. Here the interest lies wholly on the side of history," &c.

The quarrel between the Emperor and the Pope, which lasted five years, and terminated in 1810 in the annexation of the temporal estates of the Holy See to the Empire, originated in 1805. The Courts of Vienna, Russia, and England had just concluded the third coalition against France: an Austrian army occupied Munich, put the King of Bavaria to flight, and took up a position on the Iller, there awaiting the junction of two Russian armies. The Archduke John, at the head of the principal army of the House of Austria, advanced to the Adige, menacing the conquest of all Italy. A French corps of observation, from 15,000 to 20,000 strong, under the command of Marshal Saint-Cyr, occupied the peninsula of Otranto: he was separated from the army of the Adige by the States of the Pope. An English squadron appeared in the Mediterranean, and had cruisers in the Adriatic; an Anglo-Russian army

was expected at Naples. The corps of observation at Otranto was compromised; the citadel of Ancona belonged to the Pope; being on the line of communication with the French army of Italy, it was not in a state of defence; had 1200 men been landed they might have seized this important post. Napoleon requested the Pope, in a direct communication, to put Ancona in a state of defence; to garrison it with 3000 men; and to intrust the command to a man who could be depended on; or to allow him to send a French garrison there. This being refused, he then required and insisted on fresh guarantees. He demanded, categorically, 1st, That the Pope should conclude an offensive treaty with the Kings of Italy and Naples for the defence of Italy: to which arrangement the Court of Naples, which was dissembling, had consented. 2dly, That the ports of the Roman States should be closed against the English. 3dly, That a French garrison of 3000 men should be received into the citadel of Ancona. To these demands the Pope answered, that, as father of the faithful, he could enter into no league against his children; that it would, besides, be compromising the Roman Catholic subjects of the powers against which he should declare; that he had no reason to complain of any one, and that he neither would

nor could make war against any power whatever. The Emperor answered, that when Charlemagne invested the Pope with a temporal sovereignty, it was for the benefit of Italy and of Europe, and not for the purpose of introducing infidels and heretics into them; that the history of the popes was full of leagues and alliances with the emperors and the kings of Spain and France; that Julius II. had commanded armies; that in 1797 General Bonaparte's head-quarters were in the episcopal palace of Bishop Chiaramonti, when he was marching against the army of Cardinal Busca, which Pius VI. had raised to make a diversion in favour of the Austrians—a war which was terminated by the treaty of Tolentino; therefore that as in our own times the banner of Saint Peter had marched against France, by the side of the Austrian eagle, it might now march with the French eagle; that nevertheless the Emperor, willing to testify his deference for the Holy Father, would consent that this treaty should not extend to Austria or Spain, but should only be applicable to infidels and heretics. On these conditions he would undertake to protect the coasts and the flag of the Church against the Barbary powers. The correspondence on these subjects was kept up during

1805 and 1806. The letters of the Pope were written with the pen of Gregory VII: they formed a striking contrast to the mildness and amenity of his character—he was merely the signer of them. He perpetually spoke of his jurisdiction, of his supremacy over terrestrial powers; "because," he said, "heaven is above earth, spirit superior to matter."

After the peace of Presburg, however, a French army had entered Naples; King Ferdinand had taken refuge in Sicily; the whole kingdom had been conquered; a French prince had ascended the throne, who found himself separated by the States of the Pope from the army of upper Italy. The agents of the Courts of Palermo and Cagliari, and the intriguers in the pay of England, whom that power always maintains on the Continent, had made Rome the centre of their operations: soldiers were frequently assassinated in traversing the part of the route which crosses the dominions of the Church between Milan and Naples. This state of affairs was intolerable: the Emperor informed the Pope that it could not be endured; and gave him to understand, that, according to the nature of things, it was indispensable that the Court of Rome should make an offensive and defensive alliance with France; that it should close

its ports against England; that it should drive from Rome all foreign incendiaries, or that it must expect to lose that part of its territory situate between the Apennines and the Adriatic —that is to say, the Marches of Ancona, which when united to the Kingdom of Italy would secure the communication between Naples and Milan. The answer of the Holy See consisted of impotent menaces: it was evident that the forbearance of the Emperor, which was somewhat inconsistent with his character, had given rise to an opinion, at Rome, that he dreaded the thunders of the Church. To dissipate this foolish notion, he ordered a corps of 6000 men to enter Rome, under pretext of intending to proceed to Naples, but to remain at Rome. He gave particular instructions to the General who commanded that expedition, to shew the greatest respect for the Court of the Vatican, and not to interfere on any occasion: at the same time he caused it to be insinuated, that, having ventured to occupy Rome, he was determined to proceed to all extremities; that it would not be impeded in temporal affairs by spiritual menaces; and that the weak must resort to the strong for protection.

The Court of Rome was thrown into an absolute delirium: monitory letters, prayers,

sermons, circular notes to the diplomatic body, were all employed to increase the mischief; all the spiritual arms of the Papal See were brandished in support of its temporal possessions; but the amount of their efficacy had been well calculated by the Cabinet of St. Cloud. At length, early in 1808, the Emperor wrote to the Pope, that it was time to put an end to all this trifling; and that unless his Holiness should adhere to the federative treaty of the powers of Italy within two months, he (Napoleon) would consider Charlemagne's grant as null, and would confiscate the patrimony of Saint Peter; without intending thereby to infringe on the respect due to the sacred person of the Pope, or on his freedom as chief of the Catholic Church. It was impossible for any notice to be more explicit; yet no regard was paid to it. Thus braved and driven to extremities, Napoleon decreed, in 1808, the annexation of the Marches to the Kingdom of Italy, leaving to the Pope the City of Rome, and all that part of his dominions situate between the Apennines and the Mediterranean. The French agents declared at the same time, that the troops of France would quit Rome and the States of the Church, as soon as the Roman Court should acquiesce in the separation of the

Marches; but, on receiving this news, it sent orders to its minister at Paris to demand his passports, and to return without taking leave: the passports were instantly granted, and war was declared. Thus a feeble power, incapable of resistance, defied and declared war against the strongest and most victorious power in the world; but it was the system of the Court of Rome to rush into extremes, and to oppose spiritual to temporal arms. It still cherished a hope of witnessing the return of those ages when the world fell prostrate before the thunders of the Church. These had few terrors for Napoleon; but he was restrained by his sentiments towards the Pope; and he left every thing still *in statu quo.*

But in the beginning of 1809, the fourth Coalition was declared. The Court of Vienna commenced hostilities: the General commanding in Rome requested to be furnished with a reinforcement of troops, to enable him to keep in awe the population of that great city and the neighbouring country; and if this could not be granted, he desired that an end might be put to the anarchy of the pontifical government. He received orders to assume the government, to incorporate the Papal troops in the French army, to maintain a good police,

and to take care that the Pope should continue to receive the sums which had usually been paid out of the treasury for the maintenance of his household.

The war, in which France was engaged with Austria and Spain, appeared a favourable opportunity to the Holy See, which at length fulminated forth its bull of excommunication. The occupation of the States of the Pope was the consequence of the war which he had declared against France; but he had in no respect been disturbed in the direction of spiritual affairs, and he had received assurances that his person should not be the less sacred, provided he did not disturb the government established at Rome in the exercise of its functions. He would not take the benefit of this proposal, considering that his quality of Sovereign of Rome was blended with and inherent in his spiritual character: this system was inadmissible. The French troops in his States were not numerous, and the battle of Essling having rendered the issue of the war in some degree doubtful, the populace was in a state of agitation: the Holy Father, shut up in the interior of his palace, had caused it to be surrounded with barricades;—these were guarded by several hundred armed men with the

strictest vigilance. The French troops which occupied the outposts picked a quarrel with these guards; who, they thought, set them at defiance; which excited their sarcasms. The situation of the Pope was dangerous: every moment it was feared that they would come to blows: bullets respect nobody. The General commanding at Rome made the strongest remonstrances: he could not make those about the Pope understand that his Holiness would be much more secure, if guarded only by the sanctity of his character; and that the opposition of force to force might produce the most fatal consequences. Finding his advice neglected, he resolved to act according to the exigencies of the case, and to remove the Pope to Florence. His duty to the Holy Father, to the troops under his command, to the French nation, and to Europe, all dictated this step. What would Catholic Christendom have said, had a life so precious been lost in a fray? Was it not the French General's office to watch over the preservation of public tranquillity? And tranquillity was instantly restored. But the Grand Duchess of Tuscany, astonished that the Pope had been sent to Florence without the order of the Emperor, caused him to proceed in the direction of

Turin. The same motive induced his Highness the Governor-general of Piedmont, to compel him to go on to Grenoble. The Emperor learned what had taken place, at Schoenbrunn, by a Roman courier: he instantly sent orders to Florence, that if the Pope had arrived there he should be placed in a country-house of the Grand Duchy, and treated with all the honours and attention due to his sacred character; to Turin, that if the Pope had arrived there, he should be conducted to Savona; and to Paris, to go to meet his Holiness, in order to reconduct him to Florence, if he should not have crossed the Apennines, and to Savona, if he should have passed those mountains. However dissatisfied with what had happened, the Emperor could not discountenance his General at Rome, whose conduct had been prescribed by necessity. It was impossible to send the Pope back to Rome, without incurring the risk of occurrences still more vexatious than those which had already taken place. The battle of Wagram was impending, which would in all probability determine the question of peace, and it would afterwards be a proper time to negotiate with the Holy See, and to bring these troublesome affairs to a close.

The whole of the Imperial mansion at Turin

was placed at the Pope's disposal; at Savona he was lodged at the Archiepiscopal palace, where he was suitably accommodated. The Intendant of the civil list, Count Sulmatori, provided him abundantly with every thing requisite. He remained thus several months, during which he was offered liberty to return to Rome, provided he would consent not to disturb the public peace, but to acknowledge the government established in that capital, and to interfere only in spiritual matters; but he, perceiving that there was a disposition to weary him out, and that the world went on as usual, without him, addressed briefs to the Metropolitan chapters of Florence and Paris, to disturb the administration of the dioceses, during the vacancies of sees, at the same time that Cardinal Pietro was sending Vicars Apostolic into the vacant dioceses. It was then that the discussion which had existed for five years, first ceased to be temporal, and assumed a spiritual character; which produced the first and second assemblies of the bishops at the Council of Paris, the Bull of 1811, and finally the Concordat of Fontainebleau in 1812. Nothing was yet determined with respect to the temporal State of Rome; this uncertainty encouraged the Pope in his resistance. The Emperor, who had now been trifled

with for five years, by the most contemptible arguments, originating in this mixture of temporal and spiritual power, at length resolved to separate those attributes for ever, and no longer to permit the Pope to be a temporal sovereign. Jesus Christ said: "*My kingdom is not of this world;*" although heir to the throne of David, he desired to be a high priest—not a king. The Senatus-Consultum of the 17th of February, 1810,* annexed the States of

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* ARTICLE I. *Of the annexation of the States of Rome to the Empire.*—1. The State of Rome is annexed to the French Empire, and forms an integral part thereof.—2. It shall constitute two departments; the department of Rome, and the department of the Thrasymene.—3. The department of Rome shall have seven deputies in the Legislative Body; the department of the Thrasymene, four.—4. The department of Rome shall be classed in the first series; the department of the Thrasymene in the second.—5. A senatorship shall be established in the departments of Rome and the Thrasymene.—6. The City of Rome is the second city of the Empire. The Mayor of Rome is to be present at the oath of the Emperor on his accession. He is to take rank, as well as the deputations of the City of Rome, on all occasions, immediately after the mayors and deputations of the City of Paris.—7. The Imperial Prince shall bear the title and receive the honours of King of Rome.—8. There shall be at Rome a prince of the blood, or grand dignitary of the Empire, who shall hold the Emperor's Court.—9. The effects which shall constitute the endowment of the Imperial

Rome to the Empire, and settled all that related to the temporal concerns of the Pope. Throughout these negotiations, the deputations

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crown, conformably to the Senatus-Consultum of the 30th of January last, shall be regulated by a special Senatus-Consultum.—10. After having been crowned in the Church of Nôtre Dame at Paris, the Emperors shall be crowned in the Church of Saint Peter at Rome before the tenth year of their reign.—11. The City of Rome shall enjoy the particular privileges and immunities which shall be determined on by the Emperor Napoleon.

ARTICLE II. *Of the independence of the Imperial throne on all early authority.*—12. All foreign sovereignty is incompatible with the exercise of any spiritual authority in the interior of the Empire.—13. The popes at the time of their inthronization shall take an oath to do nothing contrary to the four propositions of the Gallican Church resolved on in the Assembly of the clergy in 1682.—14. The four propositions of the Gallican Church are declared common to all the Catholic Churches of the Empire.

ARTICLE III. *Of the temporal existence of the Popes.*—15. There shall be provided for the Pope palaces in the different parts of the Empire in which he shall think proper to reside; one of these will necessarily be at Paris, and another at Rome.—16. Two millions of revenue in landed property, free from all impositions, and situate in the different parts of the Empire, shall be assigned to the Pope.—17. The expenses of the Sacred College and of the College de propagandâ fide are declared Imperial.—18. The present Senatus-Consultum shall be transmitted by a message from his Majesty the Emperor and King.

of bishops always had instructions to offer the Pope liberty to return to Rome, on condition of his acknowledging the temporal government which had been established there, and concerning himself in spiritual affairs exclusively; but he constantly rejected these proposals. When removed to the palace of Fontainebleau, to place him in security from an attempt which it was intended to make by sea, he occupied the apartments in which he had formerly resided; he had always about him seven or eight French bishops to do the honours of the palace; several cardinals, amongst whom were Doria and Ruffo, his medical and ecclesiastical establishments, his almoner, chaplain, &c.; he regulated his expenses at his own discretion. A great number of carriages belonging to the Court were at his command: the guards waited on him for the pass-word every morning, and the Grand Marshal Duroc superintended the supply of every thing necessary for him and his Court, with the greatest attention. Pius VII. had few wants: the table of the refectory of a convent would have satisfied him. The Grand Marshal of the palace, therefore, had only one point to attend to; not to reduce the expense, but to increase it, and to take care that it should be suitable, and on the same footing as that of

the Tuileries; in short, his Court there was equal to the Vatican. The Emperor only saw him in January 1813, in company with the Empress: they paid him the first visit; he returned it immediately, as is usual. During three days which they passed in the palace, all the communications were in an amicable and gracious form. The Concordat was signed before several cardinals, a great number of French and Italian bishops, and part of the Imperial Court.

Napoleon evinced, on this occasion, more patience than was consistent with his character and the situation in which he stood; and if he sometimes used sarcasms, in his correspondence with the Pope, he was always provoked to it by the style of the Roman Chancellor, which resembled that of the times of Louis *le Débonnaire*, or the Emperors of the House of Suabia:—a style the more ill-judged, because it was addressed to a man exceedingly well acquainted with the wars and affairs of Italy, who knew by heart all the campaigns, leagues, and temporal intrigues of the Popes. The Court of Rome might have avoided all this by frankly embracing the French system, closing its ports against the English, voluntarily requesting the assistance of a few French battalions for

the defence of Ancona, and, in short, by preserving tranquillity in Italy.

As to spiritual questions, the Emperor never discussed with the Pope any others than those comprehended in the *Procès-verbaux* of the two ecclesiastical commissions, and of the Council of Paris: the only one of importance is that relating to the Bishops.

## NOTE IV.—COUNCIL OF 1811.

VOL. II. PAGE 493.

"The declaration of the non-competence of the Council was equivalent to its dissolution. What is a Council without competence? What was the use of their going to the Pope to inform him that they were the deputies of an Assembly which had no power? It was declaring to the Pope that he alone was master in the Church, and that there was no remedy for his misfortunes, if he had brought them on himself, but through his own endeavours," &c.

PAGE 500.

"What signifies assembling a Council to imprison those who are not of our opinion? To interrogate men, is to acknowledge even their right to err. But the dissolution of the Council was not enough; the difficulties did not cease with its discussions; on the contrary they were multiplied; the party of the opposition triumphed, and now that the blow was struck, Napoleon only found himself more embarrassed than before," &c. &c.

It was Napoleon's desire to raise the Italian nation from its ruins; to unite once more the Venetians, Milanese, Piedmontese, Genoese, Tuscans, Parmesans, Modenese, Romans, Neapolitans, Sicilians, and Sardinians, in one independent nation, bounded by the Alps, and the Adriatic, Ionian, and Mediterranean seas: —such was the immortal trophy which he was

raising to his glory. This great and powerful kingdom would have been, by land, a check to the House of Austria; whilst by sea, its fleets, combined with those of Toulon, would have ruled the Mediterranean, and protected the ancient road of Indian commerce, by the Red Sea and Suez. Rome, the capital of this State, was the eternal city; covered by the three barriers, the Alps, the Po, and the Apennines; nearer than any other to the three great islands. But Napoleon had many obstacles to surmount. He said at the Council of Lyons; "*It will take me twenty years to reestablish the Italian nation.*"

The geographical configuration of Italy has greatly influenced its fate. If the Ionian sea had washed the foot of Monte Velino; if all the countries which form the kingdoms of Naples, Sicily, and Sardinia, had been placed between Corsica, Leghorn, and Genoa, how materially would events have been affected by these circumstances! Before the Romans, the Gauls took possession of all the North of Italy, from the Alps, to the Magra westward, and the Rubicon eastward; whilst the nations of Greece occupied Tarentum, Reggio, and all the South of the peninsula: the Italians were confined within the limits of Tuscany and Latium.

But the public spirit of the Italians, an ardent and enlightened people, would have overcome these local difficulties, had it not been baffled by Papal politics; the Vatican however, although too weak to unite all Italy under its dominion, has nevertheless always possessed sufficient power to prevent any republic or prince from conquering all the neighbouring States. There were three impediments to this grand design: the possessions of foreign powers in Italy, the influence of localities, and the residence of the Popes at Rome.

Ten years had scarcely elapsed, from the date of the *Consultum* of Lyons, before the first obstacle was entirely removed: foreign powers no longer possessed any part of Italy, which was entirely under the immediate influence of the Emperor. The abrogation of the Republic of Venice, the deposition of the King of Sardinia and of the Grand Duchess of Tuscany, the annexation of Saint Peter's patrimony to the Empire, had set aside the second impediment. As those skilful founders who have to transform several guns of small calibre into one forty-eight pounder, first throw them all into the furnace, in order to decompose them, and to reduce them to a state of fusion; so the small States had been united to Austria or France, in order

to reduce them to an elementary state, to get rid of their recollections and pretensions, that they might be prepared for the moment of casting. The Venetians, having been annexed to the Austrian monarchy for several years, had experienced all the bitterness of a subjection to the Germans: when these people were restored to an Italian government, they cared little whether their city was to be the capital, or whether their government was to be more or less aristocratic. A similar change took place in Piedmont, Genoa, and Rome, disorganized by the grand movements of the French Empire. There were now no Venetians, Piedmontese, or Tuscans: the inhabitants of the whole Peninsula were no longer any thing but Italians: all was ready to form the great Italian nation The Grand Duchy of Berg was vacant for the dynasty which for the time occupied the throne of Naples: the Emperor impatiently awaited the birth of his second son, to take him to Rome, to crown him King of Italy, and to proclaim the independence of the beautiful Peninsula, under the regency of Prince Eugène.—*Italiam! Italiam!* *

* In allusion to a verse of Virgil's, cited at the end of the "*Spirit of Laws*"—

"Italiam, Italiam! primus conclamat Achates."

The third obstacle, the residence of the Popes, had vanished;—the Holy Father was at Fontainebleau: the Sacred College, the Datarium, the Archives, the Propaganda, all the papers of the Missions were at Paris. Several millions had been expended on the Episcopal palace: the pharmacy of the Hotel Dieu had been removed, and its site had been given to the Datarium: the Hotel Dieu itself had been transferred to the four new hospitals, and its place had been wholly given up to the establishments of the Court of Rome. The whole quarter of Nôtre Dame, and the Isle of Saint-Louis, were to become the central seat of Christianity. The Grand Empire comprised five-sixths of Christian Europe;—France, Italy, Spain, the Confederation of the Rhine, and Poland. It was therefore proper, for the interests of religion, that the Pope should establish his residence at Paris, and unite the See of Nôtre Dame with that of the Lateran.

The most natural method of accelerating this revolution, and of inducing the Popes themselves to be desirous of this residence, seemed to be the restoration of the authority of Councils; which being composed of the bishops of France, Italy, Spain, Germany, and Poland, would in fact be General Councils. The Pope would feel

the importance of placing himself at their head; and, consequently, the necessity of residing in the capital of the Grand Empire. This was the secret object of the Council of 1811, the apparent purpose of which was to provide the means of conferring canonical institution on the bishops. The energy and resistance of the Council were agreeable to the Emperor: nothing but the spirit of opposition could confer any consideration on these assemblies so inconsistent with the spirit of the age. He secretly commanded that the forms of the Council of Embrun, which was a Council against the Jansenists, should be adopted on this occasion: they were all in the spirit of the Court of Rome. This Council dictated the brief of Savona, which accomplished the ostensible end of the convocation, by providing for the articles which it had not been thought advisable to insert in the Concordat of 1801.

Consistently with this system the Emperor had never been willing to allow any part of what related to the discussions with Rome to be published. As he did not think fit to discover his secret views, he preferred leaving all things in a vague state: he was not displeased to see public opinion erring, and attributing anti-religious projects to him: having thus ex-

ceeded the limits of truth, it would voluntarily return to them. The bishops of the ecclesiastical Council, especially the Bishop of Nantes, had tried every persuasive art to induce him to permit the publication of the official documents, and were unable to penetrate into the motives which induced him to refuse his assent to a proposal so reasonable in itself: "Why would not this prince consent to level with the ground the whole scaffolding of the inferior clergy?" This obstinacy appeared to them inexplicable. When the Emperor found that a part of the Council had voted its incompetence, he instantly ordained its dissolution; in which measure he had several objects in view: 1st, to prevent it from giving him any official notice of its non-competence; which would have disgraced it and rendered it ridiculous in the eyes of the world, and would have shut it out from every future opportunity; 2dly, by subjecting it to the exercise of public authority, to attach to it that interest of which the imbecility and bigotry of a considerable number of French bishops was calculated to deprive it. But at the same time that the Council was dissolved, the Italian bishops assembled under the auspices of Prince Eugene, the minister Marescalchi, and the minister of

public worship, at Milan. They were indignant at the ignorance of a number of the French bishops: they declared unanimously, that they considered themselves competent, and they demanded permission to form an Italian Council to regulate episcopal institution. At the same time the prelates, who had composed the ecclesiastical Council, presented an address, in which they declared themselves competent. The Archbishop of Mechlin* hastened to Trianon: he was much provoked at the ridiculous conduct of his colleagues. The Emperor did not permit his views to be penetrated into: he affected anger and dissatisfaction. The Archbishop set himself actively to work, and contributed to persuade a great number of bishops: in short all the bishops, either united in metropolitan synods, or by particular declarations, had in less than eight days concurred in declaring the competence of the Council for the object of the convocation: it was then reassembled, and issued the following decrees:—

1st Decree, 5th of August.—"The National Council is competent to legislate on the institution of bishops, in case of necessity."

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* Baron de Pradt.

2d Decree, 5th of August.—" 1st, Episcopal Sees, according to the spirit of the Canons, cannot remain vacant more than one year; during which time the nomination, institution, and consecration ought to take place.—2dly, The Council shall petition the Emperor to continue to appoint to bishoprics, according to the Concordat: the nominees to bishoprics shall apply to the Pope to obtain canonical institution.—3dly, Within six months after notice of the nomination is given in the ordinary form, his Holiness shall be bound to give institution according to the form of the Concordats.—4thly, After the expiration of the six months, if the Pope shall not have granted institution, the Metropolitan shall proceed therein; and in default of the Metropolitan, the eldest Bishop of the province, who shall act in like manner in case of the institution of the Metropolitan.—5thly, This present decree shall be submitted to the approbation of the Pope: for this purpose the Emperor shall be requested to permit a deputation of six bishops to wait on the Pope to obtain from him confirmation of a decree, which, alone, can terminate the evils afflicting the Churches of France and Italy."

Accordingly, a deputation carried this decree to the Pope at Savona, and received from him the following brief:—

"The twentieth of September, 1811, Pius VII, Sovereign Pontiff, to our dear sons the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, and to our venerable brethren the Archbishops and Bishops assembled at Paris, greeting, with benediction in our Lord.—Since the moment, when, notwithstanding the influence of our superiors, Providence raised us to the dignity of Sovereign Pontiff, we have always sought, with paternal solicitude, to give worthy and good pastors to the churches which have had the misfortune to lose their bishops; we have regretted, with the most heartfelt anxiety, our inability to accomplish our wishes, latterly, in this respect, as we should have desired: an inability arising from causes to which it would be useless here to refer. God, in his goodness, has permitted four bishops to visit us, with the approbation of our very dear son, Napoleon the First, Emperor of the French, and King of Italy, respectfully entreating us to provide for the Churches of France and of the Kingdom of Italy, which are deprived of their own pastors; and to fix, ourself, the proper mode and the conditions suitable to the accomplishment of an affair of such importance. We received these venerable brethren with the benevolence and paternal affection which they were entitled to expect from us:

we communicated to them our intentions, and permitted them to depart from us, in hopes that, on returning to Paris, they would in conformity with our instructions effect a general accommodation. We humbly give thanks to Almighty God, who has vouchsafed to listen to our prayers, and mercifully to favour the accomplishment of our wishes. Authorized by our very dear son, Napoleon the First, five Cardinals of the holy Roman Church, and our venerable brother the Archbishop of Edessa our almoner, waited upon us; besides which, three archbishops and five bishops, deputed by you, delivered to us your letter of the 5th of the Ides of the month of August of the present year, which was signed by a great number of cardinals of the holy Roman Church, archbishops, and bishops. They gave us an exact account of all that passed in the General Assembly held at Paris on the 5th of August, 1811, and respectfully prayed us to give our approbation thereto. After mature examination, we felt sincere joy in perceiving that you had, with one consent, conformed to our views and intentions; and that you have comprised in five articles the matters which we had previously approved and determined on. According to the example of so many illustrious

bishops, your predecessors, who were worthy of your imitation, you have again addressed petitions to us, either in your General Assembly, or by your deputies, praying us to approve of the whole in a solemn manner. In reading the letter to which we have referred, it is impossible to doubt your sentiments: you have entered into the most extensive details relative to the whole business, testifying with filial affection your inviolable attachment to the chair of Saint Peter, and the Holy See, and that respectful devotedness which your most ancient predecessors have transmitted to you as an inheritance. We have thought it fitting to transcribe literally here the five articles in question, which you have submitted to us, the tenor whereof is as follows:—'Art. I. The Archbishoprics and Bishoprics, conformably to the holy Canons, cannot remain vacant for more than one year, in which space of time the nomination, institution, and consecration, ought to be fully and entirely performed.—II. The Council shall petition the Emperor, to continue to nominate to the vacant Sees, by virtue of the Concordats: the Bishops nominated by the Emperor shall apply to the Sovereign Pontiff in the customary form to obtain canonical institution.—III. Within six months after

the notice shall be given to the Sovereign Pontiff, according to the ordinary usage, his Holiness shall give institution, conformably to the Concordats.—IV. If at the expiration of the six months, his Holiness shall not have conferred institution, it shall be incumbent on the Metropolitan to proceed therein, and for want of the Metropolitan, the eldest Bishop of the ecclesiastical province, who, in case of the succession of a Metropolitan, shall in like manner give institution.—V. This present decree shall be submitted to the approbation of his Holiness; for which purpose his Majesty the Emperor and King shall be humbly entreated to grant to six bishops, to be deputed, permission to attend the Holy Father, in order to solicit respectfully his confirmation of a decree which alone can afford a remedy for the misfortunes of the Churches of France and Italy.'—We, therefore, being desirous to give our aid to the Church, and to avert, as much as in us lies, and by the help of God, the great calamities with which it is threatened; after having maturely deliberated thereon, with our venerable brethren, the five Cardinals of the holy Roman Church, and our venerable brother the Archbishop of Edessa, our almoner, and observing the tenor of the Concordats, by virtue of our

apostolical authority, do approve and confirm the articles hereinbefore set forth, which, as we have just observed, are conformable to our views and to our will. But in cases in which, after the expiration of the six months, supposing no canonical impediment to exist, the Metropolitan, or the eldest Bishop of the ecclesiastical province, shall have to proceed to institution agreeably to Article IV. it is our will that the Metropolitan or eldest Bishop of the ecclesiastical province, shall make the usual inquiries; and that he shall require of the person to be instituted and consecrated, the profession of faith, and all that is customarily demanded in conformity with the ordinary rules, and with what is prescribed by the Canons; and, finally, that he shall instruct such person expressly in our name, or in the name of the Sovereign Pontiff for the time being; and shall duly transmit to the Holy See, with all possible expedition, the authentic documents, certifying the faithful performance of all these matters. We have, most dear sons and venerable brethren, already eulogised your conduct and your sentiments, but we cannot refrain from praising also the filial submission and true obedience which you have shewn, as it became you, to us and to the Roman Church, which is the mother and mistress

of all others, in an affair of so much importance, embracing, amongst other things, matters concerning universal discipline. We have now only to exhort and conjure you, dearest sons and venerable brethren, by the great mercy of God, to exert your utmost care and diligence in continuing to edify the Church of Jesus Christ, by your good morals, your good example, and the practice of every virtue; and to endeavour, with the help of a faith operating by love, to direct, sustain, and lead on the faithful in the way of perfection. God will undoubtedly grant you the necessary grace for attaining so noble an end; for the same God who has laid in you the foundation of such good works, will deign to perfect them; in order that the progress of the holy flock, in the path of salvation, may become the means of an eternal recompense to its pastors. Continue also, dearest sons and venerable brethren—continue to bestow on the holy Roman Church, the apostolical See, new proofs of your love and filial respect; to consult it, and to be always submissive and sincerely attached to it. It is to that Church (to conclude in the words of Saint Irenæus—the most brilliant luminary of the Church of Lyons, and even of all the Gallican churches) that on account of its eminent supe-

riority all churches ought to resort: that is to say, the faithful of all countries; as having always preserved the tradition delivered by the Apostles. By thus conducting yourselves, and attaching yourselves to the immoveable rock, you will be useful to the assembly of the faithful, to civil society, and to his Majesty the Emperor and King, to whom we wish in our Lord Jesus Christ every possible blessing; and you will receive an eternal crown in Heaven, for having worthily fulfilled your ministry. Filled with love towards you, we bless you, dearest brethren; and with sentiments of paternal affection, we likewise give our apostolical benediction to the clergy, and to the faithful, committed to your charge. Given at Savona, the 20th of September, 1811, in the twelfth year of our Pontificate.

(Signed,) "PIUS VII. S. P."

The Abbé de Boulogne, the Abbé de Broglie, and the Bishop of Tournay, were put under arrest (the two former being almoners of the chapel), because they had engaged in correspondence and intrigues with the agents of Cardinal Pietro, in order to establish Vicars Apostolic; which was an incroachment on the liberty of the Gallican Church, and a state offence.

By the return of the deputation from Savona with the brief, all differences were concluded; but as the secret object was not only canonical institution, but the establishment of the authority of the Councils, and as the Pope in his Bull was silent as to this assembly, although the Emperor had made it a condition *sine quâ non*, in the instructions which he gave to his plenipotentiaries, which ran thus:—

"Monsieur, Archbishop of * * *, We have appointed you to carry the decree of the Council to the Pope, and to request his approbation thereof. This approbation is expected to be direct and simple; the decree extends to all the bishoprics of the Empire, of which Rome constitutes a part, and to all the bishoprics of our Kingdom of Italy, of which Ancona, Urbino, and Formio are also parts; it likewise comprises Holland, Hamburgh, Munster, the Grand Duchy of Berg, Illyria, and all the countries annexed to France, and which may be annexed thereto. You will refuse to accept the Pope's approbation, should he accompany it with any reservations, except those which relate to the bishopric of Rome, which is not comprehended in the decree. Neither will we accept any constitution or Bull, of which the purport shall be that the Pope reordains,

in his own name, that which the Council has decreed. We have declared, that the Concordat has ceased to be a law of the Empire and Kingdom; being justified in that declaration by the Pope's violation of that act during several years. We resumed the common right allowed by the Canons, which confer on the Metropolitan the right of instituting bishops: we now resume, therefore, the terms of the Concordat. We shall approve of the decree of the Council, provided it shall have undergone no modification, or restriction whatsoever, but shall have been merely and simply accepted by his Holiness; in default of which, you are to declare that we have resorted to the ordinary rules of the Church, and that canonical institution has devolved upon the Metropolitan, without the intervention of the Pope, as was usual before the Concordat of Francis I. and Leo X. As soon as his Holiness shall have approved of the decree without reserve or modification, we shall come to an understanding respecting the circumscription of the dioceses of the departments of Rome and the Thrasymene; of Tuscany, Hamburg, Holland, the Grand Duchy of Berg, and Illyria. We do not intend to keep up more than one bishopric to a population of one hundred thou-

sand souls, in the departments of Rome and the Thrasymene: in the rest of France there is a bishopric to every five hundred thousand souls. If the Pope is disposed to put an end to the existing disputes, you may also inform him, that we are actuated by the same principles which dictated our instructions to the bishops at the time of their last mission. As soon as the Pope shall have given his approbation to the decree, you will send it by express to our Minister of Public Worship; and you will remain at Savona until farther orders, to assist in the Pope's council with respect to the ulterior affairs on which we shall have to treat. Should the Pope refuse a mere and simple approbation of the decree, you will declare to him, that the Concordats will no longer be laws of the Empire and Kingdom, which will claim the common right respecting the canonical institution of bishops;—namely, that it shall be provided for by the Synods and the Metropolitans. We rely on your zeal for religion, for our service, and for the good of your country: we expect that you will evince no weakness, and that you will accept nothing which we ourselves should not accept, or which shall be contrary to the tenor of these presents, or calculated to involve affairs in

farther embarrassments, instead of simplifying and arranging them."

He therefore judged it most expedient to suspend all proceedings, purposing to assemble a new Council in 1813. That of 1811 was only preparatory, and had fulfilled its intention; public opinion was reconciled to these ecclesiastical assemblies; things would have been so conducted at this new Council, that the Pope himself would have demanded to place himself at the head of the assembly; and as he was already at Fontainebleau, he would also have been made to take possession of his archiepiscopal palace at Paris. Every preparation had been made there for furnishing the palace with even greater magnificence than the Tuileries: every thing was to be of gold or silver, with tapestries from the Gobelins illustrative of the events of sacred history. The unexpected issue of the campaign of Russia in 1812, decided the Emperor to sign, in January 1813, the Concordat of 1811, conceived in these terms:

—"Willing to terminate the differences which have arisen between them, and to remove the difficulties which have occurred in various affairs concerning the Church, have agreed on the following articles as the basis of

a definitive arrangement.—Article I. His Holiness shall exercise the pontificate in France and in the Kingdom of Italy, in the same manner, and under the same forms as his predecessors.—II. The ambassadors, ministers, and chargés-d'affaires of all powers at the Court of the Holy Father, and the ambassadors, ministers, and chargés-d'affaires whom the Pope may maintain at the courts of foreign powers, shall enjoy the immunities and privileges enjoyed by the members of the diplomatic body.—III. The dominions which the Holy Father possessed, and which have not been alienated, shall be exempted from taxes of every kind: they shall be governed by his agents or chargés-d'affaires: those which have been alienated shall be replaced to the extent of a revenue of two millions of francs.—IV. Within six months after the usual notification of the Emperor's nomination to any of the archbishoprics or bishoprics of the Empire or of the Kingdom of Italy, his Holiness shall give canonical institution, conformably to the Concordats, and by virtue of the present *Indult*: the requisite inquiries shall first be made by the Metropolitan; and the six months being expired without institution being granted by the Pope, the Metropolitan, or in his absence, or in case the institution

shall relate to a Metropolitan, the eldest Bishop of the province, shall proceed to the institution of the bishop nominated, in such manner that no See shall ever be vacant for a longer term than one year.—V. The Pope shall nominate, both in France and Italy, to certain Sees which shall hereafter be mutually agreed upon.—VI. The six suburbicary bishoprics shall be re-established: they shall be in the nomination of the Pope: the property still remaining shall be restored, and measures shall be taken with respect to the property sold. At the decease of the bishops of Agnagni and Rieti, their dioceses shall be annexed to the said six bishoprics, conformably to the agreement which shall be made between his Majesty and the Holy Father.—VII. With respect to the bishops of the Roman States, who, owing to circumstances, may be absent from their dioceses, the Holy Father shall be at liberty to exercise, in their favour, the right of giving bishoprics *in partibus*. They shall receive a pension equal to the revenue which they enjoyed, and they shall be capable of succeeding to the vacant Sees, either of the Empire, or of the Kingdom of Italy.—VIII. His Majesty and his Holiness shall concert measures, at a convenient opportunity, with respect to the reduction to be

made, in case it shall be necessary, in the bishoprics of Tuscany and the Genoese country; as well as to the bishoprics to be established in Holland, and in the Hanseatic departments.—IX. The Propaganda, the penitentiary, and the archives, shall be established at the Holy Father's place of residence.—X. His Majesty restores his favour to the cardinals, bishops, priests, and laity, who have incurred his displeasure in consequence of existing events.—XI. The Holy Father is induced to concur in the foregoing arrangements, in consideration of the actual state of the Church, and from the confidence with which his Majesty has inspired him, that he will grant his powerful protection to the necessities of religion, unhappily too numerous in the age in which we live."

It would have been honourable to the Council, and would have raised it in public opinion, to have taken a solemn step in favour of the Pope: the Emperor would have received the address on his throne, surrounded by his Court, by the Senate, and by the Council of State. He would have declared that the Pope was, and always had been, at liberty in the diocese of Savona; that it was at his option to return to Rome in order to exercise his spiritual functions in that

city, on acknowledging the temporal government there existing; and that, whether he returned to Rome, or remained at Savona, or chose any other city of the Empire, no obstacle should be opposed to his correspondence with the faithful, provided he and his cardinals would engage to do nothing in France contrary to the four propositions of Bossuet; and in Italy, contrary to the usages and prerogatives of the Church of Venice. But it appeared that this would be premature, and might be more suitably brought forward in 1812, at the time of the discussions which should precede the establishment of the Pope in the archiepiscopal palace of Paris.

Thus Napoleon had established the spiritual power of the Pope in France: he had not chosen to avail himself of circumstances, either to create a patriarch, or to alter the creed of his subjects. He respected spiritual matters, and wished to regulate without meddling or coming in contact with them: he was desirous of making them square with his views and his policy, but through the medium of temporal affairs. There were well informed persons at Rome who foresaw this, and said in Italian: "*That is his way of making war; not daring to attack in front, he turned the Church, as he turned the Alps*

*in* 1796, *and Melas in* 1800." To execute this plan, so vast and so well adapted to the age, he had placed his confidence in the Bishop of Nantes: he had the most perfect reliance on the theology of this holy prelate; and he was determined throughout his career never to lose sight of this luminary. Whenever the Bishop of Nantes said, "*This attacks the Catholic faith and the Church,*" he stopped. Thus secure from the danger of losing himself in this labyrinth, he was certain of success, by the aid of time, and his vast means of influence; for, except in matters of religion, he could obtain any thing of the bishops. Had it not been for the events of the Russian campaign, the Pope would, in 1813, have been bishop of Rome and Paris, and established at the archiepiscopal palace. The Sacred College, the datary, the penitentiary, the missions, the archives, would have been assembled around Nôtre Dame and in the Isle of Saint-Louis: Rome would have been transported into ancient Lutetia.

The establishment of the Court of Rome in Paris would have been fertile in great political results: its influence over Spain, Italy, the Confederation of the Rhine, and Poland, would have riveted the federative bonds of the Great Empire; and that influence which the Chief of

Christianity possessed over the faithful in England, Ireland, Russia, Prussia, Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia, would have become the inheritance of France: this alone explains the speech which the Bishop of Nantes remembered, but was unable to explain. One day, at Trianon, he was forcibly representing the utility and importance of the visible head of the Church of Jesus Christ with respect to unity of faith. "*Monsieur Bishop, be not uneasy; the policy of my states is intimately connected with the maintenance and power of the Pope: it is necessary for me that he should be more powerful than ever: he will never possess so much influence as my policy would induce me to wish him to enjoy.*" The Bishop appeared astonished, shook his head, and was silent: some weeks after, he wished to renew this discourse; but in vain—Napoleon had already said too much.

It is a certain fact which will become more evident daily, that Napoleon loved his religion; that he wished to contribute to its prosperity and honour, but at the same time to avail himself of it as a social instrument for repressing anarchy, strengthening his sway in Europe, increasing the reputation of France and the influence of Paris—the objects of all his thoughts. With these views he would have done every thing

in his power for the Propaganda, and foreign missions, and for extending and increasing the power of the clergy. He had already acknowledged the cardinals as the first persons in the state: they took precedence of every body at the palace. All the agents of the Papal Court would have been munificently provided for, so that they would have had no reason whatever to regret their former situation. It was in consequence of these views that Napoleon was always intent on the improvement and embellishment of Paris; it was not merely from a love of the arts, but in conformity with his system. Paris was to be the unrivalled city, above all comparison with other capitals: the masterpieces of the sciences and arts, the museums, in short all that had rendered former ages illustrious, were to have been found assembled there; the palaces and theatres were to have surpassed every thing existing of their kind. Napoleon regretted that he could not transfer Saint Peter's from Rome to Paris: he was disgusted with the meanness of Nôtre Dame.

## Note V.—On Bulls.

Vol. II.

"The Pope's disputes with Napoleon began at the end of 1805: I shall explain their origin elsewhere. They lasted till 1809, during which time, Bulls were given to several bishops in the usual form. The differences increased; and the Pope having begun to omit Napoleon's name in these documents, a Bull was delivered in this form. On the circumstance being noticed in the Council of State, Napoleon ordered that the proceedings should go on, and the Bull be published. He treated the omission with levity, saying, that whether his name were inserted in the Bull or not, it was equally valid, and that it was not of the least importance to him. In this he was wrong, for it was not merely an affair concerning him personally, but a question relative to a right of sovereignty—a thing which ought never to be lightly treated."

The forms established by the Concordat of 1801, were the same as those settled by the Concordat of Francis I. These forms were in themselves of no importance: nevertheless Napoleon would have had no objection to their being altered; and perceiving that the Court of Rome affected to leave off pronouncing his name, he caused a proposal to be made, that in future, Bulls should no longer be directly

required by him, but by the Minister of Worship; and that, consequently, his name should no longer be mentioned in Bulls of institution; it being at the same time fully understod that no farther change was to be made in the formula, which was so worded as to shew that the Court of Rome did not nominate bishops *motu proprio*. The Pope readily perceived the snare: the real object was to humble the Holy See, by making him correspond with a minister, like other bishops. He refused to adopt this expedient, which would have made his situation still worse: he was perfectly right. The splendour and dignity which then distinguished the Imperial throne precluded the Pope from all means of retaliation in that quarter; whilst the etiquette of the Imperial palace, and the right of direct communication with the sovereign, distinguished the Bishop of Rome, and contributed to maintain his rank and dignity.

This proposal had one good effect—it made the Court of Rome feel how much times were altered. The Emperor had offered to remove this difficulty by establishing the pragmatic sanction; by renouncing the nomination of bishops, himself, provided canonical institution should be conferred by the metropolitan synod.

But the Court of Rome was well aware that the crown would have lost none of its prerogatives by this arrangement, because the chapters stood so much in need of the government that they themselves would have given it the nomination, whilst the Holy See would actually have lost all influence in France.

## Note VI.—State Prisons.

Vol. II. Page 259.

"Napoleon treated a great number of the clergy very severely, particularly in 1813. The Memoirs from Saint-Helena, which I believe to be sincere on this point, state that there were more than five hundred of the clergy imprisoned. Surely this was a deplorable affair: *one* would have been too much. But was it only on priests, or on men taken in the fact of violating their engagements and the laws of their country, that the hand of Justice fell? In what country would such crimes be tolerated or suffered to be committed with impunity? Here truth compels us to make painful admissions."

It is a singular thing to see the Manuscript of Saint-Helena cited as an authority; that work is, doubtless, the production of a clever man, but of one perfectly ignorant of the matters of which he treats. He says, that the number of priests arrested amounted to five hundred; the fact is, that there never were more than fifty-three priests detained in consequence of the discussions with Rome; and they were lawfully confined: Cardinal Pietro, for being at the head of the correspondence with the inferior clergy, about appointing Vicars Apostolic, which was contrary to the principles of the Gallican

Church and the safety of the State; Cardinal Pacca, for having signed the Bull of excommunication, respecting which no resentment was felt towards the Pope, but the minister who had signed it was held responsible: it was intended, if any individual had been assassinated at Rome, in consequence of that Bull, to have made this Cardinal answerable for it; but the excommunication excited only the most profound contempt on all sides, which was a most fortunate circumstance for all the cardinals and prelates of the Court of Rome. D'Astros, the Vicar of Paris, was in correspondence with Cardinal Pietro: he had clandestinely received and distributed Bulls which were not recognized or admitted in France; an act contrary to the principles of the Gallican Church, and designated as a crime by the penal code.

But how could five hundred priests be in confinement on account of the affairs of the Church, when in the six state-prisons there were at this time only two hundred and forty-three individuals, in the whole; consisting, 1st, of priests who were in the above-mentioned predicament; of emigrants definitively kept on the list, who having borne arms against the nation, or being agents of England or other foreign powers,

had returned from exile contrary to law; and, had they been delivered up to the tribunals, would have been immediately condemned to death—a severity which it was not wished to exercise. 2d, Of the chiefs of the Chouans, or agents in the civil war, condemned to death, but reprieved, either because they had made discoveries, and their knowledge might be of service, or in order to confront them with other Vendean prisoners; or to obtain local information, and the particulars of such past occurrences as it was thought expedient to sift to the bottom. 3d, Emigrants who had availed themselves of the amnesty, but had been subjected to the observation of the police, and had planned conspiracies against the state and government: had these been delivered up to the tribunals, they must have been condemned to death; but the judicial proceedings would have kept up the public anxiety respecting the risk which the nation ran of losing its chief. Besides, some of these plots, although criminal, were so contemptibly foolish (such as that of the Baron de la Rochefoucauld, and the commissary of the wars of Condé's army, Vaudricourt), that it was sufficient to secure these individuals in the state-prisons until peace. 4th, Men of the lowest classes, guilty of numerous crimes cognizable

by the provostal courts, but connected with bands still existing, whom the juries had not dared to condemn, though well convinced of their guilt, for fear of their accomplices. These facts were established by a *procès-verbal* signed by the judges of the tribunal which had presided at the trial; another *procès-verbal* of the prefect and council of the prefecture supported the former, and demanded that these persons should not be set free, on the ground that their liberation would have been dangerous to public tranquillity. Such were the persons composing the 243 prisoners, confined in six state prisons, in an Empire of 40,000,000 of population, just emerging from a terrible revolution which had shaken all the foundations of society,—an Empire which had long been agitated by internal discord, and was still harassed by foreign wars. Such a state of things is unparalleled in the history of nations; for in the ordinary course of affairs every country in Europe keeps a more considerable number of state prisoners in confinement by means of various authorities, under forms sanctioned by the laws. These 243 individuals, a number which from that time forward was gradually reduced, were confined in six prisons: Vincennes was one of these; they con-

order, cleanliness, and salubrity are attended to in the prison.—11. They shall hear, separately, the claims of each prisoner, their observations on the change in circumstances which may have induced them to make such claims, and their demands to be brought to trial, or set at liberty.—12. They shall cause every person detained without the formalities prescribed by Clause I. to be discharged.—13. They shall make a report of their proceedings, and give their opinion on each prisoner's case.—14. This opinion shall be always laid before the Privy Council above-mentioned, in the 3rd Article of Clause I.—15. Before the 15th of February in every year, the attorney-general of the Imperial Court of the district shall certify, by one of his substitutes, or of the imperial attorneys under his orders, whether any person be detained in the state prison situated within his district, without the formalities above prescribed; whether the registers are regularly kept. A report of this visitation shall be drawn up, which shall be sent to our grand judge, minister of justice, and in case of persons imprisoned or detained illegally, or in contravention of the said provisions, the visiting commissioner shall cause such persons to be set at liberty.

"CLAUSE III. *Of persons placed under the observation of the police.*—ARTICLE 16. The list of all the persons placed under the observation of the police shall be laid before us by our minister of police, in the special annual Privy Council mentioned in Article 3.—17. This list shall be made out in the form prescribed for state prisoners by Article 4, excepting only that the decision by which such observation was authorized, shall be mentioned.—18. The protraction or cessation of such observation shall be determined on in the Privy Council.

"CLAUSE IV. *Of the establishment and regulation of the state prisons.*—SECTION I. *Of the superintendence of prisons.* ARTICLE 19. The keeping and government of each state prison shall be intrusted to an officer of *gendarmerie*, who shall have under his orders the troop appointed to guard the prison, and shall determine on the proper measures of safety and precaution to prevent escape.—20. There shall be a gaoler for the interior management, and the keeping of the registers. The gaoler shall have under his command a sufficient number of keepers.—21. The military commandant shall he chosen by us on the presentation of our minister of the general police; and shall be intrusted with every thing relative to the administration of

the state prisons, to the repairs of the buildings employed for that purpose, and to the food, clothing, and custody of the prisoners.—22. The gaoler shall be named and subject to be recalled by our minister of general police.—23. The commandant, gaoler, and keepers shall be responsible, each so far as concerns himself, for the custody of the prisoners.—24. If, through negligence, or any other cause whatever, they shall permit the escape of a prisoner, they shall be removed and prosecuted according to law. SECTION II. *Of the relations of the officers with the public authorities.*—25. The gaoler shall be subordinate to the commandant, and shall receive orders from him.—26. The commandant shall correspond with our minister of the general police and the counsellor of state of the *district*. He shall be under the superintendence of the prefect.—27. The gaoler may be provisionally suspended and replaced by the prefect. SECTION III. *Of the internal regulations.*—28. The gaoler shall keep an exact register of the prisoners coming in and going out, and shall transcribe therein the orders by virtue whereof they shall be detained.—29. No order of discharge shall be executed without notice being given to the commandant, of the decision of the Privy Council, authorizing such

discharge.—30. Every gaoler or keeper who shall favour the clandestine correspondence of a prisoner put in close confinement *(au secret)* shall be discharged and punished with six months' imprisonment.—31. The commandant shall not take upon himself to allow the prisoners committed to his custody, to go out with him, with the gaoler, or with any attendants, under pain of removal from his office.—32. In case of the sickness of any prisoner, the commandant shall appoint the medical officer to attend and prescribe for him.—33. Every prisoner who shall require it may receive a sum of two francs daily, or the ordinary provisions for his maintenance.—34. The prisoners shall retain the disposal of their property, unless where it shall be otherwise ordered.—35. For this purpose they shall give all necessary powers and acquittances, under the inspection of the commandant. The sums they may receive shall only be delivered to them in his presence, and with his authority.

"CLAUSE V. *Of the number of state prisons.* —ARTICLE 36. There shall be no state prisons, except in the places hereinafter appointed.—37. No state prisoner shall be detained, except in any depôt, and on journeys, in any other place than the state prisons by us appointed.—

38. The state prisons are established in the Castles of Saumur, Hamsf, Landskaone, Pierre Chatel, Fenestrelle, and Compiano-Vincennes. —39. Our grand judge, minister of justice, our ministers at war, of the general police, and of the public treasury, are each charged, so far as concerns him, with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the Bulletin of the Laws, &c."

All France would have been alarmed if *lettres de cachet* had been renewed: the forty magistrates of the Council of State would not have taken such a regulation into deliberation. Napoleon must have been deprived of reason, supposing he wished to infringe on public liberty, to have proclaimed and inserted in the bulletin of the laws, provisions contrary to all our constitutions, even to that which existed before 1789, and was demanded by the parliaments.

Under the Convention, the laws relating to suspected persons and emigrants had given rise to a great number of state prisons: there were more than 2000, containing no less than 60,000 persons, during the early part of the government of the Directory; — this number had greatly diminished. All these prisons were successively abolished; the number of state prisoners

was reduced to little more than 3000; they were confined in the ordinary prisons: the inspection of them was left to the administration, particularly the police. The commissioners and minister of police were magistrates of public safety; they had authority to imprison: a special article of the constitutions of that period gave this right to the minister of police, or to the administration, in case of any plot against the State. This number of prisoners increased, in 1799, after the revolution of Prairial, through the execution of the law of hostages. There were 9000 persons imprisoned at the period of the 18th of Brumaire: these were mostly set at liberty. At the commencement of the Imperial reign, there remained scarcely 1200 belonging to one or other of the foregoing classes.

The police exercised the most arbitrary tyranny. The necessity of investing the courts with the superintendence of the prisons, and of authorizing the imperial attorneys to visit them, and to liberate all persons not confined by lawful process, was generally felt. The regulation of the prisons was restored to the courts: the police was no longer suffered to retain prisoners in the usual places of confinement: the state prisoners above-mentioned were placed under the immediate administration of the mi-

nister of police, with power reserved for the imperial attorneys to visit and to examine the warrants of these state prisoners, and to set at liberty every individual not arrested by virtue of a decision of the Privy Council ordering a detention of less than one year, and countersigned by the Grand Judge. From that moment liberty was secured in France; every prisoner was enabled to address himself to the magistrates: the minister of police and his agents were thus stripped of that terrible arbitrary power of committing any individual at their own pleasure, and of keeping him in their own hands, without the tribunals taking any cognizance of the case, *ipso facto*. Thus, instead of a warrant issued by a mere commissary of police, a deliberation of the Privy Council was requisite to retain a prisoner in the hands of justice. This Privy Council consisted of the Emperor, the five grand dignitaries, two ministers, besides the minister of police and the grand judge, two senators, two counsellors of state, the first president, and the imperial attorney of the Court of Cassation. Sixteen persons, the head of the state, decided on the imprisonment of the individuals included in the provision of exception: were there ever more guarantees given to citi-

zens? This decree declared, that an individual being a prisoner of state could only remain so for one year, and that at the end of the year he must be set at liberty, unless the Privy Council should prolong his captivity by a new deliberation. For this purpose, two counsellors of state yearly visited the prisons, examined every prisoner, heard his demands, examined the records of his charge and defence, made their report to the grand judge, who, in the Privy Council, in the presence of the two counsellors of state who there took their seats, proposed the liberation of the party or his farther imprisonment for one year. The Privy Council then voted thereon, beginning with the vote of the first President of the Court of Cassation.

This decree, therefore, was a benefit; it was a liberal law, a diapason to establish the harmony of society; it left no arbitrary power, either in the magistrate, the administration, or the police; it guaranteed security to the citizens. There was not a counsellor of state who inspected the prisons who did not take pride in releasing the greatest possible number of captives. All those who have assisted in the Privy Councils can bear witness that these counsellors of state acted as the advocates of

the prisoners. These prisons would in time have disappeared, with the circumstances which had created them; with that race of brigands nourished in civil war; those intriguing petty priests of the inferior clergy; those persons exasperated by the Revolution, and the losses they had sustained in its progress, who were always hatching plots for subverting the government. There were in France 200,000 individuals who had emigrated, suffered deportation, or figured in the civil war, and to whom Napoleon had restored their country and their property, but with the clause of subjection to a special superintendence. It was from this class of men that the state prisoners were taken; it was this right of superintendence, alienated from arbitrary power, and legalized conformably to a liberal spirit and to the principles of justice, which animated all the acts of the Privy Council.

Whenever a fourth of the members of the Privy Council were of opinion that the prisoner ought to be released, his discharge was instantly ordered. Besides, these prisoners had, independently of this recourse to the Council of State and Privy Council, a constitutional protection in the committee of the senate for individual liberty; they never failed to apply to it;

the committee deliberated, demanded explanations from the minister of police, and caused a great number of prisoners to be released. It was necessary to attend to the demands of this committee, because when once it had pronounced its opinion, if the administration had not listened to it, it would have reported the affair to the senate. But it must not be supposed, because this committee of individual liberty made no noise, never vented pompous harangues, or was desirous to be talked of, that it was not of great utility. If the state prisons had contained, like the Bastile, prisoners who were the victims of various intrigues, or of the prince's displeasure, this intervention alone would have sufficed to put an end to the abuse. It is equally erroneous to suppose that the legislative body had no hand in the making of the laws; the legislative committees discussed the *projets* of laws with the counsellors of state, and deliberated thereon; their influence was not tumultuous, but it was not on that account the less effectual.

A circumstance which happened at Dantzic induced the Emperor to frame the decree on the state prisons. An old man had been detained fifty years in a tower at Weiselmunde; he had lost his memory; it was impossible to find

out who he was, or why he was detained in prison.

Napoleon wished to enforce the strict execution of the law, which ordained that in all ordinary cases prisoners should be placed in the hands of the magistrates within twenty-four hours after their arrest; and that in extraordinary cases, attended with peculiar circumstances, there should be no exception for more than one year, and that in this case the detention should be authorized by the decree of a Privy Council of sixteen persons, made on the report of the minister at the head of the administration of justice. This regulation of government may have excited empty cavils. People declaim, in societies, without searching into the truth of matters; perhaps the title was blameable; these places of confinement ought to have been called *executive prisons for individuals subjected to general superintendence.*

No people ever enjoyed more extensive civil liberty than the French nation under Napoleon; there is no State in Europe which has not a greater number of prisoners committed to prisons, under different warrants or forms, without being necessarily subjected to a regular trial by the courts. A country where the arbitrary violence of the impress, on the quays and in

the public streets, is authorized by the laws, ought not to boast of enjoying true civil liberty; no such thing exists for the lower classes in England, although it is certainly enjoyed by gentlemen. If the criminal legislation of England be compared with that of France, the abuses and imperfection of the former, comparatively with the latter, will be easily seen. As to the criminal legislation of Austria, Russia, Prussia, and the other States of Europe, it is sufficient to say that there is no publicity either in the informations, the debates, or the examinations of the parties and witnesses. The laws of Napoleon are accordingly very dear to the Italians, and to every nation in which they have been put in force: the inhabitants have obtained as a favour that they should continue to be the law of the land.

# FOUR NOTES

ON THE WORK INTITLED

## HISTORICAL MEMOIRS OF THE REVOLUTION OF SAINT-DOMINGO.*

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THIS work is written by a general officer who served in the campaign of Saint-Domingo, in 1802, under the command of General Le Clerc; and is interesting on several accounts. It contains some hasty decisions, which are to be attributed to the author's want of accurate information: many official papers of importance still remain secret.

### NOTE I.

VOL. I. CHAP. X.

The narrative of the events which took place at Saint-Domingo, after the 18th of Brumaire, commences in this chapter. The General of division Toussaint-Louverture, commander-in-chief of the northern part of Saint-Domingo, had disregarded the authority of General Hédouville, commissioner of the executive direct-

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* *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de la Révolution de Saint-Domingue.*

ory. He had negotiated with the English, both directly and secretly, whilst this general was on the island; treating this representative of the mother-country in such an insulting manner as obliged him to return to France. But General Hédouville, before he left the colony, distrusting the intentions of Toussaint-Louverture, gave powers to General Rigaud, chief of the men of colour, confiding to him, independently of Toussaint, the command of all the southern part of Saint-Domingo, which island thus became severed into two divisions; the North, under Toussaint, which was under the dominion of the blacks; and the South, under Rigaud, in which the men of colour were the prevailing faction. A horrible civil war soon broke out between these two parties. The Directory seemed to look on this contest with pleasure, thinking the rights of the mother-country secured by its duration. This war was raging at its utmost height in the beginning of 1800.

The first question which Napoleon had to consider on coming to the head of affairs, was whether it would be for the interest of the mother-country to foment and encourage this civil war, or to put an end to it. After mature reflection, but without any hesitation, he decided for the latter course.

1st, Because a fallacious policy, calculated to keep up intestine war, was unworthy of the greatness and generosity of the nation, and was likely in the end to render both parties equally hostile to the mother-country: 2dly, Because domestic hostilities, instead of weakening a nation, renovate its energies, and inure it to war; and therefore whenever the time should come for restoring the authority of the mother-country, she would have had to deal with a more formidable people: 3dly, Because, if this civil war continued, the inhabitants would lose all industrious habits, and the colony be deprived of what little remained of its ancient prosperity. Thus morality and policy equally dictated the propriety of stopping the effusion of French blood without delay; but what were the means to be employed? The Directory had tried to restore the *status quo*, between the two parties; but the passions which actuated the blacks and the men of colour were too violent to be restrained while the mother-country had no means of repressing them. The men of colour were, undoubtedly, braver and more warlike than the blacks; but they were so much inferior in number that it was easy to anticipate the moment of their defeat. The triumph of the blacks would have been signalized by the total massacre and destruction of the men of

colour — an irreparable loss to the mother-country, which could only hope to reestablish its authority by making use of the influence of the latter against the blacks. The First Consul therefore resolved to support the stronger party; to withdraw the powers held by General Rigaud, to recall him to France, to disarm the men of colour, to extend Toussaint's authority over the whole colony, to appoint him commander-in-chief of Saint-Domingo, and to give all his confidence to the blacks.

Colonel Vincent, director of the fortifications of Saint-Domingo, possessed in a high degree the confidence of Toussaint, whose *chargé-d'affaires* he was. This officer was then at Paris: the First Consul sent for him, informed him of his partiality for the blacks, and his perfect confidence in the character of Toussaint, and sent him back to the colony, carrying, 1st, the decree by which Toussaint was appointed commander-in-chief of Saint-Domingo; 2dly, the constitution of the year VIII; 3dly, a proclamation to the blacks, in which he said to them: "*Brave Blacks, remember that France alone acknowledges your liberty!*" He added two other commissioners, who, with Colonel Vincent, were ordered to take all necessary measures for restoring tranquillity, and putting an end

to hostilities. This judicious policy had the happiest effects. Rigaud returned to France; the men of colour laid down their arms; the authority of the blacks was peaceably acknowledged throughout the colony: they applied themselves to agriculture; the colony seemed for a moment to revive from its ashes: the whites were protected; even the men of colour, secured by the moral influence of the mother-country, breathed again, and began to repair their losses. The years 1800 and 1804, were two prosperous years for the colony; agriculture, laws, and commerce flourished once more, under the government of Toussaint; the authority of the mother-country was acknowledged and respected (at least in appearance); Toussaint regularly made a monthly report to the minister of marine.

The real views of the chiefs of the blacks could not, however, long remain concealed from the French government. Toussaint kept up a secret intelligence both with Jamaica and London; he was guilty of irregularities in his administration which could not be attributed to ignorance. He had constantly eluded the reiterated order to cause to be inscribed in gold letters on the standards, these expressions in the proclamation of the First Consul:

"*Brave Blacks, remember that France alone acknowledges your liberty.*"

When Admiral Gantheaume sailed from Brest at the beginning of 1801, with a division of troops under the command of General Sahuguet, he took on board a great number of blacks and men of colour, bound for Saint-Domingo. Toussaint appeared extremely uneasy about this: it was known that from that time he resolved not to suffer any French troops exceeding two thousand men to enter the colony; and to burn Cape-town if the army of Sahuguet should prove too strong for him to defend the town against it; but Admiral Gantheaume steered towards the Mediterranean—he was bound for Egypt.

The prosperity which the Republic enjoyed in the course of 1801, after the peace of Luneville, made it easy to foresee that England would soon be compelled to lay down arms, when decisive measures might be adopted with regard to Saint-Domingo. Two alternatives then claimed the consideration of the First Consul: the first was to invest General Toussaint-Louverture with the whole civil and military authority, under the title of governor-general of the colony; to intrust the command to the black generals; to consoli-

date and legalize the regulations respecting labour established by Toussaint, which had already been crowned with the most brilliant success; to oblige the black farmers to pay a rent or acknowledgment to the ancient French proprietors; and to preserve to the mother-country the exclusive commerce of the whole colony, by employing numerous cruisers to guard the coasts. The second scheme consisted in reconquering the colony by force of arms; in removing to France all the blacks, who had held commands superior to that of a chief of battalion; in disarming the blacks, securing their civil liberties, and in restoring the property to the colonists. Each of these projects had its advantages and disadvantages. The benefits of the first were palpable. The Republic would have an army of from 25 to 30,000 blacks, which would make all America tremble: this would be a new element of power which would cost her no sacrifice either of men or money. The old proprietors would, no doubt, lose three-fourths of their fortunes; but the commerce of France would lose nothing, as it would still enjoy the exclusive privilege. The second project was more advantageous to the colonial proprietors; it was more conformable to justice: but it required

a war which could not but produce the destruction of a great number of men, and the loss of a considerable sum of money: the opposite pretensions of the blacks, the men of colour, and the white proprietors, would always be an object of discord and embarrassment for the mother-country; Saint-Domingo would always be in jeopardy. Accordingly the First Consul inclined to the former scheme, because it appeared to him most consistent with true policy, and most conducive to the influence of his flag in America. With an army of from 25 to 30,000 blacks, what might he not undertake against Jamaica, the Antilles, Canada, the United States themselves, or the Spanish colonies? With such important political interests, could the difference of a few millions more or less of revenue to France be placed in competition? But such a project required the concurrence of the blacks; it was necessary that they should evince their fidelity to the mother-country, and to the Republic which had conferred such benefits upon them. The children of the black chiefs educated in France, in the colonial schools instituted for this purpose, daily strengthened the ties which connected these islanders with the mother-country. Such was the state of Saint-

Domingo and the policy adopted by the French government towards it, when Colonel Vincent arrived at Paris. He was the bearer of the constitution which Toussaint-Louverture had adopted of his own mere authority, which he had caused to be printed and put in execution, and which he now notified to France. Not only the authority, but even the honour and dignity of the Republic were outraged by these proceedings. Of all possible ways of proclaiming his independence, and unfurling the flag of rebellion, Toussaint-Louverture had chosen the most insulting, and that which the Republic could least submit to tolerate. From that moment there was no longer room for deliberation: the black chiefs were ungrateful and rebellious Africans with whom it was impossible to establish any system. Both the honour and the interest of France, required that they should be effectually humbled. Thus the ruin of Toussaint-Louverture, and the misfortunes which afflicted the blacks, were the effects of that rash step, which was doubtless prompted by the English, who had already foreseen all the reverses which they must experience, if the blacks should contain themselves within the bounds of moderation and submission, and attach themselves to the mo-

ther-country. To give an idea of the indignation which the First Consul must have felt, it may suffice to mention that Toussaint not only assumed authority over the colony during his life, but invested himself with the right of naming his successor; and pretended to hold his authority, not from the mother-country, but from a *soi-disant* colonial assembly which he had created: and as Toussaint-Louverture was the most moderate of all the black generals; as Dessalines, Christophe, Clervaux, &c. were more violent, disaffected, and hostile to the authority of the mother-country, there was no longer room for deliberation. The former scheme was now impracticable: it was inevitably necessary to adopt the latter, and to make the sacrifice which it required.

## NOTE II.

### VOL. II. CHAP. XI.

Colonel Vincent's connexions with the blacks, and the confidence which Toussaint-Louverture reposed in him, had long excited the suspicion of government, although it continued to employ this officer for the purpose of influencing the blacks, and convincing them, as far as possible, of its good intentions towards them. But when he presented himself as bearer of the decla-

ration of independence published by the blacks, and even seemed inclined to defend it, he excited a sentiment of disgust, which was, however, dissembled, in order to avoid alarming Toussaint, and to collect the valuable information which this Colonel possessed, respecting the military position of the blacks, and the fortifications which they had constructed in the hills. As soon as this was effected, Colonel Vincent was ordered to keep himself, for the future, a stranger to the affairs of Saint-Domingo: he was placed at the disposal of the minister at war, to be employed in his military duties; and as he wished to be sent to a warm country, he obtained the direction of the fortifications of Tuscany. He afterwards attended as director of fortifications, for several years successively, at the January council of works which was held in presence of the Emperor: he there got his plans adopted for the chateaux Despresides, of Florence, Leghorn, and Porto-Ferrajo. He was partial to Florence, where one of his daughters was married. All this ought not to have given rise to *libellous assertions which disgrace an historical work.* The First Consul could not possibly have communicated his projects respecting Saint-Domingo, which required profound secrecy, and were to be exe-

cuted in a few months; to a person who was the agent of Toussaint, and whose secret machinations were no longer a mystery. He could not possibly have imparted to him his negotiations with the Court of London, and that with respect to the expedition of Saint-Domingo, and by a preparatory note; since neither notes, conferences, nor negotiations with England, relative to the expedition of Saint-Domingo, ever passed, or took place.

## NOTE III.

### VOL. II. CHAP. XIII.

This contains the departure of the Captain-General Le Clerc's army from France, its arrival at Saint-Domingo, and its subsequent operations. It is said:

"1st, That Napoleon had several functionaries of the colonies in his private cabinet, who drew up secret instructions, without ever calling in the experienced nautical officer who at that time held the *portefeuille* of the marine, to give his opinion, even on the naval details of the expedition: he had nothing to do but to sign as a true copy, the instructions already approved and signed by the First Consul; that the time occupied by the fleets of Brest, Rochefort, and L'Orient, in rallying at Cape Samana, prevented the expedition from surprising Toussaint-Louverture; 2dly, That the negotiations set on foot by the Cabinet of Saint-Cloud with foreign Cabinets, relative to the expedition, had made known the details of the plan; 3dly, That the secret instructions for

the expedition of Saint-Domingo contained a positive order to admit of no vacillation in the principles of their execution; which was the reason that General Le Clerc was obliged to lose a day in effecting the landing and surprising the Cape: ——that the *à-propos* is every thing in war——and that it is always dangerous to prescribe the details of measures in the instructions, &c. &c."

Throughout this business the First Consul acted only through the medium of his ministers. Had he not placed confidence in Decrès, the minister of marine, what could have prevented him from dismissing that minister and selecting another? Was it the influence which he possessed over the constituted authorities, or the nation; the naval victories he had gained; or the great affection which the navy had for him? Absurd. This minister drew up all the naval instructions. If he judged it necessary to appoint three rallying points for the squadrons of Brest, L'Orient, and Rochefort; the first at Cape Finisterre, the second at the Canaries, the third at Cape Samana, it was because such was the usage in his time, and particularly in the war of 1778. Were a minister to sign instructions contrary to his opinion and experience, he would be the most base and infamous of men. Why, then, calumniate an old minister and general officer, in an historical work, by attempting to justify

him? An injudicious friend is often more dangerous than an enemy.

Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse was forty-six days on his passage from Brest to the Cape, that is to say, four or five days more than the average passage of a convoy; but this circumstance is of no importance with respect to the burning of the Cape, and the fate of Saint-Domingo. It was impossible to surprise Toussaint-Louverture: the armaments which had been making in the ports of France had attracted the attention of the whole world, and the blacks had agents and friends at Paris, Nantes, Bourdeaux, Rochefort, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London. The American ships covered the ocean; not a day passed but several of them arrived in the ports of the colony. The American ships are fast sailers: besides a vessel sailing alone has a great advantage over a convoy, in point of expedition. The armament of Admiral Gantheaume at Brest, in January 1801, had put the blacks on their guard; from that time they had begun to erect fortifications in the interior, and to collect magazines of powder and provisions; they had also come to a resolution to burn the Cape and the towns, if they should be unable to defend them, and to retire to the hills. Their works had been

designed and directed by white officers of engineers. All the admirals and generals commanding troops or squadrons, whether of Brest, L'Orient, Rochefort, Cadiz, or Toulon, had orders from the minister of marine. For the execution of these orders it was necessary that the general of the land-forces and the admiral should concert their measures together; besides, Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse commanding all the squadrons in chief, had general orders for the sea-service, as the Captain-general Le Clerc had for the land-service. These orders were not intended to be published; but nevertheless they were not what are called secret orders. The squadron and division intended to take possession of Port-au-Prince were next in importance to those of the Cape. Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse and Captain-general Le Clerc were instructed to land at the Cape. Latouche Tréville, commander of the Rochefort squadron, and the General of division Boudet. were intended to land at Port-au-Prince. Admiral Latouche Tréville was the ablest officer of our navy, and, except the admiral of the fleet, the eldest. General Boudet had served in the war of the colonies; he was esteemed by the men of colour, who are numerous in the southern part of the island. The Rochefort

squadron destined for Port-au-Prince was to take on board the men and stores requisite for this operation. From these orders no deviation could be made, except pursuant to an agreement between the Captain-general and the Admiral. It appears that the Captain-general entertained a momentary intention of landing Boudet's division to take possession of the Cape, and mentioned it to the Admiral, who convinced him of the disadvantages of this plan. "Admiral Latouche and General Boudet," said he, "having understood, when they left France, that they were going to Port-au-Prince, have made their arrangements accordingly. If we alter these dispositions of government arbitrarily, and the expedition to Port-au-Prince should happen to fail, you and I shall be responsible for it." Captain-general Le Clerc immediately yielded to these prudent considerations, not being able to allege any necessity or urgent occasion for changing the original destination of the troops of General Boudet. Had the Admiral complied with the first wishes of the Captain-general, General Boudet would not have reached the Cape an hour sooner; Cape-town would still have been burnt, and it is probable that the expedition to Port-au-Prince would have failed, and that this town would have shared the fate

of the capital. It was the want of pilots which caused the delay in the occupation of the Cape; and it was an unpardonable piece of negligence in the marine department, not to provide them before leaving Brest. But, even had Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse been provided with pilots, he would on his arrival have instantly entered the Cape Roads under a press of sail; and had he immediately landed his troops, Cape-town would nevertheless have been burnt, because five or six hours were sufficient for the blacks to accomplish its destruction, as they had long before irrevocably determined on this measure, and made all their preparations accordingly.

The First Consul hesitated for a moment whether he ought to order the Captain-general not to effect his landing or commence hostilities, until his letter to Toussaint-Louverture, which the children of that General carried with them, should be sent back to him; but this would have been productive of great inconveniences—Toussaint would have kept the children and the letter following him from place to place as long as it suited him to do so. There had been many instances of this species of cunning. This, then, would have exposed the army to the loss of a most precious opportunity, and

would have given the blacks time to recover from their first surprise. It was unlucky that Toussaint's children were for several days prevented from landing; but this circumstance was ultimately of no importance. In reflecting on the conduct of Toussaint-Louverture with General Hédouville during the whole reign of the Directory, and that which he pursued in 1800 and 1801, it is evident that he had resolved to perish or attain independence; that is to say, not to permit the presence of any white force of more than 2000 men in the colony. Toussaint well knew that in proclaiming his constitution he had unmasked himself, drawn the sword, and thrown away the scabbard.

## NOTE IV.

VOL. II. CHAP. XVII. PAGE 177, AND CHAP. XVIII.

These two chapters contain the seizure of Toussaint-Louverture, his transportation to France, the insurrection of the blacks, and the death of Captain-general Le Clerc.

Captain-general Le Clerc was an officer of the first merit, equally skilful in the labours of the cabinet and in the manœuvres of the field of battle: he had served in the campaigns of

1796 and 1797 as adjutant-general to Napoleon; and in that of 1799 as a general of division under Moreau. He commanded at the battle of Freisingen, where he defeated the Archduke Ferdinand; he led into Spain an army of observation of 20,000 men intended to act against Portugal; finally, in this expedition of Saint-Domingo, he displayed great talent and activity. In less than three months he vanquished and reduced to submission that black army which had signalized itself by the defeat of an English force.

At the time of his departure from France, Captain-general Le Clerc had, in fact, received from Napoleon's own hands, secret instructions with respect to the political line of conduct he was to pursue in the government of the colony. These instructions remained unknown until the death of General Le Clerc: they were delivered, sealed up, to his successor. The general officer who wrote the History of the Revolutions of Saint-Domingo, knew of their existence, but was never able to discover their contents. Captain-general Le Clerc would have prevented many disasters, and spared himself much vexation, had he scrupulously adhered to the spirit of his secret instructions. By these he was ordered to place the greatest

confidence in the men of colour, to treat them as the equals of the whites, to promote the marriages of men of colour with white women, and of women of colour with white men; but to pursue a system directly the reverse with the blacks. Within the first week after the pacification of the colony, he was to order all the black generals, adjutant-generals, colonels, and chiefs of battalions, on service in their respective ranks in the continental divisions of France. He was to put them on board eight or ten ships in the different ports of the colony, and despatch them to Brest, Rochefort, and Toulon; he was to disarm all the blacks, excepting ten battalions of 600 men each, commanded by one-third of black officers and non-commissioned officers, one-third of officers and non-commissioned officers of colour, and one-third of white. Lastly, he was to take all necessary measures for securing the enjoyment of civil liberty to the blacks, and to confirm the orders of classification and labour which Toussaint-Louverture had established. But Le Clerc suffered himself to be prejudiced against the mulattoes: he participated in the antipathy of the creoles against them, who hate them worse than even the blacks: he sent Rigaud, their chief, out of the colony.

The mulattoes were alienated, and they now joined the blacks: Le Clerc placed his confidence in the black generals, as Dessalines, Christophe, Clervaux, &c. and not only retained them in the colony, but gave them important commands. He consented to allow Toussaint-Louverture to reside in the colony: nevertheless having afterwards detected a secret and culpable correspondence of this general, he had him arrested and conveyed to France; but the black staff, generals, adjutant-generals, colonels, and chiefs of battalions retained their situations. When the First Consul was informed of this conduct, he was exceedingly concerned: the authority of the mother-country in the colony could only be established through the influence of the men of colour: it was to be feared that by the delay in removing the black chiefs from the colony, the opportunity had been lost. It was impossible for persons who had governed as sovereigns, whose vanity was equal to their ignorance, to live quietly and submit to the rule of the mother-country; the first thing necessary for the security of Saint-Domingo was, therefore, to remove from 150 to 200 of the chiefs. In this proceeding no moral principle would have been violated, since all generals and offi-

cers are bound to serve in any part of the state in which it may be thought proper to employ them. As all these black chiefs were in correspondence with Jamaica, and with the English cruisers, this measure would at once have deprived the whole population of its military leaders, and cut off every channel of communication with foreigners. Finally, it would have been much more proper for Toussaint to have returned to France as a general of division, than as a criminal answerable to the mother-country, not only for old offences which had once been pardoned, but for other crimes of subsequent date.

The decree of the 28th of Floreal, 1801, which ordained the continued slavery of the blacks in Martinique and the Isle of France, and their liberty in Saint-Domingo, Guadaloupe, and Cayenne, was just, politic, and expedient. It was necessary to secure the tranquillity of Martinique, which had just been surrendered by the English. The general law of the Republic was the liberty of the blacks: if this particular law had not been made for this colony and the Isle of France, the blacks of those colonies would have demanded the benefit of the general law: the consequent reaction would have fallen

much more heavily on the blacks of Saint-Domingo. Had the government remained silent, and the blacks continued slaves at Martinique, they would naturally have asked why, notwithstanding the law, persons of their colour were kept in a state of slavery at Martinique? It was, therefore, incumbent on the government to say: "The blacks shall be slaves at Martinique, and at the Isles of France and Bourbon; and they shall be free at Saint-Domingo, Guadaloupe, and Cayenne;" and to proclaim the *status quo* as a principle.

It cannot be supposed that there are men extravagant enough, after the experience of past events, to insist that the First Consul ought abruptly to have given liberty to the blacks of Martinique, and of the Isles of France and Bourbon: the consequence of this would have been insurrections in both these islands, and the continuance of their separation from the mother-country; as well as the destruction of the colony of Martinique, which had just been restored by the English in a quiet and prosperous state. Many thousands of the white French inhabitants would have become the prey of the ferocious African population. As to the continuation of the slave-trade, that could not affect the blacks of Saint-Domingo,

who were desirous that it should be kept up to recruit and augment their numbers: they had encouraged it for their own advantage.

The question of the liberty of the blacks is very complicated and difficult. In Africa and in Asia it has been resolved; but it has been so by means of polygamy. The whites and the blacks there form parts of the same family. The head of the family having white and black wives, and wives of colour, the white and mulatto children are brothers, are bred in the same cradle, bear the same name, and eat at the same table. Would it then be impossible to authorize polygamy in our islands, restricting the number of wives to two, a white one and a black one? The First Consul had several conferences with theologians to prepare this grand measure. The patriarchs had several wives in the first ages of Christianity: the Church permitted and tolerated a species of concubinage, the effect of which was to allow one man to have several wives. The Pope and the Councils have the authority and the means to authorize such an institution, because the object of it is the conciliation and harmony of society, and not the increasing of carnal pleasures. The effect of these marriages would be confined to the

colonies: proper measures would be taken to prevent them from spreading disorder in the bosom of European society.

The fact is, that the decree of May, relative to the blacks, was but a pretext. Their insurrection was the effect of the intrigues of the English in that month, and of the cruel disease which swept off the best of our troops. It was then that the Captain-general repented his imprudent indulgence, in neglecting the orders of the First Consul during the first week of May. Every thing would have turned out very differently, if he had then freed the colony of two or three hundred of the black chiefs. In politics, as in war, the lost moment never returns.

# NOTES

ON THE WORK INTITLED

# MEMOIRS

RELATIVE TO THE HISTORY OF CHARLES XIV. JOHN, KING OF SWEDEN.*

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PAGE 105.

"Bonaparte replied that he had already passed his word to the Prince Royal of Denmark, and to the Emperor of Russia."

False.

PAGE 119.

"On the 28th of May, 1810, the unexpected death of the Prince of Augustenburg, called on the States to make new regulations respecting the inheritance of the throne of Sweden. France was then at the summit of her power: the States assembled at Oërebro, resolved to consign the destinies of Sweden to a French Prince: they called Marshal Bernadotte, Prince of Ponte-Corvo, to succeed Charles XIII."

The King of Sweden required a French Prince of Napoleon. The Viceroy was wished for; but the change of his religion was an in-

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* *Mémoires pour servir à l'Histoire de Charles XIV. Jean, Roi de Suède.*

superable obstacle. There only remained the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, and he was conceded, after long negotiations carried on at Paris by the Swedish general, Count de Wrede.

PAGE 179.

" Napoleon, far from approving of this election, seemed at first much dissatisfied with it. But afterwards on reflecting that in consenting to Bernadotte's elevation, he was removing a rival whose popularity excited his jealousy; 'Well,' said he, 'let the decree of fate be accomplished.' "

This is too absurd to merit refutation. Bernadotte was destitute of military reputation. There were in France twenty generals who had commanded in chief, and were more celebrated than he. Besides he was very unpopular, from having been attached to the *Société du Manège*. He had received no education whatever.

PAGE 135.

" After having supported the passage of the Tagliamento, Bernadotte, with the advanced guard of the French army, entered the strong town of Palma-Nuova, and from thence proceeded to attack the fortress of Gradisca," &c.

Bernadotte attacked Gradisca during the passage of the Isonzo; he was completely defeated, and lost between 400 and 500 choice troops. It was so unskilful an operation as to excite in a high degree the displeasure of

Napoleon, who at this time passed the Isonzo with Serrurier's division, and occupied a commanding position on the heights of the left bank. It was not until then, that the fortress, thus invested and commanded, surrendered.

PAGE 138.

"He had caused M. d'Entraigues, attached to the Russian embassy at Venice, to be arrested at Trieste."

M. d'Entraigues was arrested on the Brenta, as he was leaving Venice, by Bernadotte, whose division occupied that part of the country.

PAGE 139.

"He displayed the tri-coloured flag."

His conduct in this respect, was considered as equally ridiculous and impolitic: it was universally condemned in France. The Directory disavowed it.

PAGE 140.

"Soon after, he married the daughter of a merchant of Avignon, settled at Marseilles, named Clary. This young lady, sister-in-law to Joseph Bonaparte, had been intended for General Duphot, who was assassinated at Rome in a popular insurrection."

In 1796, while Napoleon was in Egypt, Joseph married his sister-in-law to Bernadotte;

her father was one of the principal merchants of Marseilles, and not of Avignon. Napoleon intended her for General Duphot, murdered at Rome, in 1797. If Bernadotte became a marshal of France, and prince of Ponte-Corvo, and at length a king, it is to this marriage that he is indebted for all. Desirée, the reigning queen of Sweden, was the object of Napoleon's earliest attachment: he was to have married her. When he became Emperor, he took a pleasure in making his sister-in-law the wife of a marshal, a princess, and finally a queen. Her son Oscar, prince of Sudermania, is Napoleon's godson: his baptism was delayed till Napoleon returned from Egypt: he named him Oscar, because he was then reading with much interest the Poems of Ossian, in the excellent translation of a professor at Padua. All the errors, and foolish actions of Bernadotte, during the Imperial reign, were constantly pardoned on account of this marriage.

PAGE 141.

"Some days after, having been appointed general in chief of the armies of Italy and Naples, Bernadotte, directing his attention to these two armies, which together were scarcely equivalent to one well organized, judged that he should not have sufficient strength to preserve such an ex-

tent of territory, and attack the Austrians on the Adige: he therefore required that the Directory should place 70,000 men at his disposal. 'Though the enemy,' said he, 'have 100,000, I think that with 70,000 French or auxiliaries, I shall force their positions. I will then arm the Venetians, reach the Isonzo, and pursue my march to Vienna.' The Directory persisted in not allowing him more than 50,000 men: the general replied, 'Turenne or Bonaparte himself would be beaten with such an army; for the fortresses which were at our disposal two years ago, are now against us.' To conclude, in refusing the command of this army, he openly predicted its reverses: his predictions were unfortunately accomplished."

There were in Italy 110,000 French, besides Piedmontese, Poles, Cisalpines, Romans, and Neapolitans: Bernadotte justly considered himself incapable of directing such an army. It was the general opinion that his incapacity would have led him into endless mistakes; he was therefore well advised to act as he did.

PAGE 141.

"He set out for the army of observation, repaired the fortresses on the Rhine, and took possession of Manheim."

Manheim had then a garrison of only 500 men: the gates were opened to Bernadotte, who invested it with 8,000.

PAGE 148.

"At the moment when the profound conceptions of the minister were realizing," &c.

Bernadotte was for two months minister of war; his administration was marked only by folly, and by the protection he afforded to the mob-orators of the *Société du Manège*. He effected nothing in the way of organization, and the Directory was obliged to dismiss him from office, on account of his seditious intrigues. He had ceased to be minister, when Massena decided the campaign, by the victory of Zurich, towards the end of September 1799. He was completely ignorant of these combinations, and his causing a diversion to be made on Philipsburg with 25,000 men, was an operation contrary to all rule.

PAGE 149.

"After the revolution of the 18th Brumaire."

On the 18th of Brumaire, Bernadotte joined the *Société du Manège*, in opposing the successful transactions of that day. Napoleon pardoned him for his wife's sake.

PAGE 151.

"The discipline which he maintained in the army of Hanover."

In Hanover, he protected and participated in the peculations of the Intendant Michaux.

PAGE 152.

"Keeps the Russian army in check."

Kutusoff had no desire to quit Branau; Bernadotte was a complete stranger to the whole operation of Ulm. The corps of Marshal Soult, of twice the strength of his, was at Munich.

"The Emperor confers on Marshal Bernadotte the sovereignty and the title of Prince and Duke of Ponte-Corvo."

In making him Prince of Ponte-Corvo, the Emperor's only object was to exalt his wife, the sister-in-law of Joseph.

PAGE 152.

"It was in this engagement that the young Prince Louis of Prussia lost his life."

Prince Louis of Prussia was killed in the action at Saalfeld. That was an affair of importance: it was Marshal Lannes who commanded there. The action at Schleitz sustained by the corps of Marshal Bernadotte, was of little consequence; besides, the Emperor was there in person.

SAME PAGE.

"After the battle of Jena....."

The conduct of Bernadotte, at Jena, was such, that the Emperor had signed the decree for bringing him before a council of war, and

he would inevitably have been shot, so general was the indignation of the army against him; he had nearly occasioned the loss of the battle. It was out of regard for his wife, that the Emperor destroyed the order, at the moment he was about to put it in the hands of the Prince of Neufchâtel. Shortly after, Bernadotte distinguished himself at the battle of Halle, which in some degree effaced the former unfavourable impressions.

Bernadotte commanded the first corps, consisting of 18,000 men; he arrived at Naumburg in the rear of Marshal Davoust, who commanded the third corps, 30,000 strong. Bernadotte had orders to support Davoust, thus forming a mass of 50,000 men, to defend the defile of Kosen and the field of battle of Averstadt. Half the corps of Davoust had already passed the Saal, when Bernadotte arrived and offered to head the column upon the foolish pretext that his corps was No. 1: Davoust, with reason, opposed this, representing that it would occasion the loss of valuable time, and would confuse the different troops in a defile, which would be productive of much mischief. Bernadotte then raised his camp, and marched towards Dornburg: at break of day he passed the Saal there. Precisely at this time, Davoust

was attacked by the King of Prussia, at the head of 60,000 of his best troops. He then felt severely the loss of the 18,000 men under Bernadotte: it was under these circumstances that the battle of Averstadt took place, in which Davoust gained so much glory. Bernadotte, at Dornburg, had still an opportunity of retrieving his error, by falling upon the rear of the Prussian army; he contented himself with parading his troops, without firing a shot: the generals, officers, and soldiers evinced the bitterness of their indignation in loud accusations of treason.

PAGE 175.

"The evening before the battle of Wagram, the Emperor issued a general order, forbidding any of the troops to quit the ranks, for the purpose of conveying the wounded to the waggons; measures being taken, as the order stated, to render them assistance on the field. The Prince of Ponte-Corvo, who commanded the Saxons, did not insert this prohibition in the orders of his corps; and as it happened, that during the action the French division of Dupas, which he had placed in reserve, was withdrawn without his being informed of it, and that an adjoining corps seized upon the horses belonging to the Saxon waggons, for the service of its flying artillery, the Saxon troops suffered more than any other; a great number of them lay wounded on the field. Bernadotte ordered the horses to be taken from some pieces of cannon and applied to the use of the waggons for the wounded; and when it was represented to him that it ex-

posed the artillery to the risk of being taken: 'What then?' said the philanthropic warrior, 'the cannon are but so much brass; the blood of the soldier is much more precious.'"

This is altogether false. The Saxons gave way, both on the morning of the battle of Wagram, and on the evening before; they were the worst troops in the whole army. Notwithstanding this, the Prince of Ponte-Corvo, contrary to all order and discipline, issued a proclamation the following day, calling them a column of granite. Weary of his idle vapouring and boasting, the Emperor deprived him of his command, and sent him back to Paris.

PAGE 156.

"In the mean time the order of the Emperor had been executed throughout the army to such a degree of severity, that a Marshal of France, seeing some grenadiers carrying their Colonel, whose thigh had been carried away by a ball, ordered them to set him down by the road-side, and sent them back to their ranks with a reprimand. 'Sir,' said he to the dying Colonel, 'a soldier should know how to die on the spot where he receives his wound.' A young officer, Colonel Lebrun, the son of the Duke of Placenza, was at this time near the Marshal, he shuddered with horror: 'Our profession does not allow of much delicacy,' said the unfeeling warrior; 'It is no time to talk of philanthropy during a day of battle.'"

A calumny.

PAGE 156.

"On his arrival at Antwerp, his (Bernadotte's) presence dispelled all their fears. Endowed with unwearied activity he combined and arranged, as by magic, all the means of defence. He did more; he excited an universal enthusiasm. Thousands of soldiers arose at his call, and defeated the rash projects of the enemy. The English abandoned the enterprise, and the Prince prepared to rejoin the army of Germany. He was about to resume a command in it, when peace was signed; upon this he returned to Paris, and was invested with the Grand Cross of St. Henry of Saxony."

On his arrival at Paris, the Minister of war supposing that he had returned on account of ill health, sent him to Antwerp, where he talked much, wrote much, and did nothing to the purpose. When he arrived at Antwerp, the English expedition had already failed; Antwerp was safe, for the Scheldt squadron, carrying 12,000 seamen, had returned to the city, and reinforced the garrison, which now consisted of 30,000 men. The object of all Lord Chatham's arrangements must have been the intercepting of this squadron, which was in the roads of Flushing; for, without that, Antwerp could never have been taken.

PAGE 158.

"Some political writers have supposed that Napoleon exerted a great influence in securing the elevation of Ber-

nadotte to the throne of Sweden. In this respect they have been mistaken. Not only was the Emperor a stranger to this astonishing nomination, it is also certain that it was far from agreeable to him,"

If this election had been disagreeable to the Emperor, it would not have taken place; for it was to obtain his protection and the good will of France that the Swedes made it.

The Emperor was allured by the glory of seeing a Marshal of France become a King; a woman for whom he was interested, a Queen; and his godson, a Prince Royal. He gave Bernadotte, on his departure from Paris, several millions of francs, to enable him to appear in Sweden with suitable splendour.

PAGE 163.

"Provided that the aforesaid Prince, in case he be elected by the States to the succession to the throne, shall, before his arrival in the Swedish territory, have declared his profession of the Lutheran Evangelical Doctrine," &c.

Bernadotte was born in the Apostolic Roman Catholic faith; this he abjured for the Reformed Religion. Many would have done as much; but it was this circumstance that prevented Prince Eugene from being sent to reign over Sweden. His wife, a Princess of Bavaria, would have been inconsolable. Desirée, the reigning Queen of Sweden, refused

to change her religion, but still professes the Apostolic Roman Catholic Faith, in which she was born.

PAGE 255.

"Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden, to H. M. the Emperor of France. Stockholm, 11 May, 1812."

This letter is a falsehood; it is an after-invention; it was never received: in fact, M. de Signeul, the Swedish Consul, was even so late as June, at Dresden, negotiating on the part of Sweden. Surely, after a letter of this description, negotiations would no longer have been kept up with Sweden.

PAGE 273.

"Note from Baron Engestrom to M. de Cabre."

The truth was well known respecting the dispositions of the Cabinet of Stockholm, and its connexions with that of London; these matters were no longer doubtful.

PAGE 323.

"Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden, to His Majesty the Emperor of France. Stockholm, 23 March, 1813."

The style of this letter plainly indicates that it is a libel; no such letter was received. A month before the battle of Lutzen, the Emperor of France was not to be thus addressed! It is a pity that persons of such

elevated rank should lend their signatures to such gross fabrications.

PAGE 338.

"General Lauriston was sent to Prince Kutusow, to propose an armistice. The Prince received Lauriston in the midst of his Generals."

This is all false; it was not the object of Lauriston's mission to demand either peace or armistice.

PAGE 340.

"On the 11th of October Murat was charged by Bonaparte to make a second attempt upon Miloradowich, who commanded the van-guard of the Russian army."

This dialogue of the King of Naples with General Miloradowich, is also false.

# NOTES

ON THE WORK INTITLED

## CONSIDERATIONS ON THE ART OF WAR, *

PRINTED AT PARIS IN 1816.

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### OBJECT OF THE NOTES.

1. Organization and recruiting of the Army.—2. Infantry.—3. Cavalry.—4. Artillery.—5. Orders of Battle.—6. Defensive War.

THIS work is divided into fourteen chapters, forming a volume of six hundred pages. The author has no experience as a commander; he is a stranger to the service of the infantry, the cavalry, the artillery, and the staff. He was lieutenant-colonel of engineers, in Spain, in 1809; he directed the sieges of several places in Catalonia, Arragon, and the

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* *Considérations sur l'Art de la Guerre.*

Province of Valencia. Marshal Suchet recommended him as skilled in his profession, and obtained for him successively the ranks of brigadier-general, and general of division, and the title of baron: at the campaign of Saxony, in 1813, he was nominated to the situation of chief engineer in this army. He did not justify the opinion which Marshal Suchet had conceived of him; he possessed neither sufficient experience nor depth of mind. The most indispensable qualification for the chief engineer of an army, who ought to understand, arrange, and direct all the works that belong to his department, is a sound judgment.

## NOTE I.

### ORGANIZATION AND RECRUITING OF THE ARMY.

PAGE 70.

"The use of permanent armies, constantly at the disposal of the Prince, intended to supersede temporary and disorderly levies, was established throughout Europe, and the villages were obliged to furnish annually a certain number of men to form and recruit them; these soldiers or militia were chosen by lot from the whole population."

PAGE 72.

"What base and odious means have the recruiters employed, to entrap unguarded youth in their snares. . . . ."

PAGE 75.

"But this word *Conscription* alarms the minds of the multitude! Well! let us change this terrible expression. Let us take another, *Militia*, for instance. . . . . ."

PAGE 79.

"An important question presents itself, which is to enquire to what age it is expedient for the good of the army, and of the state, that the soldier should be retained in the ranks. Towards the age of thirty, when man has completed his growth, his limbs begin to lose their flexibility, he soon becomes heavy and inactive. . . . ."

PAGE 86.

"The inhabitants of the North, stupified by the climate, and fattened with beer, are heavy and inactive, of a patient phlegmatic disposition, and a sluggish imagination. Those of the South, animated by the general warmth of their climate and their wine, are dry and spare in body, but of strong sinews, of livèly imagination, and of volatile disposition. . . . . The first, accustomed to inclement seasons and a life of hardship . . . . . support the labours and fatigues of war without a murmur; are proof against the reverses of fortune, and obey mechanically without reflection: but being cold, passionless and slow, they find it difficult to sustain rapid marches, and are ill qualified for sudden attacks and desperate enterprises. The second, quick and active, susceptible of enthusiasm and transport, march rapidly forward, rush on the enemy and dash into the midst of danger. Nothing is more terrible than their first attack:

but this heat soon evaporates, a continuance of danger wears them out, a succession of toils renders them impatient. The rude life of a camp, which affords none of the luxuries to which they are accustomed, seems insupportable to them; a retrograde march discourages them; if they are exalted by success, they are equally dejected by the smallest reverse. Inconstant and untractable, they can ill endure the restraint of discipline."

PAGE 83.

"3dly.—The English, who, of all nations, possess the best institutions both civil and military."

1st.—Forced enlistments have ever been in use among Republics as well as Monarchies, both with the ancients and the moderns. The peasants being slaves in Russia and Poland, men are levied in those countries as horses are in others. In Germany, every village has its lord, who names the recruits, without regard either to their rights or convenience. In France, the recruiting of the army has always been determined by lot: under Louis XIV, Louis XV, and Louis XVI, it was called drawing the Militia; under Napoleon, drawing the Conscription. The privileged classes were exempt from the former; no one was exempt from the latter: it was a levy without distinction, which rendered it as unpalatable to the privileged classes, as the former mode was to the mass of the people.

The Conscription was the milder, the more equitable, and the more advantageous plan for the people in general. The regulations respecting it were rendered so perfect under the Empire, that there is nothing to change, not even the name, lest it should lead to an alteration in the principle. The departments which since 1814 have been detached from France, have solicited and obtained, as a benefit, the continuance of the laws of the Conscription, in order to escape the arbitrary, unjust, and vexatious regulations of the Austrians and Prussians on this subject. The Illyrian provinces, long accustomed to the Austrian mode of recruiting, never ceased to express their admiration of the French Conscription; and since they have returned to the dominion of their former sovereign, they have obtained a continuance of its regulations.

During the first ten years of the Revolution, the armies were recruited by the Requisition, which comprehended all citizens from the age of eighteen to twenty-five; in this there was no drawing, or serving by substitute. The Conscription only selected for recruiting the army, young men entering their twentieth year; they were not obliged to serve more than five years; this regulation had the advan-

tage of forming a great number of soldiers, who on any sudden emergency, were prepared to defend their country; but it was not without many inconveniences. It is desirable to extend the term of service to ten years, that is to say, to the age of thirty, except where leave of absence, under the obligation of rejoining the regiments in time of war, is granted to those who, being above twenty-five, shall have served for five successive years. It is from the age of thirty to fifty that man is in full possession of his powers, it is during this period that he is best qualified for war. The soldier should be encouraged by all means to remain under his colours; this will be accomplished by shewing a marked esteem for the veteran troops, by dividing them into three classes, giving five sous a-day to the first, seven sous and a half to the second, ten sous to the third, fifteen sous to a corporal, and thirty sous to a sergeant. It is highly unjust not to give higher pay to a veteran than to a recruit.

A population of a million furnishes annually from 7 to 8000 Conscripts, that is, about the hundred and thirty-fifth part: half this number is necessary to supply men for the business of government, of the church, and of

the arts. An annual levy of 3500 men, would in ten years give 30,000, allowing for deaths; 15,000 men would compose the army of the line, 15,000 the army of reserve. Of the 15,000 troops of the line, 6000 might be kept under arms for twelve months, 4000 for three months, and 5000 for fifteen days; this will be equivalent to 7000 men for the whole army, withdrawn from agriculture. The 15,000 men of the army of reserve would neither be taken from their occupations, nor removed from their homes.

On the establishment of peace, Napoleon was to compose his army of 1,200,000 men; of which number 600,000 were to form the army of the line, 200,000 the army of the interior, 400,000 the army of reserve. The 600,000 men of the army of the line would have formed: 1st. Forty regiments of infantry, of twelve battalions, each battalion containing 910 men; with a squadron of troopers of 360 horses, each four feet six inches high; a battery of eight cannons, served by 280 men; a company of sappers of 150 men; a battalion of military equipage, of three companies, having 22 carriages and 210 men: total 12,000. 2dly. Twenty regiments of cavalry, of 3600

men each; that is to say, eight of light horse, six of dragoons, and six of cuirassiers; each regiment of ten squadrons, of 360 men each, divided into three companies. 3dly. Ten regiments of artillery, forming eight battalions of 500 men each. 4thly. A regiment of engineers of eight battalions, 4000 men. 5thly. A regiment of military equipages, &c. of 4000 men: total 300,000 men.

The Empire contained a population of upwards of 40,000,000; it was intended to be divided into forty *arrondissemens*, or districts, each containing one million. Each district was to be assigned to a regiment of infantry to recruit from. The fear of the spirit of federalism would have been guarded against, by taking care that the officers and half the sub-officers should be strangers to the district.

The infantry of an army being represented by one, the cavalry will be one fourth; the artillery one eighth; the troops of the engineer department, a fortieth; the military equipage, a thirtieth; which will make 13 thirtieths; but it will be sufficient to make the cavalry the fifth part of the infantry of the state, on account of the mountainous districts.

The army of the interior, of 200,000 men

would have been composed of 200 battalions of infantry, and of 400 companies of cannoneers destined, in time of war, to defend the fortresses and coasts; of this army only the officers would have been constantly maintained; the non-commissioned officers and privates would only have been assembled on Sundays in the principal place of their commune. The 400,000 men of the army of reserve would only have existed on paper; they would merely have been subjected to a review once in three months to ascertain their existence and to rectify the muster rolls, descriptions, &c. Thus a numerical force of 1,200,000 would have withdrawn from agricultural labours only 280,000 men.

2dly.—The Romans, Greeks, and Spaniards, are southern nations; in the times of their glory their armies were patient, disciplined, indefatigable, and never to be discouraged. The Swedes, under Gustavus Adolphus, and Charles XII; as well as the Russians, under Suwarrow, became agile, intelligent, and impetuous. The character of troops is more influenced by the territorial circumstances of their country, its open or mountainous nature—by their education, and discipline, than by climate.

3dly.—The military institutions of the Eng-

lish are faulty: 1st, They recruit only by means of money, except that they often empty their prisons to fill their ranks. 2dly, Their discipline is cruel. 3dly, Their soldiers are of such a description, that only middling non-commissioned officers can be drawn from the ranks; whence they are obliged to multiply their officers beyond all proportion. 4thly, Each of their battalions drags in its train hundreds of women and children: no army carries so much baggage. 5thly, The officers' commissions are saleable; lieutenancies, companies, and battalions, are purchased. 6thly, An officer may be at the same time a major in the army and a captain in his regiment; an absurdity quite incompatible with a proper military feeling.

## NOTE II.—INFANTRY.

PAGE 93.

"But the greatest defect of our battalions is, that they have only one kind of infantry. Formerly we had two sorts: the pikemen, who fought in the ranks, and the arquebuseers, whose business was to keep up a fire of small arms."

PAGE 96.

"This is the way in which I compose my battalion, which I call a *cohort*, to mark that I have the Roman organization in view. In battle the cohort has no other natural division than that of ranks: I adopt, therefore, this division, sanc-

tioned by the example of the ancient Roman legion; and I make of each rank a company of the line; which gives three companies of the line to each cohort, because we form our line of battle in three ranks. The first company, formed of soldiers selected, not on account of their height, but of their bravery, will form the front rank, which is the most exposed, and ought to be an example to the others: I would have it retain the honourable name of *grenadiers*, distinguished by so many exploits, and recalling such glorious recollections. The second company, formed by a second choice, will be placed in the third rank; and, lastly, the third company, composed of the most raw and least intrepid soldiers, confined in the second rank, between two ranks of picked men, will be forced to do its duty."

PAGE 99.

"Besides these three companies of the line, we shall organize a fourth company of light troops, to which we shall continue to give the title of *voltigeurs*,* which expresses so well the nature of their service; for it is certain that two sorts of infantry must be created: the one forming masses or lines to sustain the shock and brunt of the battle, and overthrow the enemy; and the other to reconnoitre, harass, and pursue him: this is a truth which no one experienced in war will dispute."

PAGE 166.

"The training of the light troops and that of the troops of the line ought to be as distinct as the services to which they are destined. What is the use of teaching voltigeurs slow and regular evolutions, and movements of the line, when they are never to serve in the line or make use of them? Let us rather exercise them in running, leaping, swimming, clearing all impediments, covering themselves by all the local

* Riflemen, or Sharpshooters.

advantages of the ground, dispersing themselves in front of the lines; in rallying with the utmost swiftness, to form in platoons against cavalry; in mixing and fighting along with our legionary horse; in mounting behind them, and, above all, in firing with great dexterity, in all sorts of positions. Such is the training suitable to the nature of their service."

PAGE 168.

"The voltigeurs are intended to fight and march disjunctively; it is therefore useless to teach them an uniform step, and to instruct them in manœuvring regularly and together like troops of the line. It is sufficient to accustom them to form rapidly together in a circle, against cavalry, and to rally in the rear of the lines. In the first case they ought to run and platoon irregularly round their officers, and to form a complete circle, presenting bullets and bayonets in every direction. This is the most prompt, and perhaps the best way of forming a little troop to resist cavalry."

PAGE 200.

"Part of the voltigeurs of the first line will be dispersed in advance, in front of the cohorts. The number of these tirailleurs ought to be proportioned to the extent of the line, in the ratio of three or four feet to each man, a space necessary to enable them to act without constraint. This service will seldom employ more than half a company to a cohort; the other voltigeurs will form in platoons behind the cohort, or will remain in reserve, ready to relieve the first tirailleurs, to whom rest becomes necessary after two or three hours of this fatiguing and perilous service. This reserve may be employed in picking up the wounded of the line, to carry them to the waggons; in fetching supplies of cartridges from the ammunition stores; and, in short, in all those functions for which it is necessary to quit the colours; so that the soldiers

of the line, having no pretext for leaving their ranks, may habituate themselves never to abandon them, but to remain immovable at their posts: this will be the way to preserve the lines entire and unbroken. The voltigeurs of the second line will platoon to the right and left of their cohorts in column; or, when the columns are formed into squares, they may be placed at the four angles, where, on account of the position of the faces of the square, no fire would otherwise be kept up."

PAGE 212.

"The tirailleurs may be of the greatest utility in facilitating an approach to the enemy's lines, and diverting or confusing their fire; they ought not to hesitate to run two or three hundred toises in advance, to get within gun-shot of the foe, and distress them with their scattered fire; which they may do the more securely as the enemy cannot retaliate; for with a little intelligence and experience, the skirmishers may all cover themselves; some crouch at the bottom of a ditch, others lie down in a furrow; here some hide themselves behind the trees; there others thrust themselves into the midst of the hedges and thickets."

PAGE 214.

"The enemy will no doubt send his cavalry to chase away and punish these troublesome skirmishers; but our voltigeurs can defend themselves from this attack; they rally, running at full speed; they platoon, and form a number of little globes of fire, the more difficult to attack, as every soldier, armed with a double-barrelled gun, has two shots to fire."

PAGE 123.

"Our tactics also subdivide the ranks into companies of a cohort, into eight and sixteen parts; which fixes, at eight and sixteen, the number of sergeants and corporals necessary to command these sections: the same non-commissioned

officers will always be intrusted with the command of the same sections, that their pride may be interested in carefully superintending the instruction and discipline of the soldiers under their command."

PAGE 193.

"According to my legionary organization, which I beg the reader to recollect, the grenadiers form the first rank; the third company, the second; and the second company, the third. The three captains will be stationed each at the right of his company or rank; the three lieutenants will occupy similar stations on the left. Thus the cohort will find itself inclosed between these six officers, who will prevent and suppress, by their immediate presence, the wavering and disorder which, in critical moments, usually commence on the flanks, the weak parts of every order of battle. They will find themselves stationed on the same line with their soldiers, whom they will animate and encourage by their example. The six ensigns will be placed, at equal distances, behind the cohort, to maintain order, and prevent any soldier from quitting his post. The sergeants and corporals will be stationed each at the right of his section."

PAGE 169.

"The voltigeurs will be exercised in mixing with the light cavalry, and fighting along with it. We shall form our voltigeurs in platoons of the strength of our legionary squadrons, of seventy-two men; each platoon will be attached to a squadron, which it will accompany, at a running pace, in all its movements, in order to force or to maintain defiles. These two arms will mutually protect each other, and each will endeavour to take up such ground as is most favourable to its manner of fighting; but always observing to remain sufficiently near each other to render mutual support. The

voltigeur should exercise himself in leaping up behind his horseman, in order that the platoons of infantry may be transported from place to place as rapidly as the cavalry. He should be accustomed to sling his firelock in a bandeleer at his back, and to jump up behind the horseman, by leaning lightly with his hands on the crupper of the horse. For most of these exercises it must be supposed that the voltigeur carries no knapsack; that load would deprive them of their lightness and agility, and would constantly impede the rapidity of their motions. I would have their knapsacks carried by bat-horses, in the rear of each cohort, which would require nine for each cohort."

PAGE 310.

"We form our vanguard of legionary cavalry, of the four legions of the *corps d'armée*, with an equal number of voltigeurs."

PAGE 121.

"I shall say but one word on military instruments, and that will be to endeavour to procure the banishment of the drum, a barbarous instrument, which, by its monotonous and disagreeable sounds, deafens and fatigues every ear of the least sensibility."

PAGE 146.

"This want of defensive armour is very fatal to our infantry; every time they are struck, from whatever distance, they are disabled; they are wounded by the slightest stroke."

PAGE 148.

"Their weight will not exceed eight or nine pounds."

PAGE 150.

"The voltigeurs stand less in need of cuirasses than the troops of the line, because they are not intended to fight in

ranks, and to close with the enemy; they only combat at a distance."

PAGE 123.

"The officers of the company, except the commanding officer, will be in their turns charged with and responsible for those details which now come within the exclusive province of the sergeant-major. By this regulation the frauds of the non-commissioned officers may be prevented."

PAGE 262.

"In closing this chapter, I may perhaps be allowed to protest against a custom most pernicious to the health and preservation of the troops, introduced amongst us by the war of the revolution: it is one of the principal causes of that frightful destruction of men which has occurred in the course of our last wars, in which it may be calculated, on an average, that the foot soldiers do not last more than two campaigns. Our unfortunate men after a fatiguing march in the mud, in rainy weather, often arrive in the midst of the night at a wet piece of ground which affords no shelter. They have neither the time nor the materials necessary for the construction of barracks; they pass the night under a cold, rainy sky, unable to close their eyes; and after dragging on, for a short time, a painful existence, every instant of which is embittered by the sufferings they endure from being constantly wet, they fall sick, and perish miserably."

1st.—The Romans had two sorts of infantry: the first, lightly armed, was provided with a missile weapon; the second, heavily armed, bore a short sword. After the invention of powder, two species of infantry were still continued: the arquebuseers, who were lightly

armed, and intended to observe and harass the enemy; and the pikemen, who supplied the place of the heavy-armed infantry. During the hundred and fifty years which have elapsed since Vauban banished lances and pikes from all the infantry of Europe, substituting for them the firelock and bayonet, all the infantry has been lightly armed; it has been employed to observe the enemy and keep him in check. There has been, since that time, only one sort of infantry: if there was a company of chasseurs in every battalion, it was by way of counterpoise to the company of grenadiers; the battalion being composed of nine companies, one picked company did not appear sufficient. If the Emperor Napoleon created companies of voltigeurs armed with dragoons' fusils, it was to substitute them for those companies of chasseurs. He composed them of men under five feet in height, in order to bring into use that class of the Conscription which measured from four feet ten inches to five feet; and having been, until that time, exempt, made the burden of the Conscription fall more heavily on the other classes. This arrangement served to reward a great number of old soldiers, who, being under five feet in height, could not enter into the companies of grena-

diers; and who, on account of their bravery, deserved to enter into a picked company: it was a powerful incentive to emulation to bring the giants and the pigmies into competition. Had there been men of different colours in the armies of the Emperor, he would have composed companies of blacks and companies of whites; in a country where there were cyclops or hunchbacks, a good use might be made of companies of cyclops, and others of hunchbacks.

In 1789, the French army was composed of regiments of the line and battalions of chasseurs: the chasseurs of the Cevennes, the Vivarais, the Alps, of Corsica, and of the Pyrenees, who at the revolution formed half-brigades of light infantry; but the object was not to have two different sorts of infantry, for they were raised alike, instructed alike, drilled alike; only the battalions of chasseurs were recruited by the men of the mountainous districts, or by the sons of the garde-chasse; whence they were more fit to be employed on the frontiers of the Alps and Pyrenees; and when they were in the armies of the North, they were always detached, in preference, for climbing heights, or scouring a forest: when these men were placed in line, in a battle,

they served very well as a battalion of the line, because they had received the same instruction, and were armed and disciplined in the same manner. Every power occasionally raises, in war time, irregular corps, under the title of free or legionary battalions, consisting of foreign deserters, or formed of individuals of a particular party or faction; but that does not constitute two sorts of infantry. There is and can be but one. If the apes of antiquity must needs imitate the Romans, it is not light-armed troops that they ought to introduce, but heavy-armed soldiers, or battalions armed with swords; for all the infantry of Europe serves as light troops.

If it were possible for the infantry to employ only the voltigeurs in skirmishing, it would forget the use of fire-arms; whole campaigns would pass without a trigger being drawn; but that is not possible. When the company of voltigeurs is detached to the van-guard, to the baggage, or to the flanks, must the four companies of the battalion give up watching the enemy's motions? Will they stand still whilst the enemy's bullets are falling in the midst of their ranks? When a company of the battalion is detached, must it dispense with all observation of the enemy, or must it be followed by a

squad of the company of voltigeurs? This company of voltigeurs is only the fourth part of the battalion. It is not sufficient to meet the exigencies of the skirmishing duty in a battle. It would not be sufficient if it consisted of one-half, nay of three-fourths of the whole battalion. In the course of an important day, the whole of a line is exposed to the skirmishers; sometimes even twice; and the skirmishers must be relieved every two hours, as they become fatigued, and their pieces get out of order, and foul.

And so the voltigeurs have no need of order, or tactics, or even of knowing how to march in line of battle! Will they, then, never be obliged to change their front; to move into column; to make the chequered retreat? No; it is enough for them to know *how to run, to make use of their legs, in order to escape the charges of the cavalry!* But how then shall we be able to unite them in a body, to form the van-guard of the army? How get them to advance three hundred toises before the line, mixed with platoons of legionary cavalry? It is not necessary to teach soldiers how to run, or jump, or hide themselves behind trees; but it is absolutely necessary to accustom them, when they are separated from their commanding officers,

to preserve their presence of mind; not to be influenced by any groundless alarms; to keep always within reach of each other, so that they may be able to flank each other; to form, steadily, four and four, before the enemy's skirmishers have time to cut them down; to platoon by eights and sixteens, before the squadron can charge them: and thus, without confusion, often facing about, to rejoin the reserve where the captain is stationed with the third of his skirmishers, drawn up in line, within musquet-shot. The company thus reunited ought to form a square, or change front, or begin its retreat, turning again when it is too closely pressed, at the command "*Right about face; Commence firing!*" Then, at the tap of the drumstick, to recommence the retreat; and in this manner rejoin the chief of the battalion, who is himself in the reserve, with the third of his men. The battalion then forms itself into column, at platoon distance, and in this manner conducts a retreat. At the word of command, "*Platoon, Halt, to the right and left, wheel into line, fire by independent files!*" it forms into the square battalion, and repulses the charge of the cavalry. At the word of command, "*Continue the retreat!*" it breaks the square, forms into divisions, &c.; or else it steadily

effects the chequered retreat upon the position laid down, refusing either the right or left. It is such things as these that the voltigeurs ought to learn; and if there could be two descriptions of infantry formed of them, one to serve as skirmishers, and the other to remain in the line, it would be advisable to select the best-trained for skirmishers. In fact, the companies of volunteers, who act as skirmishers more frequently than the others, are those who manœuvre the best in the army, because they have the most frequently experienced the necessity of so doing. To make such applications of examples from Greek and Latin authors, is to have read them to very little purpose; the time would have been much better employed in consulting a corporal of voltigeurs, or an old sergeant of grenadiers, on the subject: they would have imparted sounder notions.

2d.—Until now, a battalion composed of a certain number of companies, more or less, has always been drawn up in battle, in such a manner as to have a commanding-officer on the right; one, or more, in the centre; and one on the left; so that a captain might always have under his orders, his own officers, and his own sergeants; and the latter their own corporals, and their own men. Who could ever

have imagined that it would one day be seriously proposed to draw up a company in order of battle, in one rank, so that it should take up a front of sixty toises; with its captain on the right, its lieutenant on the left; the third and second companies behind, and the six ensigns as supernumeraries? The three captains of the battalion ranged one behind another, would be killed by one cannon shot, the three lieutenants by a second. And then how is the captain on the right to make himself heard on the left, when the chief of the battalion, who is in the centre, can hardly do it? How are the soldiers to distinguish the voices of their respective captains, when all the three captains are placed at the same point? "But the firings can be effected with greater facility by this method." No: the firings will be effected with much greater facility, at the voice of the chief of the battalion, since he is in the centre. It may happen that the captain of the first company will give the word of command "Forward," that of the third "Eyes front," that of the second "Right about face." At the command "By grand divisions, right wheel," the battalion will divide into three lines, which will each contain officers, sergeants, corporals, and men

belonging to the three different companies. At the command "By companies, right wheel," there will be the officers, subalterns, and men, of the three companies in six lines. If a company be detached, it will form itself in one line, and the rest of the battalion will remain in two. What a jumble! what ignorance of the whole platoon discipline! And it is a French general officer, who thus exposes his uniform to the derision of Europe! How is it that the printer of his book did not point out its absurdities to him? for most likely he had been in action, or at least served in the National Guard.

3d.—3000 voltigeurs will form part of the advanced guard, without being organized into battalions, every platoon independently of the rest; every captain to be general-in-chief. But how indeed can they be formed in battalions, since they are not expected to know any thing of manœuvring, or of tactics, but every company is to be attached to a company of light-horse, behind whom they are to mount? In truth, it is well they are to be taught to run—they will certainly find it necessary to do so, unless they are made prisoners, or killed, the first day they take the field. If a platoon of fifty men cannot engage to any advantage without instruction, the necessity for training is still greater in

a battalion, and will increase in a cubic ratio, in a brigade of 3000 men. But let us even suppose those three thousand voltigeurs properly instructed, skilful in manœuvres, and formed into battalions, still no benefit will result from mixing them with the cavalry; it will draw down destruction both on the horse and foot. How can a light-horseman manœuvre with a voltigeur behind him? how can the light cavalry make a serious resistance, unless supported by the cavalry of the line? It is the business of the van-guard and the rear-guard in battle, to manœuvre the whole time. The cavalry might doubtless, by sacrificing themselves, carry the men behind them in an interior position, so that the foot soldiers should arrive at a given point more speedily; but to think of their proceeding thus, in the van-guard, or the rear-guard, is not to have the slightest notion of the duty of those bodies, or even to have served a day with the van-guard. If there had been any advantage in such a practice, every nation, every great commander, would have resorted to it.

4th.—The drum imitates the roar of the cannon. It is the best of all instruments, it is never out of tune. Defensive armour is of no avail in warding off bullets, balls, or grape-

shot. It is not only useless, it is likewise injurious, by rendering wounds more dangerous. The Parthian bows were very large; handled by vigorous and practised men, they discharged arrows with such force as to pierce the Roman bucklers, which disconcerted the old legions; and this was one of the causes of the defeat of Crassus.

Skirmishers would stand more in need of defensive armour than other soldiers, because they are the most frequently close to the enemy, and are more exposed to the sabres of the cavalry; but they ought not to be overloaded, they cannot be too active. For this reason, though defensive armour might be useful for the infantry of the line, they still ought not to have it, because all the men in the battalion must of necessity do the duty of skirmishing. There is not a cadet, who has not, on first leaving school, thought of arming the light infantry with double-barrelled guns; but the experience of a single campaign is generally enough to convince him of the inconveniences that such a practice would occasion in actual warfare. There are five things that a soldier ought never to be separated from—his musquet, his cartridges, his knapsack, his provisions for at least four days,

and his pioneer's tools; let this sack be reduced to the smallest possible compass; let him have in it but one shirt, one pair of shoes, one stock, one handkerchief, one steel; but these he ought to have with him always; for, if he once lose sight of them, he will never see them again. Theory and practice are not the same thing in war. It was a custom in the Russian army, at the moment of beginning a battle, for every soldier to lay his knapsack on the ground. What were the advantages of this method? The ranks could be better closed up; the fire of the third rank could be rendered useful—the men were lighter, freer, and not so soon fatigued; the fear of losing his knapsack, wherein a soldier generally puts all he has, was useful in retaining him in his place. At Austerlitz, all the knapsacks belonging to the Russian army were found in battle array upon the heights of Posoritz—they had been abandoned at the moment of defeat. However specious the reasons that might be alleged in favour of this practice, experience taught the Russians to give it up. It would be better to employ the bat-horses in carrying the medical chests, provisions, and ammunition.

The officers of the companies would dégrade

themselves by meddling with the details of the soldiers' accounts: it would make sergeants of them. The sergeant-major is the proper person for this part of the service. Is it impossible to find an honest sergeant-major? Besides, should the officer abuse his trust, to whom can the soldier look for redress? How repugnant it would be to the feelings of a captain to have to receive the complaint of a soldier against his lieutenant, with whom he associates, with whom he messes, and who is in fact his equal. We would willingly believe that no officer would be base enough to take advantage of a soldier's ignorance; but still, would the soldier, who is naturally suspicious on account of that very ignorance, be the less mistrustful? Would not that feeling of profound respect, which military discipline requires him to have for his officer, be somewhat lessened by it?

Tents are not wholesome. It is better for the soldier to bivouac, because he can sleep with his feet towards the fire: he may shelter himself from the wind with a few boards, or a little straw. The ground upon which he lies will be rapidly dried in the vicinity of the fire. Tents are necessary for the superior officers, who have occasion to read, and consult maps. They ought to be appropriated to the chiefs of

battalions; to colonels and generals, who ought to be ordered never to sleep in a house—a fatal abuse, which has given rise to so many disasters. All the European nations have so far followed the example of the French, as to discard their tents; and if they be still used in camps of mere parade, it is because they are economical, sparing woods, thatched roofs, and villages. The shade of a tree, against the heat and the sun, and any sorry shelter whatsoever against the rain, are preferable to tents. The carriage of the tents for each battalion would load five horses, who would be much better employed in carrying provisions. Tents are a subject of observation for the enemy's spies and officers of the staff: they give them an insight into your numbers and the position that you occupy; and this inconvenience occurs every day, and every instant in the day. An army ranged in two or three lines of bivouac is only to be perceived at a distance by the smoke, which the enemy may mistake for the vapours of the atmosphere. It is impossible to count the number of fires; it is easy to count the number of tents, and to trace out the positions that they occupy.

## NOTE III.—CAVALRY.

PAGE 112.

"It has been in vain attempted to aid the infantry by means of troops of horse, independent of its generals. The defects of this method have been too fatally developed by experience. The rivalries and jealousy between the two branches of the service, prevent them from sustaining and aiding each other at the moment of need. There is only one way of avoiding this evil; and that is by attaching the cavalry to the legions. The particular service of the legionary-cavalry, which consists in observing, reconnoitring, following, and forming ambuscades, requires great activity, and but little method. These horsemen ought to be every where; to disperse and insinuate themselves in all directions; to see every thing; note every thing; accustom themselves to single combat, and depend on the swiftness of their horses, alike in pursuit and in escape. They would perform their duty very ill, if they accustomed themselves to remain together. In a word, it is the light cavalry, and not the cavalry of the line, which ought to form a part of the legion."

PAGE 171.

"I have already said that the legionary-cavalry ought to do the duty of light troops; hence uniformity, order, and regularity, are no more necessary for them than for our voltigeurs. Their education ought not to be the same as that of our hussars and chasseurs: we spoil and transform them by manœuvres of the line. Indeed, if we accustom them to keep together and squadron regularly, how shall we get them to observe, reconnoitre, and scour a country; to watch and espy the motions of the enemy; to steal upon

their rear, and annoy their convoys; lay ambuscades for them, follow the fugitives, and make prisoners; to mask and cover the march of our columns, and, in a word, to fulfil all the duties of light troops; which they cannot perform except by dispersing themselves, and fighting singly. Besides, what shall we gain by abating and repressing the rapidity and vivacity of the light cavalry by order and regularity? What advantage should we find in making it charge in line? Would it become more formidable to the enemy? I do not think it would; and I could bring a host of examples, both ancient and modern, to bear me out in my opinion. Without, however, going back to the Numidians and the Parthians, those irregular and unorganized bodies of horsemen, so celebrated in the annals of antiquity, I will content myself with citing the Turkish Spahis and the Mamelukes, who pass for the finest cavalry in the world, and who, nevertheless, know nothing of manœuvring beyond platooning precipitately and charging without order, giving the reins to their horses. I appeal to the French, who learned to estimate the valour of the Mamelukes in Egypt. Did our European squadrons, with their regular movements, and their charges in line, appear to advantage before this undisciplined soldiery? Could they resist them for an instant? Were they not broken down and cut to pieces by the Mamelukes, who seemed rather exercising than fighting; so little danger did they find in this sort of charge? As to the French infantry, that they were able to brave such courageous and skilful horsemen with success, even on the smooth plains of Egypt, is an irrefragable proof of the impotence of cavalry, however excellent it may be, against good infantry. The hussars, that form the light cavalry of the Austrians, were nothing more originally than irregular bands of Hungarian peasants, without pay, without discipline, making war for the sake of booty: they scattered

PAGE 125.

"To this number must be added two chiefs of the cavalry wings, invested with the rank of chief of squadron; ten captains, and as many lieutenants, to command the ten platoons of legionary-cavalry. The lightest and most active officers of the legion will, of course, be chosen for the cavalry; for it is a service well fitted for those lively, impetuous, eager officers, who fear nothing, because they never stay to calculate any thing. The impetuosity of their temperament is necessary to hurry them on incessantly towards the enemy, to gain intelligence of them, and pierce through the screen of light troops with which they seek to conceal their movements."

PAGE 229.

"The cavalry is destined to play two very different parts. In marches, it ought to be dispersed in order to scour the country, to reconnoitre, and pursue; in battles, on the contrary, it can produce no considerable effect, but by charging suddenly, in a body, on the weak points and breaches of the enemy's line. Almost all the nations in Europe are aware that such different duties require also two different sorts of cavalry; which has occasioned them to distinguish the light cavalry from the cavalry of the line; or, as it is generally called, the heavy horse."

PAGE 247.

"The Romans used to station the cavalry on the flanks of the infantry, in order to protect and cover it: in modern times the same practice is pursued, when the wings are not supported by local difficulties; but the legionary-cavalry answers all the purposes of flankers, and the cavalry of the line ought to be kept in reserve, behind the centre or the wings."

PAGE 313.

"The mixture of voltigeurs with light cavalry is admirably adapted to secure success in skirmishes of the van-guard."

PAGE 314.

"In the reign of Louis XIV. the French van-guards were, in part, composed of dragoons, a kind of mixed light troops, fighting sometimes on horseback, but more frequently on foot. This description of soldiers, which in our time exists only in name, was formerly of great service to the van-guards; but it is easy to see that we can supply the place of the dragoons, and at a less expense, by means of the proposed combination of our legionary-cavalry and voltigeurs. Our light foot-soldiers, mounted behind the horsemen, would travel as expeditiously as dragoons, and their employment would not, like that of the latter, be attended with the inconvenience of withdrawing a number of soldiers from action, by employing them in holding the horses; and, lastly, they would fight on foot the better, because they would never be required to fight in any other manner: as to economy, it is obviously promoted in this case."

PAGE 154.

"The swords of our legionary-cavalry should be straight, like that of the dragoons, so that they may be induced to thrust rather than to cut: they should carry a lance of ten or twelve feet in length, which should be slung upon the left arm; and they should be furnished with a very short carbine, to be hung from the saddle-bow."

PAGE 115.

"The training of our dragoons is ridiculous: when the soldiers are on horseback, they are told that the infantry can

never resist the impetuosity of their charges; when they are on foot, they hear that they are invincible against cavalry: thus are the men taught to despise each service in turn."

PAGE 218.

"I would form my army of four legions, with the addition of a reserve of 3000 cavalry of the line; this would make a grand total of above 36,000, thus classed: 22,800 infantry of the line, 7600 light infantry, 3000 legionary-cavalry, and 3000 cavalry of the line, exclusive of the artillery-men and sappers. After allowing for convalescents, sick, and absentees, which may be taken at one-fifth, there will remain 30,000 fighting men. It will be seen that one-sixth part of the army consists of cavalry."

PAGE 230.

"As to cavalry of the line, it seems advisable to form but one body of them for each army, since cavalry can produce effects of great importance only by fighting in a body; it should, in battle, be placed in reserve, under the immediate order of the general-in-chief, ready to charge at the critical moment;—but if we were to send cavalry, at the beginning of the fight, to charge upon unbroken veteran infantry, it would certainly be driven back upon the rest of the army, which it would infect with its confusion."

PAGE 310.

"We compose our van-guard of legionary horse-soldiers, of the four legions of the army, with an equal number of voltigeurs produced by taking four companies from each legion. This light body, consisting of 3000 horse, 3000 voltigeurs, and five pieces of light artillery, should precede the head of the column by one or two leagues, detaching posts

in front and on each side of the line of march, and leaving parties of observation upon the roads and principal eminences to the right and left of the route; and these posts should not rejoin the advanced guard until relieved by the flankers of the column."

1. Ought the direction of the light cavalry troops to depend upon that of the infantry corps? 2. Ought the light cavalry to be instructed in tactics, like the cavalry of the line? or ought the soldiers of the light cavalry to serve as foragers, like the Hungarian Insurgents, the Mamelukes, or the Cossacks? 3. Should it be made use of in van-guards, in rear-guards, or in the wings of an army unsupported by cavalry of the line? 4. Ought the dragoons to be discontinued? 5. Ought the heavy cavalry to be wholly placed in reserve? 6. What number of cavalry of the different descriptions should an army contain, and in what proportions?

The light cavalry ought to reconnoitre and watch the motions of the enemy considerably in advance of the army; it is not an appendage to the infantry: it should be sustained and protected, especially by the cavalry of the line. Rivalry and emulation have always existed between the infantry and the cavalry: light cavalry is indispensable to the van-guard, the rear-guard, and the wings of the army; it,

therefore, cannot properly be attached to, and forced to follow the movements of any particular corps of infantry. It would be more natural to attach it to the cavalry of the line, than to leave it in dependence upon the infantry, with which it has no connexion; but it should be independent of both.

The cavalry requires more officers than the infantry; it should possess more military knowledge. It is not only its rapidity that ensures its success; but its order, its acting together, and the due employment of its reserves. If the light cavalry is to form van-guards, it must be organized into squadrons, brigades, and divisions, for the purpose of manœuvring; for that is all van-guards and rear-guards do: they pursue or retreat by platoons, form themselves into several lines, or wheel into column, or change their position with rapidity for the purpose of out-fronting a whole wing. By a combination of such evolutions, a van-guard, or a rear-guard, of inferior numbers, avoids brisk actions and general engagements, and yet delays the enemy long enough to give time for the main army to come up, for the infantry to deploy, for the general-in-chief to make his dispositions, and for the baggage and parks to file into their stations.

The art of a general of the van-guard or of the rear-guard, is, without hazarding a defeat, to hold the enemy in check, to impede him, to compel him to spend three or four hours in moving a single league: tactics alone point out the methods of effecting these important objects, and are more necessary for cavalry than for infantry, and in the van-guard, or the rear-guard, than in any other position. The Hungarian Insurgents, whom we saw in 1797, 1805, and 1809, were pitiful troops. If the light troops of Maria Theresa's times became formidable, it was by their excellent organization, and, above every thing, by their numbers. To imagine that such troops could be superior to Wurmser's hussars, or to the dragoons of Latour, or of the Archduke John, would be entertaining strange ideas of things: but neither the Hungarian Insurgents, nor the Cossacks, ever formed the van-guards of the Austrian and Russian armies; because, to speak of a van-guard or a rear-guard, is to speak of troops which manœuvre. The Russians considered a regiment of Cossacks who had been trained worth three regiments untrained. Every thing about these troops is despicable, except the Cossack himself, who is a man of fine person, powerful, adroit, subtle, a good horseman, and indefatigable;

he is born on horseback, and bred among civil wars; he is, in the field, what the Bedouin is in the desert, or the Barbet in the Alps; he never enters a house, never lies in a bed; and he always changes his bivouac at sunset, that he may not pass a night in a place where the enemy may possibly have observed him.

Two Mamelukes kept three Frenchmen at bay, because they were better armed, better mounted, and better exercised; they had two pair of pistols, a *tromblon*, a carbine, a helmet with a vizor, a coat of mail, several horses, and several men on foot to attend on them. But a hundred French did not fear a hundred Mamelukes; three hundred were more than a match for an equal number; and 1000 would beat 1500: so powerful is the influence of tactics, order, and evolutions! Murat, Leclerc, and Lasalle, cavalry generals, presented themselves to the Mamelukes in several lines: when the latter were upon the point of outfronting the first line, the second came to its assistance on the right and left; the Mamelukes then stopped, and wheeled, to turn the wings of this new line: this was the moment seized for charging them; they were always broken.

The duty of a van-guard, or of a rear-guard, does not consist in advancing or retiring, but

in manœuvring. It should be composed of a good light cavalry, supported by a good reserve of cavalry of the line, by excellent battalions of foot, and strong batteries of artillery: the troops must be well trained; and the generals, officers, and soldiers, should all be equally well acquainted with their tactics, each according to his station. An undisciplined troop would only embarrass the advanced-guard.

It is admitted that, for facility in manœuvring, the squadron should consist of one hundred men, and that every three or four squadrons should have a superior officer.

It is not advisable for all the cavalry of the line to wear cuirasses: dragoons, mounted upon horses of four feet nine inches in height, armed with straight sabres, and without cuirasses, should form a part of the heavy cavalry; they should be furnished with infantry-musquets, with bayonets: should have the *schako* of the infantry, pantaloons covering the half-boot-buskin, cloaks with sleeves, and portmanteaus small enough to be carried slung across the back when the men are on foot. Cavalry of all descriptions should be furnished with fire-arms, and should know how to manœuvre on foot. 3000 light cavalry, or 3000 cuirassiers,

should not suffer themselves to be stopped by 1000 infantry posted in a wood, or on ground impracticable to cavalry: and 3000 dragoons ought not to hesitate to attack 2000 infantry, should the latter, favoured by their position, attempt to stop them.

Turenne, Prince Eugene of Savoy, and Vendome, attached great importance to dragoons, and used them successfully. The dragoons gained great glory in Italy, in 1796 and 1797. In Egypt and in Spain, during the campaigns of 1806 and 1807, a degree of prejudice sprang up against them. The divisions of dragoons had been mustered at Compiegne and Amiens, to be embarked without horses for the expedition of England, in order to serve on foot until they should be mounted in that country. General Baraguay d'Hilliers, their first inspector, commanded them; he had them equipped with gaiters, and incorporated with them a considerable number of recruits, whom he exercised in infantry manœuvres alone. These were no longer cavalry regiments: they served in the campaign of 1806 on foot, until after the battle of Jena, when they were mounted on horses taken from the Prussian cavalry, three-fourths of which were unserviceable. These combined circumstances injured the dra-

goons; but in 1813 and 1814 their divisions acquired honour in rivalling the cuirassiers. Dragoons are necessary for the support of light cavalry in the van-guard, the rear-guard, and the wings of an army; cuirassiers are little adapted for van and rear guards: they should never be employed in this service but when it is requisite to keep them in practice and accustom them to war. A division of 2000 dragoons, advancing rapidly upon a point with 1500 light-cavalry horses, can dismount in order to defend a bridge, the head of a defile, or an eminence, and to await the coming up of the infantry. Then how great is the utility of the dragoons in a retreat! The cavalry of an army ought to equal one-fourth of the infantry, and should be divided into four sorts: two of light cavalry, and two of heavy cavalry; that is to say, troopers, composed of men of five feet high, mounted on horses of four feet six inches; light cavalry on horses of four feet seven or eight inches; dragoons on horses of four feet nine; and cuirassiers on horses of four feet ten or eleven: which arrangement will employ horses of all kinds for mounting the troops.

The troopers should be attached to the infantry, because the smallness of their horses

renders them unfit for charges of cavalry. By attaching a squadron of 360 men to each division of 9000, they would form the twenty-fifth part of the infantry; they would furnish orderly men to the general officers, and escorts to convoys, parties for garrison duty, and brigades of non-commissioned officers; they would assist the gens-d'armerie in the escort of prisoners, and in matters of police. There would still remain enough of them to form several divisions to serve as scouts to the legion, and to occupy any important position in which it should be deemed advantageous to anticipate the enemy. In actual combat, drawn up behind the infantry, and constantly under the controul of the infantry generals, they would seize the favourable moment when the enemy should be broken, to fall upon the fugitives with their lances, and to make prisoners. The smallness of their horses would not tempt the cavalry generals.

At the commencement of every campaign, each regiment of infantry would furnish a company of 120 troopers, ready organized, to be incorporated into the regiments of heavy cavalry, at the rate of a tenth to the cuirassiers and a fifth to the dragoons. Thus, for example, 360 cuirassiers would have 36 troopers; and a like number of dragoons would have 72: they

would be employed in acting as orderlies to the general officers, and in escorting baggage and prisoners; they would do the skirmishing duty; would scour the country, and would hold the horses of the dragoons, when the latter were fighting on foot.

An army of 36,000 foot, should have 9000 horse; that is to say, 2070 troopers, 1440 of whom would be with the four divisions of infantry, 420 with the dragoons, and 210 with the cuirassiers; 2700 chasseurs or hussars, 2100 dragoons, and 2100 cuirassiers; which make 4800 light cavalry, and 4200 heavy cavalry.

## NOTE IV.—ARTILLERY.

PAGE 117.

"But it is necessary to furnish every legion with artillery; and why not reject all the pieces at the tail of an army, in order to prevent the march of the troops from being interrupted and impeded? I think this could be done but partially: the legions should retain some guns, in order to fight separately, or to begin and maintain the action, while the reserves of artillery are coming up to the field. All the rest of the artillery may march in reserve at the rear of the army, so as not to embarrass and retard the movement of the troops."

PAGE 118.

"Five pieces of cannon to each legion, appear to me sufficient for the duty they have to perform, until the arrival of the batteries of reserve."

PAGE 119.

"One half company of artillerymen should be appropriated to the service of the legionary battery."

PAGE 236.

"One unerring principle is, that the quantity of artillery should be regulated by the quality of the troops. Where the infantry is bad, hesitates to march towards the enemy, and fears to face them, it is neccssary to rely upon the artillery, and to decide the war by the cannon. These weapons become the means of victory, and the infantry is degraded into a secondary arm, with no other duty than to escort the cannon upon a march, and to guard it in the field of battle. When two bad armies engage, that which brings the greatest number of guns to bear, carries the day; but, at the same time it must be borne in mind, that there is a proportion to be always observed, because, beyond a certain limit, the other arms would not suffice for the protection of the guns. I apprehend that the maximum of artillery, which it is allowable to employ in armies, however bad they may be, was ascertained in the Seven Years' war, and in our campaign of 1813 in Saxony, when we endeavoured by cannon to compensate for the qualities wanting in our raw infantry."

PAGE 234.

"Besides these legionary batteries, I would have an army followed by a park of reserve of thirty-five pieces, fifteen of which should be howitzers, and twenty twelve-pounders. In battle but one single battery should be formed of all this reserve, to be directed against that point of the enemy's line which it is intended to force."

PAGE 235.

"In short, five light pieces are destined to march with the van-guard; they should be of less calibre, and better

horsed than the others, and attended by mounted gunners, whose horses should carry a breast-band and traces, so as to be capable of being harnessed to the guns when requisite. A light artillery, thus organized, would travel any road, and run rapidly in pursuit of an enemy. We should thus have sixty pieces of artillery for an army of 30,000 men: this proportion, I believe, is adapted to an open country, most favourable to artillery, supposing the infantry good."

If these principles were adopted, the following would be the result.—1st, That the division of artillery would consist of two howitzers, and three six-pounders; 2dly, That the artillery train, for an army of 40,000 men, would be sixty guns, (one and a half to each 1000 men); 3dly, That the train would be composed thus: three twelfths would be six-pounders, four twelfths twelve-pounders, and five twelfths howitzers; in other words, fifteen six-pounders, twenty twelve-pounders, and twenty-five howitzers, making the sixty pieces.

The division of artillery was fixed by General Gribeauval at eight pieces, of one calibre, four, eight, or twelve-pounders; or six-inch howitzers; because it is necessary, 1st, That a division of artillery should be capable of subdivision into two or four batteries; 2dly, Because eight pieces may be served by a company of 120 men, having a section in reserve

with the park; 3dly, Because the waggons necessary for the service of these eight pieces, may be horsed by a company of the equipage of the train; 4thly, Because one able captain can direct this number of pieces; 5thly, Because the number of waggons which belong to a battery of eight pieces, affords ample employment to one travelling forge, and one drag-rope; and two spare carriages are sufficient for it. If the division consisted of fewer pieces, so many more forges, and spare carriages would be requisite.

Napoleon abolished the four and eight-pounders, and substituted for these, the six-pounders: experience had shewn him that the infantry generals used the four and eight-pounders indiscriminately, without consideration of the effect they desired to produce. He removed the six-inch howitzer, and replaced it with the howitzer of five inches six lines, because two cartridges for the former calibre, weigh as much as three for the latter; and because the howitzer of five inches six lines, is found to be of the same calibre with the twenty-four-pounders so common in our besieging trains, and in our fortresses; he formed his division of foot-artillery of two howitzers of five inches six lines, and six six-

pounders; or of two howitzers of five inches six lines of extensive range, and six twelve-pounders; the division of horse-artillery he formed of four six-pounders and two howitzers: but it would be preferable to compose it like the former, that is to say, of two howitzers of five inches six lines, and six six-pounders; his trains consisted of twelve twentieths in six-pounders, three twentieths in twelve-pounders, and five twentieths in howitzers.

These alterations were modifications of M. de Gribeauval's system; they were made in a similar spirit, and he would not have objected to them; he reformed much, and simplified much; the artillery is still too heavy and too complicated; it must be rendered uniform, and reduced to the utmost degree of simplicity.

One twelve-pounder cartridge weighs as much as two six-pounders; the question is, then, whether it be better to have one twelve-pounder, or two six-pounders? Though there may be circumstances in which a twelve-pounder is to be preferred, yet still on ordinary occasions two six-pounders are more useful. Is it better to have one howitzer or two six-pounders? The howitzer is a very useful piece for setting a village on fire, or for

bombarding a redoubt; but its aim is uncertain: in ordinary cases it is not only unequal to two six-pounders, but it is not an adequate substitute for even a single one; a limited number of them is therefore sufficient. Napoleon certainly introduced more of them into his trains than any other commander; but to propose that trains should be formed of five twelfths in howitzers, four twelfths in twelve-pounders, and but three twelfths in six-pounders, is to evince complete ignorance of the very rudiments of the science of artillery.

A train of sixty pieces, formed upon Napoleon's principles, consisted of thirty-six six-pounders, nine twelve-pounders, and fifteen howitzers; forming seven divisions and a half, and requiring thirty-two waggons in forges, drag-ropes, or spare carriages, to complete the divisions; requiring also eighty-one caissons of six-pounders*, forty-one and a half of twelve-pounders†, sixty-seven and a half howitzers‡, twenty-nine park waggons§, thirty infantry waggons‖, and twenty¶ pontoon car-

* One hundred and thirty-six cartridges per caisson.

† Sixty-eight rounds per caisson. ‡ The same.

§ Six forges, drag-ropes, six cases of tools, and eight park caissons. ‖ 480,000 cartridges.

¶ One waggon for every three pieces, which affords a bridge

riages: in the whole 400 carriages, or six carriages to each gun; by which arrangement every piece was provided with 306 rounds, exclusive of the box. A train of sixty pieces organized according to the principles sought to be established, would contain fifteen six-pounders, twenty twelve-pounders, and twenty-five howitzers: five pieces forming a division, there would be twelve divisions, which would require forty-eight forges, drag-ropes, or spare carriages: the total being 424*carriages, or seven to a gun: this would be sixty-four carriages more than the former train. What an increase of impediments, what a heavy train, what a waste of men, horses, and materials! The twelve-pounders are the chief impediments of a march, for they weigh from fifteen to eighteen hundred pounds, and off the high roads are very difficult to draw. The Imperial train of sixty pieces contained forty-five pieces of cannon; that proposed would have but thirty-five.

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of 150 toises for 120 guns; and a bridge of 400 toises for an army of 160,000 men.

* Sixty guns, forty-eight carriages attached to the divisions, thirty-four caissons of six-pounder cartridges, 202 of twelves and howitzers, thirty park caissons, thirty infantry, and twenty of pontoons: total 424.

But with the 424 carriages which would be required for this train, there would be seventy-two Imperial guns; that is to say, nine divisions: viz. forty-two six-pounders, twelve twelve-pounders, and eighteen howitzers.* The question is then reduced to this: is it preferable to have fifteen six-pounders, twenty twelves, and twenty-five howitzers; or fifty-two six-pounders, twelve twelve-pounders, and fifteen howitzers? What a mania for talking without understanding the subject!

Sometimes it is said that, after the manner of the Romans, the division ought to be an army in miniature, and yet it is to be deprived of that which is most necessary and important to it, namely, artillery. What! a legion of eight or nine thousand men to form the van or rear guard of an army—to be detached with three pieces of cannon and two howitzers! But suppose it meets with a Russian, Prussian, or Austrian division of equal numbers, which will have thirty pieces of cannon (for that is the actual proportion): most assuredly the artillery

* Seventy-two guns, thirty-six waggons attached to the divisions, ninety-four and a half six-pounders, fifty-four twelve-pounders, seventy-six and a half howitzers, thirty-two park caissons, thirty-six infantry, and twenty-four of pontoons. total 424.

of the legion would be speedily silenced and dismounted; the infantry would be driven from its position by the enemy's cannon; or if it should maintain its position, it must be at the expense of many valuable lives.

M. de Gribeauval, who had served during the Seven Years' war in the Austrian army, and possessed a genius for the science of artillery, decided that the strength of the trains ought to be at the rate of four pieces for every battalion of 1000 men, or thirty-six guns for each division of 9000 men, or 160 for an army of 40,000. The Imperial train consisted of 120 guns for an army of 40,000 men, or four divisions of infantry, having one division of light cavalry, one of dragoons, and one of cuirassiers; of these fifteen divisions of artillery, two were attached to each division of infantry, three were in reserve, and four horsed: one to the division of light cavalry, one to the division of dragoons, and two to that of cuirassiers; there were seventy-two six-pounders, eighteen twelve-pounders, and thirty howitzers, nearly 600 carriages, including the guns and the double-supplies and infantry caissons.

There are required for the service of one piece of cannon of the Imperial train, one with another, thirty horses and thirty-five men; but

for one piece of the proposed train there would be wanting, one with another, forty men and thirty-five horses.* A division of eight pieces of artillery requires 272 men and 240 horses, which are equal to two good squadrons,

Men who have formed their ideas of modern warfare from commenting on the ancients, will insist that it would be better to make an addition of 3600 cavalry, or 4000 foot-soldiers, to an army of 40,000 men, than of 120 pieces of cannon; or to have but sixty guns, and an addition of 1500 cavalry and 2000 foot-soldiers; they are wrong. In an army there must be infantry, cavalry, and artillery in due proportions; these arms cannot be substituted for each other. We have seen affairs in which the enemy might have gained the battle: they occupied a fine position with a battery of

* One gun of the Imperial train requires three waggons and three-thirtieths to each piece, for furnishing 300 rounds, independent of its box; one waggon for park, forge, drag-rope, spare carriage, park caisson, ten twentieths of an infantry caisson, seven twentieths of a waggon for pontoons; in all six waggons. For 120 pieces, 720 waggons: this would give for an army of 160,000 men, 480 guns, 2880 waggons; of which 160 would be for pontoons, sufficient for the construction of 480 toises of bridge upon broad rivers; requiring in the whole 16,800 horses and 20,000 men.

from fifty to sixty guns; in vain should we have attacked them with 4000 more horse, and 8000 more foot; it required a battery of equal strength, under the protection of which the attacking columns could advance and deploy. The proportions of the three forces have ever been a subject of reflection with the greatest generals.

They all agree that there must be, 1st, four pieces to every 1000 men, that is the eighth part of the men in an army, for the service of the artillery; and 2dly, a cavalry equal to a fourth part of the infantry.

As to pretending to rush upon the guns, and carry them by the bayonet, or picking off the gunners by musquetry, these are chimerical ideas; such things may happen sometimes; and have we not instances of the taking of the strongest positions by a *coup de main?* But, in a general system, there is no infantry, however intrepid, that can, without artillery, march with impunity the length of 5 or 600 toises, against sixteen well-placed pieces of cannon, served by good gunners: before they could get two-thirds of the way, the men would be killed, wounded, or dispersed. The field artillery has acquired too much exactness in firing, to allow of the plan of Machiavel, who, full of

Greek and Roman ideas, would have his artillery make but one discharge, and then retire to the rear of the line.

A good infantry forms, no doubt, the sinews of an army; but if it were required to fight long against a very superior artillery, its good qualities would be exhausted, and it would be destroyed. In the first campaigns of the war of the Revolution, what France always had in the greatest perfection, was artillery: we know not a single instance in which twenty pieces of cannon, judiciously placed, and in battery, were ever carried by the bayonet. In the affair of Valmy, at the battle of Jemmapes, at that of Nordlingen, and that of Fleurus, we had an artillery superior to that of the enemy, although we had often but two guns to 1000 men; but that was because our armies were very numerous. It may happen that a general more skilful in manœuvring, more expert than his adversary, and commanding a better infantry, may obtain some successes during part of a campaign, though his park of artillery be far inferior; but on the critical day of a general engagement, he will severely feel his inferiority in point of metal.

Eighty waggons of military stores are very inadequate for an army of 40,000 men: they

would carry but 1520 quintals, flour and brandy for the army for two days. Experience has proved that an army ought to carry with it a month's provisions, ten days' food being carried by the men and baggage-horses, and twenty by the waggons; so that at least 480 waggons would be required; 240 regularly organized, and 240 requisition waggons. To this end, there will be a battalion of three companies of military stores for each division: every company having its establishment for forty waggons; twenty furnished and horsed by the commissariat, and twenty upon requisition; this gives for each division 120 waggons, 480 for each army, and 210 men for each battalion.

## NOTE V.—ORDER OF BATTLE.

PAGE 201.

"This, then, is the order of battle for the legion, such as we ought to conceive it, conformably to the principles that we have just developed, always making allowances for the forms and various accidents of the ground, of which we will speak by and by. In the first line, the five first cohorts of the legion ranged in battle array from right to left, in numerical order, beginning with the cohort of the *élite* (the chosen troops), who are the example and the rule for the whole

legion. The cohorts, of fifty-five toises each of front, are separated from each other by passages of five toises: this affords 300 toises for the whole length of the line."

"Next, at 150 toises behind the first line, are placed the five last cohorts, formed each in columns, by divisions at proper distances for deploying: these small columns of fourteen toises wide, by forty-seven files, and fourteen toises long, in four sections, leave between them spaces of forty-six toises. The voltigeurs of the first line are partly dispersed in advance, in front of the lines, and partly platooned behind their cohorts, near the intervals which divide them; those of the second line are platooned by half companies, upon the flanks of their columns.—The cavalry holds itself in reserve upon the flanks, on a level with the second line; and the legionary artillery forms a single battery, at fifty toises, in advance of one of the wings."

A Roman army encamped and ranged itself in battle array invariably in the same order; it enclosed itself in a square of 3 or 400 toises on each side; there it spent some hours in fortifying itself: it then thought itself unassailable. If battle was to be offered, it arranged itself in three lines, fifty toises distant from each other; the cavalry being upon the wings. The staff-officer, whose business it was to mark out an encampment, or to marshal an army for battle, performed nothing more than a mechanical operation; he had no occasion for either *coup-d'œil*, genius, or experience. But with us moderns, on the contrary, the art of

taking up a position for encamping or fighting is subject to so many considerations, that it requires experience, *coup-d'œil*, and genius. It is in fact the business of the general-in-chief himself, because there are many modes of arranging an encampment, or of forming an order of battle, even in the same position.

Sempronius was defeated at Trebbia, and Varro at Cannes, though they commanded armies more numerous than those of the enemy; because, conformably to established usage among the Romans, they placed their army in order of battle in three lines, while Hannibal displayed his in one line. The Carthaginian cavalry was superior in number and quality. The Roman armies were at the same time attacked in front, flanked, and assailed in the rear; they were defeated. If the two Roman Consuls had adopted that order of battle which was most suitable to circumstances, they would not have been out-fronted; they would perhaps have been victors!

Ought an army to be confined to one single encampment, or ought it to form as many as it has corps or divisions? At what distance ought the van-guard and the flankers to be encamped? What frontage and what depth ought to be given to the camp? Where should

the cavalry, the artillery, and the carriages be distributed? Should the army be ranged in battle array in several lines—and if it should, what space should there be between those lines? Should the cavalry be in reserve behind the infantry, or should it be placed upon the wings? As every piece has sufficient ammunition for keeping up its fire twenty-four hours, should all the artillery be brought into action at the beginning of the engagement—or should half of it be kept in reserve? The solution of these questions depends on the following circumstances: 1st, on the number of troops, and the numbers of infantry, artillery, and cavalry, of which the army is composed; 2dly, on the relation subsisting between the two armies; 3dly, on the quality of the troops; 4thly, on the end in view; 5thly, on the nature of the field; and 6thly, on the position occupied by the enemy, and on the character of the general who commands them. Nothing absolute either can or ought to be prescribed on this head. In modern warfare there is no natural order of battle.

The duty to be performed by the commander of an army is more difficult in modern armies than it was in those of the ancients; it is also certain, that his influence is more efficacious in

deciding battles. In the ancient armies the general-in-chief, at a distance of 80 or 100 toises from the enemy, was in no danger, and yet he was conveniently placed, so as to have an opportunity of directing to advantage all the movements of his army. In modern armies, a general-in-chief, though removed 4 or 500 toises, finds himself in the midst of the fire of the enemy's batteries, and is very much exposed; and still he is so distant that several movements of the enemy escape him. In every engagement he is occasionally obliged to approach within the reach of small arms. The effect of modern arms is much influenced by the situation in which they are placed; a battery of guns, with a great range, and a commanding position, that takes the enemy obliquely, may be decisive of a victory. Modern fields of battle are much more extended than those of the ancients: whence it becomes necessary to study operations on a large scale; a much greater degree of experience and military genius is requisite for the direction of a modern army than was necessary for that of an ancient one.

## Note VI.—Of Defensive War.

Page 479.

"But when it is proposed to guard the frontiers of an empire almost entirely by means of lines of fortresses, and without the assistance of armies, opinions are divided as to the efficacy of this method. Let us suppose, in order to simplify our ideas, a frontier in an open country, one hundred leagues in extent, and that it is determined to cover this extent against the enterprises of the enemy by fortresses. The system in use requires that three successive lines of fortresses should be formed, with intervals of a day's march, or five or six leagues between each: thus the complete defence of the frontier calls for fifty or sixty strong holds. Let us suppose fifty only, in order to take the matter at the lowest, and calculate the expense of their erection at fifteen millions, taking one with the other, and including the indispensable vaulted retreats, and we shall find that the State will be under the necessity of incurring an expense of 750 millions of livres for one single frontier. But will this labyrinth of forts compel the invading armies to stop and abandon themselves to the endless procrastinations of sieges, or will it compel them to leave behind forces superior to those of the garrisons? Reason, enlightened by experience, proves the negative.

"Our fifty forts, garrisoned on an average by 6000 men each, would occupy 300,000 defenders; and this is nearly the whole number of troops which any one of the greater European powers keeps on foot; so that there would remain no force to oppose the invading armies, and the other frontiers would be left absolutely ungarrisoned. But reason and custom equally forbid this disposition of the forces, and we content

ourselves with leaving the third of a garrison only in every one of those numerous fortresses, which, from the remoteness of their situation, or their distance from the depôts and armies of the enemy, appear not to be threatened with an early siege, and which, consequently, it is sufficient to protect against a sudden attack. It is even suggested, that occasionally, in order to economize the troops of the line, the care of these places should be left to the inhabitants; but this expedient appears to me exceedingly dangerous."

PAGE 482.

"We cannot, then, avoid appropriating at least 100,000 men for the keeping of fifty fortresses; and we shall then have 100,000 men the fewer to fight those battles which eventually decide the fate of empires. Let us conceive, in this state of things, that the enemy advances in several columns to attack our frontiers, defended by a triple barrier of fortresses: all the great roads leading into the interior are, of course, barred by forts; then these columns, without throwing away time in besieging them, quit the high road, and take cross roads, in order to turn them, passing beyond the range of their cannon: and thus they penetrate between the fortresses without any other difficulty than that of being compelled to follow, for the space of two or three leagues at a time, narrow ways which it is easy to repair and widen."

PAGE 484.

"I know that it is calculated, and truly enough, that triple forces are required for the blockade of a garrison: so that if the enemy should think proper to blockade the places left in the rear, they must employ more troops than the defenders. But we have just seen how useless it is to blockade them: it is sufficient for the enemy to observe them carefully, that they

may not have it in their power to do him harm: he may transport his whole army into the midst of our places when they are left to themselves, and fearlessly penetrate within our triple line of fortresses, taking only the precaution to leave an army of observation in the rear. When at length he is free from this maze of strong holds, he will extend himself over the country, in order to draw his resources from it; he will there establish depôts, a basis of operation, his army of reserve, and, in a word, carry on the war almost as if our strong places did not exist, as soon as they shall be found without the area of the active operation of armies. This frontier of a hundred leagues, defended by fifty fortresses, is not merely imaginary: it really exists; and we may appeal to the experience of a very recent war, as to what we have a right to expect from a triple line of fortresses left to themselves."

PAGE 488.

"Upon this open frontier, of one hundred leagues in extent, which the system in use overloads with fifty fortified places, I establish but five or six, at fifteen or twenty leagues from each other: they should command the uniting points of the principal roads, and more especially the two banks of rivers, whatever may be their course, in order to facilitate the movements of the armies. They should be large, that they may supply the wants of our belligerent armies, frequently amounting in strength to upwards of 100,000 fighting men. If apprehensions are entertained of attempts to surprise the grand depôts, which may be considered the anchors of the state, at such times as the war in open field leaves them but few troops for their protection, it is easy to avert the danger by the establishment of a citadel, which, at the same time that it is capable of being guarded by a very few men, ensures the retaking and maintaining possession of the town."

PAGE. 490.

"I see no better way of effecting these objects, than that of erecting four small forts round each fortress, forming an immense square of which the principal place would occupy the centre. These forts, closed in every sense, should be established upon the most favourable summits of the eminences, at from 12 to 1500 toises from the works of the place, and distant from each other from 2 to 3000 toises. The space intervening between one fort and another would form a field of battle capable of receiving an army of from 50 to 100,000 men, who might be considered immoveable by an enemy: the forts, mounted with guns of large calibre, would completely support the wings; as to the centre, upon which they would have but little effect, on account of their distance from it, that might be reinforced by field-works, constructed at the moment they were wanted, and sustained by the guns of the place. Thus the four forts, encircling each fortress, would form around it one vast intrenched camp, presenting four different forts, or four different fields of battle; so that we might face the enemy with our army on whichever side he might appear. Some twenty leagues behind these first fortresses, I establish others similar, also spaced between each other by fifteen or twenty leagues, and so on to the very centre of the kingdom. The principal passes of the mountains and forests are to be guarded by forts, or covered batteries, which are not to be confounded with fortresses."

PAGE 494.

"Whatever may have been the practice pursued in the late war, we shall take good care not to oppose ourselves in front, with our 100,000 men, to the march of 500,000 of the enemy; that would be turning the chances of war against ourselves: for, if our design were to give him battle, his superiority of

numbers would no doubt give him the victory; if, by retiring from one position to another, to retard his progress, we should discourage our troops by these retrograde manœuvres, and that, too, without gaining the advantage we aim at, namely, to force him to divide his active force: his army of reserve, which, according to established principles, ought to replace his first army, would be sufficient for blocking or observing the fortresses left in the rear, subjecting and restraining the populace, and securing its communications and subsistence: so that we should lose ground without obliging his active army to weaken itself. As soon as it places itself between two of our frontier fortresses, we hasten to throw 6 or 7000 men into one of the two liable to be invested or besieged, in order to complete its garrison; and we withdraw, with the rest of the army, from position to position, till we reach the intrenched army of the other fortress. In this state of affairs what can the enemy do? If he advance rashly into the interior, neglecting our army which is on his flank, he hastens to destruction: for as soon as he has passed, we place ourselves in his rear, and cut off all his communications with his magazines and his basis of operations. If he decide on leaving an army equal to ours to observe us and restrain us in our camp, and then penetrating with the 50,000 men which he has above our number into the interior of the country: not only that incursion, which must be speedily stopped by our army of reserve and the armed populace, will procure him no advantage, no real, lasting conquest, but it will expose him to the greatest dangers."

PAGE 496.

"Convinced of the impossibility of advancing while our defensive army remains on his flank and in his rear, he will, no doubt, decide on marching against it with all his forces. Then,

having retired into the intrenched camp of one of our frontier places, we form our line of battle between two forts, on the side of the square facing the aggressor. We may consider ourselves there as inexpugnable; particularly if we take care, in order to support our centre, to raise, between the two forts on which our wings are supported, some field-works of the kind mentioned in Chapter IX, which may be done in a single night. The fortress serves as a retreat, or citadel for our camp, and affords all necessary resources in military stores and provisions; but these resources are not inexhaustible; they must be renewed, which may be easily effected by means of the communications which are kept open with our fortresses on the side opposite the enemy. If the invader seek to deprive us of these communications, he cannot effect it without blockading us on all sides; but for that purpose he would have to divide his 150,000 men into four corps, placed one on each side of the immense square of 12,000 toises which our four forts would constitute. This system of intrenched camps, established under the guns of fortresses, appears to me admirable for arresting the progress of an invader, in his very first entrance. It will no doubt be objected to me, that as he cannot attempt any thing against our defensive army, he will attack a neighbouring fortress in order to besiege it; this is just what I would wish to reduce him to, the undertaking a war of sieges, which is always so tedious, expensive, and dangerous in the sight of a fresh defensive army, and so unproductive of important results."

1st, Have the frontier fortresses of Flanders been useful or detrimental? 2dly, Is the new system more economical—does it require fewer troops for garrisons—or is it more advantage-

ous than those of Vauban and Cormontagne? 3dly, In order to defend its capital, must an army retreat upon it? Ought it to place itself in an intrenched camp? or ought it to manœuvre freely, so as not to be driven back, either on the capital, or on a fortress?

The system of the defence of the Flemish frontier was, in great measure, conceived by Vauban, but that engineer was obliged to adopt the fortresses then existing; he constructed others to cover the sluices, extend inundations, or close important debouches between great forests or mountains. There are places on this frontier of first, second, third, and fourth degrees of strength: they may be estimated at four or five hundred millions, and were constructed in one hundred years, making an expense of four millions per annum.

Fifty thousand men of the interior national guards are sufficient to secure them from a *coup de main*, and to frustrate the attempts of incendiary batteries. Lisle, Valenciennes, and Charlmont, are capable of affording refuge to whole armies; as are the intrenched camps of Maubeuge and Cambray. Vauban formed entire countries into intrenched camps, covered by rivers, inundations, fortresses, and forests; but he never pretended to bar the frontier by

these fortresses alone. He intended this frontier, so fortified, to protect an inferior against a superior army; to afford to the former a more favourable field of operations, for maintaining itself and preventing the hostile army from advancing, and advantageous opportunities of attacking it; in short, means of gaining time to allow its succours to come up.

At the time of the reverses of Louis XIV. this system of fortresses saved the capital. Prince Eugene, of Savoy, lost a campaign in taking Lisle: the siege of Landrecies gave Villars an opportunity of changing the fortune of the war: a hundred years afterwards, at the time of Dumourier's treachery, the fortresses of Flanders once more saved Paris; the combined forces lost a campaign in taking Condé, Valenciennes, Quesnoy, and Landrecies. This line of fortresses was equally useful in 1814: the Allies having violated the territory of Switzerland, engaged themselves in the defiles of the Jura, to avoid the fortresses; and even while turning them in this manner, they were obliged to weaken their force, by detaching a considerable number of men, superior to the total of the garrisons. When Napoleon passed the Marne, and manœuvred in the rear of the enemy's army, if treason had not opened the gates of

Paris, the fortresses of that frontier would have played an important part; Schwartzenberg's army would have been obliged to throw itself amongst them, which would have produced great events. In 1815 they would likewise have been of great utility: the Anglo-Prussian army would not have dared to pass the Somme before the arrival of the Austro-Russian armies on the Marne, had it not been for the political events of that capital; and it is certain that those of the fortresses which remained faithful influenced the treaties and the conduct of the Allied Kings in 1814 and 1815.

The new system proposed is more costly than that of Vauban; it requires more numerous garrisons, and affords much less strength. Three lines, each composed of six great fortresses, require eighteen great fortresses; each surrounded by four forts, which, being distant from the fortresses, require places of shelter, a garrison battalion, twenty-five pieces of cannon, and would be as expensive in the labour of construction as the fortress itself. These three lines would, therefore, require what is equal to thirty-six great fortresses. But these four insulated forts would be blockaded, besieged, and taken, in the first seven

days of investment, even before the line of circumvallation could be completed. They would be marvellously well placed to flank and support it; and before the trench could be opened, the garrison of the place would see half their stores, and the best troops of their battalions fall into the power of the enemy; an event which certainly could not fail to affect their resolution.

The position which the army might take between these four forts would afford it no security. The enemy would encamp perpendicularly to one of the forts, would raze it in a few days, and would successively gain possession of the rest. His field-train, with the addition of thirty twenty-four-pounders, would suffice for this operation. According to this system, the enemy might penetrate an opening between two fortresses at two days' march from either of them; whilst in that of Vauban, the passage could only be effected between two places at two or three leagues from each. It would also be much easier to surprise one of the fortresses of this new system.

But must a capital be defended by covering it directly, or by the defending army's barring itself up in an intrenched camp in the rear of

the invader? The first method is the safest: it allows of disputing the passage of rivers, and defiles, even of creating field positions; of receiving all the troops in the interior as reinforcements, whilst the enemy's force would be insensibly decreasing. It would be a very bad measure to let oneself be shut up in an intrenched camp; running the risk of being forced, or at least blockaded, and of being reduced to cut one's way sword in hand to procure bread and forage. Four or five hundred waggons a-day are required for supplying an army of 100,000 men with provisions. The invading army, being superior in infantry, cavalry, and artillery, by one-third, would prevent the convoys from arriving; and, without blockading them hermetically, as fortresses are blockaded, it would render all access to them so difficult, that there would be a famine in the camp.

There remains a third way: to manœuvre incessantly, without submitting to be driven back on the capital which it is meant to defend or shut up in an intrenched camp in the rear. For this purpose it is necessary to have a good army, good generals, and a good commander-in-chief. In general, the idea of

covering a capital, or any point whatever, by flank marches, carries with it the necessity of detaching troops, and the inconveniences attached to all division of force, in the face of a superior army.

After the affair of Smolensko in 1812, the French army, marching directly on Moskow, General Kutusoff covered that city by successive movements, until, arriving at the intrenched camp of Mojaisk, he halted, and accepted battle. Having lost it, he continued his march, and crossed the capital, which fell into the power of the victor. If he had retreated in the direction of Kiow, he would have drawn the French army after him; but then he must have covered Moskow by a detachment, and nothing hindered the French general from causing such detachment to be followed by a superior one, which would equally have compelled it to evacuate that important capital.

Had such questions been offered for solution to Turenne, Villars, or Eugene of Savoy, they would have been greatly embarrassed. To dogmatize on what we have never practised belongs to ignorance: it is thinking to resolve by a formula of secondary degree, a problem of transcendant geometry, which would have turned Lagrange or Laplace pale. All

these questions of high tactics are indeterminate physico-mathematical problems, which admit of several solutions; and cannot be determined by the formulas of elementary geometry.

# APPENDIX.

## CONVENTION

### Between his Holiness PIUS VII. and the French Government.

The Government of the Republic acknowledges the Catholic Apostolic Roman religion as the religion of the great majority of French citizens. His Holiness equally acknowledges that the said religion has derived, and still expects at the present moment, the greatest benefit, and the utmost splendour from the establishment of the Catholic faith in France, and from the particular profession of it by the Consuls of the Republic.

Therefore, after this mutual acknowledgment, as well for the good of religion, as for the maintenance of internal tranquillity, they have agreed upon the following Articles:

Article I.—The Catholic Apostolic Roman religion shall be freely exercised in France. Its worship shall be publicly exercised, so that the regulations of Police, which the Government shall consider necessary for the public tranquillity, be conformed to.

II.—The Holy See, in concert with the French Government, shall remodel the French dioceses.

III.—His Holiness declares to the titulars of French bishoprics, that he confidently expects from them, for the promotion of peace and unity, every species of sacrifice, even that of their sees. After this exhortation, if they should refuse making the sacrifice required for the good of the Church (a refusal, however, which his Holiness does not expect), the administration of the bishoprics, according to the new arrangement, by new titulars, shall be provided for in the following manner.

IV.—The First Consul of the Republic shall nominate within the three months succeeding the publication of the Bull of his Holiness to the archbishoprics and bishoprics of the new formation; his Holiness shall confer canonical institution according to the forms established relatively to France, before the change of Government.

V.—The nominations to bishoprics which shall subsequently become vacant, shall also be made by the First Consul; and canonical institution shall be given by the Holy See, conformably to the preceding Article.

VI.—The bishops, before entering upon their functions, shall immediately take, in presence of the First

Consul, the Oath of Fidelity used before the change of Government, expressed in the following terms:

" I swear and vow to God, upon the Holy Gospels, to preserve obedience and fidelity to the Government established by the Constitution of the French Republic. I promise also to have no intelligence with, nor to be present at any council, nor to enter into any league, either within or without the Republic, which may be contrary to the public tranquillity; and if, in my diocese, or elsewhere, I should be informed of the existence of any plot or machinations against the welfare of the State, I will communicate such information to the Government."

VII.—The ecclesiastics of the second order shall take the same Oath before the civil authorities appointed by the Government.

VIII.—The formula of the following prayer shall be recited at the end of divine service, in all the Catholic churches of France:

" Domine, salvam fac Rempublicam.

" Domine, salvos fac Consules."

IX.—The bishops shall make a new division of the parishes belonging to their dioceses; but this shall be of no effect till it shall have obtained the consent of the Government.

X.—The bishops shall nominate to the rectorships. They can, however, only elect those persons who shall be approved of by the Government.

XI.—The bishops may have a chapter in their cathedral, and a seminary in their diocese, without any obligation on the Government to endow them.

XII.—All metropolitan, cathedral, parochial, and other churches necessary to public worship, and not alienated, shall be placed at the disposal of the bishops.

XIII.—His Holiness, for the good of peace, and the prosperous reestablishment of the Catholic religion declares that neither he nor his successors, shall in any manner molest the purchasers of alienated ecclesiastical property; and that, in consequence, the possession of the said property, and the rights and revenues attached to and derived from it, shall remain immutably in the possession of themselves, or their assigns.

XIV.—The Government shall secure proper salaries for the bishops and the rectors whose dioceses and rectorships shall be included in the new arrangement.

XV.—The Government shall also adopt measures to enable French Catholics, if so disposed, to make endowments in favour of churches.

XVI.—His Holiness recognises in the First Consul

of the French Republic, the same rights and privileges which he acknowledged in the old Government.

XVII.—It is agreed between the contracting parties that in case any one of the successors of the First Consul should not be a Catholic, the rights and prerogatives mentioned in the preceding article, and the nomination to bishoprics, shall be regulated with respect to him by a new Convention.

The ratifications shall be exchanged in Paris, within the space of fourteen days.

Given at Paris, the 26th of Messidor, in the IXth year of the French Republic.

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## ORGANIC ARTICLES.

ARTICLE 1.—No bull, brief, rescript, decree, mandate, patent, signature serving for patent, or other instruments from the Court of Rome, even concerning individuals, can be received, published, printed, or otherwise put into execution, without the authority of Government.

2.—No individual, calling himself nuncio, legate, apostolic vicar or commissioner, or assuming any other title, can, without the same authority, exercise on French ground, or elsewhere, any functions relative to the affairs of the Gallican church.

3.—The decrees of foreign synods, even those of

general councils, cannot be published in France before the Government has examined their form, their conformity with the laws, rights, and immunities of the French Republic, and all that in their publication may disturb or affect the public tranquillity.

4.—No national or metropolitan council, no diocesan synod, no deliberating society can take place without the express permission of the Government.

5.—All the ecclesiastical duties shall be gratuitous, excepting the obligations which shall be authorized and fixed by regulations.

6.—In all cases of abuse or grievance on the part of superiors and other ecclesiastical individuals, recourse shall be had to the Council of State: the cases of abuse are, usurpation, or undue exercise of power; the contravention of the laws and regulations of the Republic, the infraction of the regulation authorized by the Canons received in France; attempts against the liberties, franchises, and customs of the Gallican church, and every enterprise or procedure, which, in the exercise of worship, can compromise the honour of the citizen, arbitrarily trouble his conscience, or degenerate into oppression or injustice against him, or into public scandal.

7.—Like recourse shall be had to the Council of State, if any attempt be made against the public exer-

cise of worship, and against the liberty which the laws and regulations guarantee to its ministers.

8.—Any person interested shall be entitled to the above appeal; and in case no individual complaint be made, it shall be preferred officially by the prefects. The public functionary ecclesiastic, or the person desirous of making this application, shall address a detailed account, duly signed, to the Minister of State intrusted with all that concerns public worship, whose duty it shall be to obtain, as soon as possible, every requisite information; and upon his report, the affair shall be pursued and definitively terminated in a judicial form, or referred, according to circumstances, to the competent authorities.

## Section I.

### *General Arrangements.*

9.—The Catholic worship shall be exercised under the direction of the archbishops and bishops in their dioceses, and under that of the rectors in their parishes.

10.—Every privilege implying exemption or attributions of the episcopal jurisdiction is abolished.

11.—The archbishops and bishops may, with the authority of the Government, establish in their dioceses, cathedral chapters and seminaries: all other ecclesiastical establishments are suppressed.

12.—The archbishops and bishops shall be at liberty to add to their name the title of citizen, or that of Monsieur ——— ; all other qualifications are disallowed.

## Section II.

### *Of Archbishops or Metropolitans.*

13.—The archbishops shall consecrate and install their suffragans; in case of hindrance or refusal on their part, they shall be represented by the eldest bishop of the metropolitan district.

14.—They shall watch over the maintenance of the faith and of ecclesiastical discipline, in the dioceses dependant upon their metropolitan sees.

15.—They shall take cognizance of the complaints made against the conduct and decisions of the suffragan bishops.

## Section III.

### *Of the Bishops, of the Vicars-general, and of the Seminaries.*

16.—No person can be appointed bishop before he shall have attained the age of thirty years, nor unless he be of French extraction.

17.—Previously to the decree of nomination being

published, the person or persons nominated shall be required to produce an attestation of exemplary life and character, forwarded by the bishop of the diocese in which they have exercised the functions of the ecclesiastical ministry, and they shall be examined upon their doctrine by a bishop and two priests, who shall be commissioned by the First Consul; which commissioners shall address the result of their examination to the Counsellor of State intrusted with all that concerns religious worship.

18.—The priest, nominated by the First Consul, shall use every diligence in obtaining institution from the Pope. He can exercise no function till the Bull authorizing his institution has received the consent of Government, and till he has taken, in person, the Oath prescribed by the Convention passed between the French Government and the Holy See. This Oath shall be taken to the First Consul; and a procès-verbal of its being administered shall be drawn up by the Secretary of State.

19.—The bishops shall nominate and institute the rectors; notwithstanding, they shall signify their nomination, and they shall not grant canonical institution until after that nomination shall have been approved by the First Consul.

20.—They shall be required to reside within their dioceses, which they shall not quit, without the permission of the First Consul.

21.—Each bishop may appoint two vicars-general, and each archbishop three; they shall elect them from among those priests who are properly qualified for being bishops.

22.—They shall annually visit in person one part of their diocese, and within the space of five years, the whole of their diocese. In case of lawful hindrance or impediment, the visit shall be performed by a vicar-general.

23.—Those who shall be chosen for teachers in the seminaries, shall subscribe the Declaration made by the Clergy of France in 1682, and published by an edict of the same year; they shall consent to teach the doctrines therein contained, and the bishops shall send an instrument, in form, of that consent, to the Counsellor of State intrusted with all that concerns public worship.

24.—The bishops shall send every year to the same Counsellor of State, the names of the persons who are students in the seminaries, and who are intended for the ecclesiastical profession.

25.—They cannot ordain any ecclesiastic, unless he can prove that he possesses property producing, at

least, an annual income of three hundred francs; has attained the age of twenty-five years; and unites the necessary qualifications required by the canons in force in France. The bishops shall make no ordination before the number of the persons to be ordained has been submitted to, and approved of by the government.

## Section IV.

### *Of Rectors.*

The rectors cannot enter upon their functions until they have taken before the prefect, the Oath prescribed by the Convention concluded between the Government and the Holy See. A procès-verbal of the taking of the Oath shall be drawn up by the secretary-general of the prefecture; an authenticated copy shall be delivered to them. They shall be inducted by the rector, or the priest, appointed by the bishop. They shall be required to reside in their parishes. In the exercise of their functions the rectors shall be subject to the immediate jurisdiction of the bishops.

The vicars and curates shall exercise their ministry under the superintendence and direction of the rectors. They shall be approved of by the bishop, and shall be also removeable by him.

No foreigner can be employed in the duties of the

ministry of the church, without permission from the Government. No ecclesiastic, although a Frenchman, can exercise any function, unless he belong to some diocese.

A priest cannot quit his diocese to do parochial duty in another, without the permission of his bishop.

## SECTION V.

### *Of Cathedral Chapters, and of the administration of Dioceses during the vacancy of the See.*

THE archbishops and bishops, who may be desirous of using the power intrusted to them of establishing chapters, cannot do so without having first obtained authority from the Government, as well for the establishment itself, as for the number and selection of the ecclesiastics intended to constitute it.

During the vacancy of the Sees, the administration of the diocese shall be provided for by the metropolitan, or in case of his inability, by the eldest of the suffragan bishops.

The vicars-general of these dioceses shall continue their functions even after the decease of the bishop, till the installation of his successor.

The metropolitans and cathedral chapters shall be bound to notify to the Government, without delay, the

vacancy of sees, and the measures which have been adopted for the administration of the vacant dioceses.

The vicars-general who shall govern the sees during vacancy, as well as the metropolitans or chapters, shall introduce no innovation on the usages and customs of the dioceses.

## TITLE III.

### OF PUBLIC WORSHIP.

THERE shall be but one liturgy, and one catechism, for all the Catholic churches of France.

No curate can order public prayers extraordinary in his parish, without the special permission of the bishop.

No holiday or feast-day, except Sunday, can be established, without the permission of the Government.

In religious ceremonies, the ecclesiastics shall wear the dress and ornaments suitable to their degree; they cannot, in any case, or under any pretext, assume the colours and the distinctive marks reserved for the bishops.

All ecclesiastics shall be dressed in black, after the French fashion; the bishops may add to this costume the pastoral cross, and the violet-coloured stockings.

Domestic chapels, and private oratories cannot be

established, without an express permission from the Government, granted upon the application of the bishop.

In towns where there are places of public worship belonging to different modes of faith, no religious ceremony can be performed out of the edifices consecrated to the Catholic worship.

The same temple can only be consecrated to one particular worship.

In all cathedrals and parish churches, there shall be distinguished places for those Catholics who fill civil and military situations.

The bishop shall concert with the prefect, the manner of calling the faithful to divine service by the sound of bells. They can be rung for no other cause, without the permission of the local police.

When the Government shall order public prayers, the bishops shall arrange with the prefect and the military commandant of the place, the day, the hour, and the mode of fulfilling these instructions.

1.—The solemn addresses, called sermons, as well as those known under the name of the stations (*stations*) of Advent and Lent, shall only be delivered by priests who have obtained a special license from the bishop.

2.—The rectors, in their exhortations at the parochial masses, shall pray, and shall cause to be prayed for

the prosperity of the French Republic, and of the Consuls.

3.—In their instructions, they shall not allow themselves to make directly or indirectly any reflections, either upon persons, or upon the other modes of worship tolerated in the State.

4.—In their exhortations, they shall not give publicity to any thing unconnected with the public worship, unless they be authorized so to do by the Government.

They shall only bestow the nuptial benediction upon those who shall certify in due form, that they have contracted marriage before the civil magistrate.

The registers kept by the ministers of religion being merely relative to the administration of the sacraments, cannot, in any case, supply the registers ordered by the law to ascertain the civil state of the French.

In all proceedings, ecclesiastical and religious, the calendar of the equinox as established by the laws of the Republic, shall be made use of; the days shall be designated by the names assigned them in the calendar of the solstices.

The holiday of the public functionaries shall be on the Sunday of each week.

## Section I.

### *Of the number of Archbishoprics and Bishoprics.*

There shall be in France ten archbishops or metropolitans, and fifty bishops.

The limits of the metropolitan and other sees, shall be conformable to the annexed table.

## Section II.

### *Of the number of Parish Churches.*

There shall be at least one parish church in each justiceship of the peace.

There shall be established also, in addition, as many chapels of ease as may be necessary.

Each bishop, in concert with the prefect, shall regulate the number and extent of those chapels; the plans agreed upon shall be submitted to the Government; and cannot be put into execution without its authority.

No part of the French territory can be converted into a rectory or curacy without the express permission of Government.

The priests officiating at the chapels of ease, shall be nominated by the bishops.

## SECTION III.

### *Of the Salaries of the Clergy.*

THE salary of the archbishops shall be fifteen thousand francs.

The salary of the bishops shall be ten thousand francs.

The rectors shall be divided into two classes.

The salary of the rectors of the first class shall amount to one thousand five hundred francs; that of rectors of the second class, to one thousand francs.

The pensions which they enjoyed in virtue of the laws of the Constituent Assembly shall be deducted from their salary.

The general councils of the great communes may, if circumstances require, allow the rectors an increase of salary; but such augmentation must be provided from the rural property or tolls of such communes.

The vicars and curates shall be chosen from among the ecclesiastics pensioned by virtue of the laws of the Constituent Assembly.

The amount of these pensions, and the produce of the oblations, shall constitute the salary.

The bishops shall draw up the plans for the regulations relative to the oblations, which the ministers of

religion are authorized to receive for the administration of the sacraments. The plans of the regulations drawn up by the bishops shall not be published, nor otherwise put into execution, till approved of by the Government.

Every ecclesiastic pensioned by the state, shall be deprived of his pension, if he refuse, without lawful reasons, to perform the duties confided to him.

The general councils of the department are authorized to procure a suitable residence for the archbishops and bishops.

The presbyteries, and the gardens attached to them, not alienated, shall be given up to the rectors and the curates of the chapels of ease; where there are no presbyteries, the general councils are authorized to procure them a residence and a garden.

The funds destined for the support of the clergy and the solemnization of public worship, can only consist of annuities from Government: they shall be accepted by the diocesan bishop, and can only be applied with the authority of Government.

Immovables, other than the building intended as a residence and the adjoining gardens, cannot be attached to any ecclesiastical titles, nor possessed by the ministers of religion, in virtue of their office.

## SECTION IV.

*Of the Edifices appropriated for Public Worship.*

THE buildings formerly appropriated to the Catholic worship, and now in the possession of the nation, not exceeding one edifice for each rectory and each chapel of ease, shall be placed at the disposal of the bishops by an order of the Prefect of the department. A notification of these orders shall be addressed to the Counsellor of State intrusted with all that concerns public worship.

Guardians shall be appointed to administer the revenues for the support and preservation of the temples, and for the distribution of alms.

In parishes where there is no convenient edifice for public worship, the bishop shall take measures with the prefect for the establishment of a suitable one.

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## BRIEF OF POPE PIUS VII.

### TO OUR DEAR SON NAPOLEON.

EVER since Divine Providence, without any merit of our own, elevated us to the supreme pontificate, you have witnessed our wishes for peace among all nations, and for the tranquillity of the Catholic church;

you have witnessed our anxiety for the spiritual peace of the French people, and our paternal kindness; you have witnessed our favours to the Gallican church, and to your subjects; you have seen that on all occasions we have performed every thing within the extent of our ministry, in concessions, and concordats with the French empire and the kingdom of Italy; in short, you have been a witness of the immense sacrifices which we have made and supported for the well-being and tranquillity of the French and Italian nation, to the prejudice even of our own subjects, already reduced to want and helplessness by the vicissitudes to which they have been exposed.

But notwithstanding so many signal favours, you have not ceased to agonize our heart, to reduce us, under vain pretexts, to a state of the deepest affliction, and to put our sacred duties and our conscience to the severest trials. The only return you have made us for the ecclesiastical Concordat, is the destruction of that same Concordat by the separate laws entitled Organic. You have made us premeditated proposals, irreconcileable with the morality of the Gospel, and with the maxims of the universal Church. As a recompense for peace, and for the favours received at our hands, the dominions of the Holy See have had for a long time to support the enormous burden of your

troops, and to endure the ambitious views of your commanders; so that from 1807 till the present time, they have consumed nearly five millions of Roman crowns, without fulfilling the solemn promise of reimbursement by the Kingdom of Italy. In compensation for these sacrifices, you have despoiled us of the Duchy of Benevento and Ponte Corvo, at the same time promising the Holy See the most ample equivalents. To complete your aggression, you have presented some articles for our sanction and consent, contrary to the rights of nations, to the unity and to the canons of the Catholic Church, and to the welfare of the Catholics throughout foreign climes; as well as destructive of our independence, and of ecclesiastical freedom: you have hostilely invaded our dominions which were granted by the munificence and the piety of monarchs, chiefly French, to the Holy Apostolic See, consecrated to the independence and liberty of the successors of St. Peter, and confirmed by all Catholic monarchs for more then ten ages up to the present time, in order that the Holy Apostolic See might remain in the midst of its elder children in absolute liberty and independence. Finally, you have hostilely invaded the capital itself, and converted the militia into rebels; you have seized the posts, and printing-offices; you have torn from us the faithful counsel-

lors for the spiritual affairs of the Church, the ministers of state; and you have made ourself a prisoner in our apostolical residence, at the same time oppressing our people with your armies. From conduct such as this, we appeal to the universal rights of nations; we appeal to yourself, as to *a consecrated and sworn son, to repair our wrongs, and to maintain the rights of the Catholic Church;* lastly, we appeal to the justice of the Most High. You abuse your power by trampling under your feet the most sacred duties, chiefly to the prejudice of the Church; thus you will force us to employ, in all humility of heart, that power which Almighty God has placed in our hands, if in future you give us fresh reasons for proclaiming to the universe the justice of our cause; for you alone will be responsible for the evils which may be the consequence.

Counter-signed at the office of the Secretary of the Embassy; the 27th of March, 1808.

APOSTOLIC LETTERS, in the form of a BRIEF, by which BONAPARTE, and all the authors, perpetrators, and abettors of the usurpation of the Kingdom of Rome, and of the other dominions belonging to the Holy See, are declared to be excommunicated.

## PIUS VII. POPE.

*Ad perpetuam rei Memoriam.*

WHEN on the memorable day of the 2d of February, the French troops, after having invaded the richest provinces of the Pontifical state, made a sudden irruption into Rome itself, it was impossible for us to attribute such an aggression solely to the political and military reasons adduced by the aggressors; namely, of defending themselves in this town, and of driving their enemies from the territory of the Holy Roman Church; on the contrary, we only saw the desire of inflicting vengeance upon our firmness and constancy in refusing to submit to the demands of the French Government. We immediately saw that this aggression had a still farther object than mere military and temporary precautions, or the manifestation of displeasure against ourselves. Reproduced from their ashes, we saw those impious machinations again revive which had appeared, if not wholly stifled, at least suppressed;

machinations, the work of those deluded and deluding men, who wished to introduce sects devoted to perdition, by the assistance of a vain and deceitful philosophy, and who secretly laboured for a long time at the destruction of our holy religion. We saw that in our own person they circumvented and attacked the Holy See of the blessed Prince of the Apostles, in the hopes that its fall, if it were possible, would necessarily involve with it the ruin of the Catholic Church, founded by its Divine author upon that See, as upon a firm and immoveable rock.

We had lately thought, and even hoped, that the French Government, instructed by experience of the misfortunes into which that powerful nation had been precipitated by having given the reins to impiety and schism, and convinced by the unanimous wishes of the great majority of the citizens, was at length truly and deeply convinced how important it was, both for its own security, and the public happiness, to re-establish in good faith the free exercise of the Catholic religion, and to take it under its special protection. Actuated by this opinion—animated by this hope, we, who unworthy as we are, are the representative on earth of Him who is the God of Peace, had scarcely perceived that an opportunity presented itself of repairing the disasters of the French Church, when we entered into

treaties of peace, with an ardour of which the whole universe can bear testimony, as well as of the great sacrifices both of ourself and the said Church, in order to bring those treaties to a happy termination.

But, just Heaven! how have our hopes been fulfilled! what have been the fruits of all our condescension and liberality? From the moment that the peace was proclaimed, we have been reduced to use the lamentation of the prophet: "Behold, during peace my sorrow became the more bitter." We did not, however, conceal that sorrow from the Church, nor from our brethren the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church, in the allocution we addressed to them in Consistory on the 24th of May, 1802, for the purpose of informing them that several articles unknown to us had been added to the Convention since its promulgation; articles which we disapproved as soon as they were made known to us. In short, by those articles not only was the liberty of the exercise of the Catholic religion, which had been verbally assured, agreed upon, and solemnly promised in the preamble of that very Convention, as constituting its very basis, destroyed; but even in some of the articles the doctrines of the Gospel itself were impugned. The result of the Convention which we entered into with the Italian Republic was nearly similar: the identical articles which

it had been our greatest care to guarantee from an arbitrary or equivocal interpretation, having been precisely interpreted in a manner perfectly arbitrary, and avowedly fraudulent.

After having seen the conditions of both these Conventions, which had been made in favour of the Church, thus violated and misrepresented, and the spiritual power having been thus subjected to the will of the temporal power, far from those salutary effects which we had promised ourselves from these Conventions being obtained, we had, on the contrary, the grief of seeing the misfortunes and disasters of the Church of Jesus Christ increase and multiply from day to day.

We shall not stop here to recall and to enumerate one by one those evils and disasters; they are publicly known and deplored by all good men; we have, besides, sufficiently pointed them out in two Consistorial Allocutions which we made, the one on the 16th of March of the same year, 1808; and to which we have given as much publicity as the state of constraint under which we are placed would permit. By these means the world will know, and posterity will be informed, what have been our sentiments upon the subject of those numerous and sore aggressions of the French Government upon the objects relating to the

Church: our patience and long suffering, in having deferred from day to day to publish our grievances to the world, in the firm hope of being able to apply a remedy to so many evils, will be acknowledged: it will be seen what have been our sufferings and solicitude, and how by our actions, our prayers, and our urgent solicitude, we have endeavoured incessantly to heal the wounds inflicted upon the Church, and to prevent her suffering fresh ones. But in vain we exhausted all the resources of humility, moderation, and mildness, with which up to the present time we have studied to defend the rights and interests of the Church against him who has associated himself with the impious, in order utterly to destroy it; against him who, for this purpose, affected to be attached to it, that he might the more easily betray it, and who had appeared to grant protection that he might be the better enabled to oppress.

We had often, and for a long time, been made to entertain lively hopes, especially when our journey into France was desired and solicited. Soon, however, our demands and prayers began to be eluded by artful subterfuges, by evasions, and by dilatory or perfidious answers: in short, the mask was at length thrown aside, as the time was at hand for putting in execution

the machinations against the Church of Jesus Christ; and we were immediately assailed and overwhelmed with demands always new, or exorbitant, or captious, the nature of which sufficiently and abundantly proved that our enemies had two objects in view equally fatal and disastrous for the Holy See and for the Church: namely, to betray our ministry to shame and dishonour, if we consented; if we refused, to make our refusal a sufficient pretext for a declaration of open war.

But as our conscience did not permit us to accede to these demands, our refusal was immediately made a pretext for detaching hostile troops against this sacred city: the castle of St. Angelo was seized; detachments were posted in the squares and streets; and even the Quirinal palace, our residence, was menaced by numerous bodies of infantry and cavalry, and by pieces of artillery. But, with the assistance of God, by whom we can do all things, and strong in the importance of our duty, we did not permit ourselves to be intimidated, nor our resolution to be shaken by this sudden alarm, nor by this show of hostility. With calmness and tranquillity becoming our office, we celebrated the holy ceremonies, and the divine mysteries belonging to the solemnity of that thrice holy day; nor did we omit, either through fear, negligence, or forgetfulness, any thing

which our duty required of us, under circumstances so alarming and so critical.

We recollected with Saint Ambrose (de Basilic. tradend. No. 17.), "that the holy Naboth, having a vine, and being required to give it up to the king, answered: God forbid that I should thus give up the inheritance of my fathers." Much less have we supposed that it was permitted us to yield to another an inheritance so ancient and so sacred (we mean here the temporal sovereignty of this Holy See, possessed through a long course of ages by the Roman Pontiffs, our predecessors, evidently according to the ordering of Divine Providence), or tacitly to consent that any power whatsoever should be put into possession of this capital of the Christian world; in which, after having overthrown and destroyed the most holy form of government, bequeathed by Jesus Christ to his most Holy Church, and governed by the sacred canons instituted by the Divine spirit, a code not only hostile to those sacred canons, but even incompatible with the precepts of the Gospel, would be substituted in its stead, a code which would introduce, as it has already done, a new order of things manifestly tending to associate and confound all sects and all superstitions with the Catholic Church.

Naboth defended his vine at the expense of his blood. (Saint Ambrose, ib.) Could we, let the conse-

quence be what it might, have declined defending the rights and possessions of the holy Roman Church, which, by oath, we are obliged to maintain, and not demand the freedom of the Apostolic See, which is so intimately connected with the liberty and rights of the universal Church?

Highly important and necessary indeed, is this temporal principality, in order to secure to the Supreme Head of the Church the free exercise of that spiritual power which God has given him over the whole world. Were proofs wanting to confirm this, the events now taking place would establish it but too undeniably. Although neither the honours, revenues, nor power of this sovereign principality have ever afforded us gratification, the desire after which things is far from our character and from the holy profession which we have embraced, and always cherished, from our earliest years, we have, nevertheless, thought it our indispensable duty, to date from the said day, 2d Feb. 1808, however critical might be our situation, and to cause to be drawn up by the Cardinal our secretary of state, a solemn Protestation, for the purpose of publishing to the world the causes of those grievances to which we are exposed, and our determination of maintaining inviolable the rights of the Holy See.

Seeing, however, that menaces failed in their effect,

the aggressors resolved to adopt a different system towards us: they tried a species of persecution more slow, but in fact more vexatious and cruel, that of gradually undermining a constancy which they perceived was proof against sudden terror. For this purpose, since the 2d of February, in the palace in which we have been detained a prisoner, scarcely a day has passed, but what has been marked by some insult to the Holy See, or some persecution inflicted upon us.

All the military employed by us in the maintenance of public tranquillity and civil discipline, have been incorporated with the French troops; our body-guard, all chosen men, and of the order of the nobility, were sent to the fortress of Rome, here they were detained a few days, and were at length disbanded; guards have been posted at the gates and principal places of the city; forcible possession was taken of the post-office, all the printing-establishments, especially those of our apostolic chamber, and of the *propaganda;* we have even been deprived of the power of causing to be printed the declaration of our will, as well as that of proclaiming our commands. The administration of government and of justice has been interrupted, and impeded. Solicited by fraud, cunning, and every species of artifice, to form what are called National Guards, our subjects have become rebels to

their legitimate sovereign. The more audacious, the more corrupted amongst them, wearing the French and Italian tri-coloured cockade, and protected by that signal of revolt as with a shield, have, whether ordered so to do, or only tolerated, dispersed themselves on all sides, sometimes in bands, sometimes singly, indulging in every kind of excess against the ministers of the church, against the government, and against all who still remain faithful to their duty; and notwithstanding all our representations, journals, or, as they are called, periodical pamphlets, full of abuse, sarcasms, and even calumnies against the pontifical power and dignity, are published in Rome, whence they are distributed both at home and abroad; declarations and public notices issuing from us, signed with our own hand, and affixed by our order in the usual places, have been pulled down by the vilest satellites, torn in pieces, and trampled under foot, in defiance of the indignation and complaints of good men. Imprudent young men, and other citizens, have been invited, elected, and admitted into suspected societies, prohibited under severe penalties by the civil and ecclesiastical laws, even under pain of excommunication, by our predecessors Clement XII. and Benedict XIV; many of our ministers and officers, both at Rome and in the provinces, men of the greatest integrity and

fidelity, have been either harassed, thrown into prison, or exiled. Public papers and writings of every kind in the portfolios of the magistrates of the pontifical state, even those in the office of our first minister of state, have been all seized without exception; thrice have we replaced our first secretary of state, and thrice has he been violently removed from our own palace; in short, the majority of the Cardinals of the Holy Roman Church who remained near us as our advisers, have been, by main force, torn from our presence, and removed to a distance.

All these, and many other aggressions not less shameful and audacious, perpetrated in defiance of every law both human and divine, are so notorious to the public, that it is useless to retrace and to enumerate them in this place; nor have we omitted, as became our office, to make strong protests against each particular act, in order that it might never appear that we had connived at them, or given them our consent. Thus, already despoiled of almost all the splendour of our dignity, and deprived of all the necessary means of fulfilling the functions of our ministry, especially that of distributing our paternal care amongst all the churches; and, in short, overwhelmed, oppressed, and tormented, by every species of terror, insult, and vexation, and impeded every day

more and more in the exercise of our temporal and spiritual power, if we have preserved to the present moment some appearance, some shadow of that power, we owe it, after that Almighty God whose providence has given us so many marks of his protection, to our own constancy, to the prudence of our ministers, as well as to that of the clergy. The subjection of the sacred authority of the bishops to the power of the laity; the violence of every kind to which their consciences have been exposed; and finally, their expulsion from their own sees, their exile, and other sacrilegious aggressions of the same nature, against the liberty, the rights, and the doctrine of the church, committed as well in our states, as in the other countries which previously succumbed to the power of the same government;—these, these are the valuable pledges, the convincing proofs of that wonderful attachment to the Catholic religion, which it continues even to this day to promise and to boast of.

For ourselves, having for so long drunk deep of the bitter cup presented to us by those from whom we had least reason to expect it, and harassed in every possible manner, we are less afflicted by our present situation, than by the future lot which awaits our persecutors. For, if the anger of the Lord has been lightly kindled against us, he will again be reconciled

with his servants. But whose endeavours to injure the Church, how can he escape the hand of God? No; God will except no one, nor will he respect the grandeur of the mightiest; for the little and the great are the work of his hands, and it is for the strongest that he reserves the severest chastisement. Would to God that we could, at any price, even that of our life, avert eternal perdition, and effect the salvation of our persecutors, whom we have loved, and whom we shall never cease to love, with our whole heart! Would to God we were permitted never to depart from that spirit of charity and mildness natural to us, and which we have so willingly put into practice; and that we could for the future, as we have hitherto done, abstain from using the rod which was put into our hands when the flock of Jesus Christ was intrusted to us, in the person of the ever blessed Saint Peter, by the Prince of Shepherds, for the correction of erring and obstinate sheep, and for the example and terror of the rest!

But the moment of indulgence has passed away. They, indeed, must be blind who cannot see the ultimate end of all these aggressions, and what will be their results, if a timely stop be not opposed to them in the most effective manner. On the other hand, it must be apparent to every one that there now remains absolutely

no hope that the authors of those aggressions can be moved either by representations, advice, prayers, or supplications, or that they will become more favourable to the Church. They will permit no approach to such means, they are deaf to them; their only reply is accumulated insult. It is no longer possible for those men to listen to and obey the Church, as children do a tender mother, or as disciples do their master, whose sole thoughts, actions, and endeavours, are to bring that very Church into subjection under them, like a servant to his master, and afterwards to destroy it to its very foundations.

What, then, remains for us now to do, if we are desirous of not incurring the reproach of sloth and negligence, and perhaps even that of having shamefully abandoned the cause of God! What then, we say, remains for us to do, if it be not to silence every humane consideration, to abjure all fleshly prudence, and to put into practice that precept of the gospel, "And if he neglect to hear the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican." Matthew xviii. v. 17. Let them once more be instructed that they are subjected by the law of Jesus Christ to our throne and to our rule. For we also, we exercise a sovereignty, "and a sovereignty much more noble; unless it be said that the spirit should be obedient to the flesh, and the things

of heaven serve those of earth." (Saint Greg. de Naz. or XVII. ad Maur.). So many great pontiffs, illustrious by their doctrine and their sanctity, have formerly been driven to these extremities, in order to defend the cause of the Church against obdurate kings and princes, who had committed sometimes one, sometimes another of those crimes, visited by our canons with anathema! Shall we fear, then, to follow their example, after crimes so many, so enormous, so atrocious, so sacrilegious, so notorious, and manifest to the eyes of the universe? Have we not great reason to apprehend the accusation of having done it too late, instead of having done it with temerity and precipitation? especially when by this last aggression, the heaviest hitherto committed against our temporal sovereignty, we are forewarned that we shall not henceforth be free to fulfil a duty so important and so necessary to our ministry.

Therefore, by the authority of Almighty God, by that of the blessed apostles St. Peter and St. Paul, and by our own, we declare, that all those who after the invasion of this city and the ecclesiastical states, after the sacrilegious violation of the patrimony of the blessed St. Peter, prince of the apostles, committed by the French troops (aggressions which have excited our just complaints in the two consistorial allocutions already mentioned, as well as in many protests and

declarations which have been published by our order) have acted in the said city and in the provinces of the State of the Church, against the ecclesiastical immunities and the temporal rights of the Church and of the Holy See :—we declare, therefore, that all who have committed any of those acts, or who have ordered, abetted, advised, or adhered to them, as well as those who have caused them to be executed, or have themselves assisted in the execution of them, *have incurred the greater excommunication, and the other ecclesiastical pains and censures fulminated by the sacred Canons, the apostolic Constitutions, and the decrees of General Councils, especially that of Trent (Sess. XXII. cap. XI. of Reform)**;

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* " If any ecclesiastic, or layman, of whatever dignity, be he even emperor or king, have his heart so filled with avarice, which is the root of all evil, as to dare to convert to his own use, and usurp by himself, or by another, by force, or by menaces, or even by the intervention of other persons, be they ecclesiastics or laymen, by any artifice, and under any pretext or colour whatever, the jurisdictions, property, lands, and rights, even feudal and amphitheotic, the fruits, emoluments and revenues whatsoever, of any church or any benefice, secular or regular, Mount of piety, or other place of devotion whatsoever, which ought to be appropriated to the necessities of the poor, and the officiating ministers; or to hinder, by the same means, the said property from being received by those to whom it, by right, belongs: let him be sub-

*and if there be occasion, we excommunicate and anathematize them again, and declare that they* have equally incurred the loss of all privileges whatsoever, of all pardons and indultos of whatever kind which may have been granted them, as well by ourselves, as by the Roman Pontiffs our predecessors; and that they cannot be absolved and liberated from the censures so incurred by any other but by ourselves, or by the Roman Pontiff for the time being, (except in the article of death, and then falling again under the weight of the same censures so soon as they shall be out of danger); and we also declare them incapable and incapacitated from obtaining the benefit of absolution, until they shall have publicly retracted, revoked, destroyed, and abrogated all the effects whatsoever of their crimes, and fully and effectually reestablished all things in their former situation; and shall, moreover, have made to the

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jected to anathema, until he shall entirely restore and give back to the Church and to its administrator, or to the incumbent, the aforesaid jurisdiction, property, effects, rights, fruits, and revenues which he shall have seized, or which shall have come into his possession by whatever means, even by the donation of a supposed person; and until he shall afterwards obtain absolution from the sovereign pontiff."

Church, to us, and to the Holy See, the just satisfaction which they owe us upon the above-mentioned heads. Therefore, by these presents, we command likewise that all those already mentioned, even those who require to be specifically mentioned, and their successors in office, shall not, under any pretext whatever, consider themselves exempted and dispensed from retracting, revoking, destroying, and annulling all their aggressions, nor of really and effectively satisfying as is fitting, the Church, the Holy See, and us; on the contrary, it is our will that for the present and the future this obligation retain its efficacy, if ever they wish to obtain the benefit of absolution.

Notwithstanding, however, when we are thus obliged to unsheath the sword of that Church's severity, we do not forget that, unworthy as we are, we fill upon earth the place of Him, who when he exercises justice, remembers also forgiveness: we therefore command and order, first to our own subjects, and then to all Christian people, in virtue of holy obedience, that no one, by reason or under the pretext of our present apostolic letters, shall presume in any manner to injure, prejudice, or wrong the property, rights, or privileges, of those to whom the present letters are directed; for while we correct them with that castigation which God has put into our power, and while we

avenge so many and so great wrongs done to God and his holy Church, our great object is that those who now persecute us should be converted, and even crowned with us (St. Aug. in Ps. 54. v. 1.) if God should graciously grant them repentance; that they may know the truth (2 to Tim. cap. ii. v. 25). Therefore, raising our hands to heaven in all humility of heart, whilst we refer and leave to God the just cause which we defend, which is rather his than ours, and whilst we confess that, with the assistance of his grace, we are ready, for the cause of his Church, to drink even to its dregs the cup which he deigned first to drink for her; we pray and conjure Him, by the bowels of his mercy, not to despise nor reject the prayers which we offer up night and day for their repentance and salvation. How beautiful and consoling for us will be that day, on which we shall see, by the grace of Divine mercy, the same children who now cause so much sorrow and tribulation, take refuge in our paternal bosom, and hasten to return to the fold!

It is our will that the present apostolic letters, and all things therein contained, be not at any time opposed or impugned, (even under the pretext that those who are designated in them, and all those who have or pretend to have an interest in the said letters, in whatsoever manner, of whatever estate, rank, order,

preeminence, or dignity they may be, or however worthy they may otherwise be supposed to be of specific and individual mention or denomination, have not consented to them, or that having been summoned, cited, and heard, they had not been sufficiently convinced of the truth and justice of the cause for which these letters have been promulgated; or for any other cause, colour, or pretext whatsoever). These same letters cannot at any time be considered as corrupted with the vice of subreption, obreption, nullity, or want of intention on our part, or from want of the consent of the parties who are interested in them, or from any other want or defect whatsoever, and under this pretext they cannot be impugned, annulled, retracted, disputed upon, or reduced to question of right; nor can there be alleged against them either the right of verbal protest, or that of plenary restitution, or any other remedy, either by right, deed, or favour; or that such remedy, after having been solicited, having been granted, or having even emanated from our own impulse, knowledge, and full power, can be of any effect whatever, whether in or out of judgment: but we decree, that these present letters shall always remain firm, valid, and efficacious, to have and to obtain their full and entire effect, and be inviolably and constantly observed by those whom they concern, and for the time during which they shall

so concern them: that they should be thus and not otherwise considered, either by the common judges, or by delegated judges, even by the auditors of causes of the apostolic palace, and the cardinals of the holy Roman church, also by the legates *in latere*, and the nuncios of the holy see: and all others whatsoever who enjoy and shall enjoy any preeminence or power whatsoever: taking from every and all of them the power and authority of considering and interpreting them differently; declaring, finally, null and of no effect all that may be done or attempted against them, either knowingly or ignorantly, by any power or authority whatsoever.

And notwithstanding all the aforesaid; and, in case of need, notwithstanding our regulation, and those of the apostolic chancery, respecting the maintenance of acquired rights, and the other constitutions and apostolic ordinances, and all the other statutes and customs corroborated by oath, apostolic authorization, or any other confirmation; notwithstanding all usages and forms even immemorial, all privileges, indultos, apostolic letters promulgated antecedently, and granted to any persons whatsoever, with whatever dignities, secular or ecclesiastic, they may be invested, and whatever qualification they may possess, and even although they should pretend to need an express and special specifi-

cation, under whatever form or tenour; notwithstanding still all other derogating, unusual or annulling cause, and all other decrees which it would appear emanated from the express impulse, certain knowledge, and full power, whether in consistory, or in any other manner whatever, and which would be in opposition to what has been declared above, although even they might have been made public, and have been several times repeated, and whatever number of times they may have been approved, confirmed, and renewed; we declare that we derogate by these presents, in an express and special manner, and for this time only, from those constitutions, clauses, customs, privileges, indultos, and acts whatever; and we intend that they should be derogated from, although those acts, or some of them, may not have been inserted or specified expressly in these presents, although deserving a special, express, and individual mention, or particular form in like case. Being willing that these presents should have the same force as if the tenour of the constitutions to be suppressed, and that of the special clauses to be observed, were nominally and word for word expressed therein, and that they obtain their full and entire effect, notwithstanding all things to the contrary. And as these present letters cannot be safely published every where, and especially in the places where it would be most

expedient that they should, as is notorious, we will that these letters, or their copies, be affixed to and published at the gates of the Church of Lateran, and of the Basilica of the Prince of the Apostles, as well as at the Apostolic Chancery, and in the grand court at Mount Citorio, and at the entrance of the Campo-di-Fiore of this city, according to custom; and that being thus affixed and published, they be law for all and every one whom they may concern, as if they had been communicated to each separately and personally.

We also will, that in all places, and in all countries, the same credit be given to the copies transcribed or printed from the present letters, signed by some notaries public, and bearing the seal of some persons duly invested with ecclesiastical dignity, as to the originals, whether in law or otherwise.

Given at Rome, near St. Mary-Major, under the seal of the Fisherman, the 10th of June, 1809, in the tenth year of our pontificate.

(Signed,) Pius VII. Pope.

## DECLARATION.

### Pius VII. Pope.

By the authority of Almighty God, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, and our own, we declare that you and all your coadjutors have, by the aggression which you have committed, incurred the pain of excommunication (as notified by our apostolic Bulls, which as in similar cases have been affixed to the usual places in this city): we declare all those to have also incurred excommunication, who since the late hostile invasion of this city, which took place on the 2d of February, of last year, have committed either in Rome, or within the ecclesiastical states, the acts of aggression against which we have protested, not only in the Declaration issued by our Secretaries of State, for the time being, but also in our two consistorial allocutions of the 14th of March and 11th of July, 1808. We also declare to be equally excommunicated, all those who shall have assisted, promoted, advised, or otherwise cooperated in the commission of those aggressions, or shall have themselves committed them.

Given at Rome, at St. Mary-Major, the 11th of June, 1809, and in the tenth year of our Pontificate.

Pius VII. Pope.

LETTER from His Holiness POPE PIUS VII. written from his prison at Savona, upon the subject of the Capitular Elections.

## LETTER I.

To MONSIGNOR CARDINAL CAPRARA, Archbishop of Milan.

MY LORD CARDINAL,

I RECEIVED here, on the 19th inst. your letter dated the 20th of July, by which, as Archbishop of Milan, you inform me of the desire of H. M. the Emperor of the French, that I should grant canonical institution to the bishops destined to fill the sees which are or may be vacant in his dominions. You add that H. M. consents that in my Bulls I shall not make mention of his nomination, provided that on my part I suppress the clause *proprio motu*, or from any other equivalent causes. It will be impossible for you, my Lord Cardinal, upon the least consideration of this proposition, not to see that I cannot acquiesce without acknowledging the right of nomination in the Emperor, and the power of exereising that right. You say that my Bulls will be granted not to him, but to the solicitations of the Council, and of the Minister of religion:

in the first place, such solicitation on the part of the laity is inadmissible by the Apostolic Chancery; and, secondly, are not this Council and Minister virtually the Emperor himself? are they any other than the organs through which he promulgates his orders, and instruments of his will?—Now, after so many fatal innovations upon religion which the Emperor has allowed himself, and against which I have so often and so vainly protested; after the vexations exercised against so many ecclesiastics of the Holy See; after the deportation of so many bishops and the greater part of the cardinals; after the imprisonment of Cardinal Pacca, at Fenestrelles; after the usurpation of the patrimony of St. Peter; after having seen myself assaulted in my own palace by an armed force, and dragged from town to town under so strict a guard, that the bishops of several places through which I had to pass were not permitted to approach me, and could not say a single word to me without witnesses; after all these sacrilegious crimes, and innumerable others which it would be tedious here to enumerate, but which the General Councils and Constitutions have visited with anathema; what have I done but obey those Councils and Constitutions as my duty required? How, then, can I now recognise in the author of all these enormities the right in question, and consent that

he should exercise it? I could not do it without making myself guilty of prevarication, without contradicting myself, and without scandalizing the faithful by giving them reason to suppose that, overwhelmed with the misfortunes I have undergone, and by the apprehensions of still greater, I am base enough to betray my own conscience, and approve that which it requires me to condemn. Weigh these reasons, my Lord Cardinal, not in the balance of human wisdom, but in that of the sanctuary; and you will feel their orce.

Heaven knows, however, how anxiously, even in the midst of all these severe trials, I desired to fill up the vacant sees of the Church of France, for which I have ever had so great a predilection! with what ardour I would adopt any expedient which would enable me to fulfil my ministry without compromising my duty. But alone, and without assistance, how can I engage in an affair of so much consequence? All my counsellors are taken from me, and I am deprived of the power of free communication with any of them; no one is left to assist me, in so intricate a discussion, with their advice and counsel; even the assistance of a secretary is denied me. But if the Emperor has a real attachment for the Catholic Church, let him commence by reconciling himself to its Head; let him recall those fatal innovations, against which I have continually protested;

let him restore me my liberty, my throne, my officers; let him restore that property which constituted not my patrimony, but that of St. Peter; let him replace me in the Chair of St. Peter, widowed since the captivity of its Supreme Chief; let him collect around me once more forty cardinals, whom his orders have torn from my presence; let him reinstate in their dioceses all the exiled bishops, and harmony will be immediately reestablished. In the midst of all my tribulations, I cease not to address my most fervent prayers to God, the disposer of all hearts, and to invoke him for the author of all these evils; I should think my prayers fully heard, did it please the Almighty to inspire him with wiser councils; but if, by a secret judgment of the Almighty, it should prove otherwise, though these misfortunes are to be deplored, at least they cannot be imputed to me; I will neglect nothing in my power to avoid them, and for that purpose I will employ my deepest attention and most unremitting efforts.

As to the report endeavoured to be spread, that I compromise spiritual things for interest purely temporal, it is a calumny very easy for you, my Lord Cardinal, to confound, who have known from day to day all that has occurred: you know very well, that were the usurpation of the patrimony of St. Peter the only point of

dispute, I could not abandon its defence, without failing in an essential duty, without the guilt of perjury.

Your letter was accompanied by that of Cardinal Maury, and at the same time a third letter from the Bishop of Cazal was put into my hands, all three upon the same subject. Pray acknowledge the receipt of them to those gentlemen, at the same time communicating to them this answer: I shall take an opportunity of greater leisure to answer Cardinal Maury more at length; in the mean time assure them of my sentiments of esteem, and receive my paternal and apostolic benediction.

PIUS VII. Pope.

Savona, 26th August, 1809.

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## LETTER II.

To the Venerable Brother CARDINAL JEAN MAURY, Bishop of Montefiascone and Corneto, at Paris.

Venerable Brother, Salutation and Apostolic Benediction.

FIVE days have now elapsed, since we received the letter by which you inform us of your nomination to the Archbishopric of Paris, and your installation in the government of that diocese. This intelligence has completed our other calamities, and has inflicted upon

us sufferings scarcely to be borne, and impossible to be expressed. You were fully informed of our letter to the Cardinal Caprara, at that time Archbishop of Milan, in which we set forth the powerful motives which made it incumbent upon us, in the actual state of things, to refuse canonical institution to the bishops nominated by the Emperor. You were not ignorant, that not only circumstances remained precisely the same, but that they have become, and are becoming daily, more and more alarming, from the sovereign contempt which is affected against the authority of the Church. Since in Italy audacity and boldness has been carried so far as to cause the gene ral destruction of the religious communities of both sexes, suppressing rectories and bishoprics, reuniting them, amalgamating them, giving them new limits, not even excepting the suburbicary sees; all which acts have been performed solely in virtue of the imperial and royal authority: for we do not speak of the sufferings of the clergy of the Roman Church, the mother and mistress of all other churches, nor of so many other aggressions. You were not ignorant, we again repeat, of all these events; but, on the contrary, were well acquainted with their minutest details; and with such knowledge, we should never have thought it possible that you could have accepted from the Em

peror the nomination to which you allude, nor that your joy in announcing it to us would have been the same as if your appointment had been the circumstance most agreeable and conformable to your wishes.

Is it thus then, that, after having so courageously and eloquently pleaded the cause of the Catholic Church, in the most stormy period of the French revolution, you abandon that same Church, now that you are loaded with its dignities and favours, and are strictly bound to it by the religious obligation of an oath? Is it thus that without a blush you take part against us in a cause in which we are solely engaged for the maintenance of the dignity of the Church? Is it thus lightly that you treat our authority, as to dare, in some measure, by this public act, to pronounce sentence against us to whom you owe fidelity and obedience? But what still more afflicts us, is to see that after having begged an archbishopric of the Chapter, you have, of your own authority and without consulting us, taken upon you the direction of another church; far from imitating the pious example of the cardinal Joseph Fesch, archbishop of Lyons; who, having been nominated previously to yourself to the same archbishopric of Paris, so wisely thought it his duty to deny himself all spiritual government of that Church, notwithstanding the invitation of the Chapter.

We will not here observe that in the ecclesiastical annals no example has been found of a priest, nominated to any bishopric, being prevailed upon by the Chapter to enter upon the government of his diocese before he received canonical institution: we will not examine (and no one knows better than yourself, whether it is so) if the capitular vicar elected before you has voluntarily and freely resigned his office, and if he has not yielded to threats, fear, or promises, and consequently, whether your election has been free, unanimous, and regular; we are as little anxious to know if there were in the Chapter a person capable of performing functions so important; for, in short, what is the desired object? It is wished to introduce into the Church a custom as novel as it is dangerous, by means of which the civil power may insensibly succeed in nominating to the vacant sees such persons only as are entirely devoted to it. Who does not evidently see that such a course is not only calculated to destroy the liberty of the Church, but also to open the door to schism, and facilitate invalid elections? But, moreover, who has loosed you from that spiritual tie by which you were united to the church of Montefiascone; or who has granted you dispensations, in order to be elected by the Chapter, and to assume the direction of another diocese? Quit, therefore, immediately that

direction: not only do we command, but, urged by parental affection, we beg, we entreat you, in order that we may not be forced to proceed against our own wishes and with the utmost regret, conformably to the statutes of the Holy Canons; and no one is ignorant of the penalties pronounced against those, who being set over one church, undertake the direction of another, before they are disengaged from their former ties. We hope that you will voluntarily accede to our wishes, if you sufficiently consider the evil which such an example upon your part will do the Church, and the dignity with which you are invested. We write to you with all the freedom our duty requires; and if you receive our letter with the same sentiments which have dictated it, you will acknowledge it as a striking proof of our tenderness for you. In the mean time we shall not cease to address to the Holy and Almighty God, fervent prayers that He will deign to calm by one word, the winds and tempests let loose with so much fury against the bark of St. Peter; and that he will at length conduct us to that wished-for shore where we can freely exercise the functions of our ministry. We heartily bestow upon you our apostolic benediction.

Given at Savona, 5th of November, 1810, in the eleventh year of our Pontificate.

Pius VII. Pope.

## LETTER III.

To our dear son, EVRARD CORBOLI, Archdeacon of the Metropolitan Church of Florence, and Capitular Vicar during the vacancy of the archiepiscopal see at Florence.

Our dear Son, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is very easy for us to answer the questions proposed to us, as well in your name as in that of the Metropolitan Chapter of your city. All these questions may be reduced to two: 1st.—By what authority could our venerable brother the Bishop of Nancy lawfully become the Archbishop of Florence, to which see he has lately been nominated? for this nomination is a privilege not even enjoyed by the Grand Dukes of Tuscany, to whom our predecessors, in recompense of the signal services they had rendered the Church, had only granted the favour of proposing for every vacant church three candidates, from among whom the Sovereign Pontiff chose one, (a favour which we did not ourselves hesitate to grant to the late King of Etruria, and to the Queen Regent, on account of their great piety.)

2dly.—Can the said bishop be delegated and elected by the Metropolitan Chapter of Florence capitular vicar or administrator of that church, after your dismission?

Can he, in virtue of that delegation or election, be duly invested with any faculty, power, or jurisdiction?

In the first place, we have a celebrated canon of the second Holy Œcumenical Council of Lyons, which, in its foresight, forbids that any one who has been elected to a church can, previously to canonical institution, take upon himself the administration or government of that church, under the name of steward or procurator, or under any other denomination, in any manner, whether in whole or in part, of the spiritual as well as temporal government, for the purpose of ordering and taking it upon himself, either by himself or by any other person. These words are so general and so clear, that they exclude all exception, and render all comment unnecessary. In support of this canon we shall quote the decrees of Boniface XIII. (Injuncta, inserted in the Extravag. Comm.) and the constitutions of the Sovereign Pontiffs Alexander V. Julius II. Clement VIII. Julius III. by whom this canon was confirmed and strengthened; which, in short, have been received by the universal Church with so much respect, that they have become the sanction and basis of that salutary discipline which has ever since been in force throughout the whole Church.

Now, the Council of Trent, which has determined and fixed the duties of the Cathedral Chapters during

the vacancy of the see, far from derogating any thing from the canon of Lyons, and from so many decrees of the sovereign pontiffs, on the contrary, evidently supposes them, when it declares that the Chapters have no other function, and consequently no other power, than that of electing, within eight days, one or more stewards, with an official or capitular vicar. It afterwards declares, that these same stewards, and officials or vicars, once elected, no longer depend upon the Chapter, but upon the future bishop, to whom, after his promotion to the government of the vacant church, it is ordered, to require from them an account of their conduct, jurisdiction, administrations, and functions whatsoever, and to punish them if they have committed any faults; although even they may have obtained from the Chapter absolution and entire pardon for the said faults. Whence are deduced two evident consequences; the first, that the officials once established, the exercise of ecclesiastical government no longer resides in the hands of the Chapter, but in those of the officials; the second, that this capitular officer must necessarily be a person distinct from the bishop who shall be promoted.

Thus, then, according to the canonical and pontifical sanctions, according to the discipline of the Church now in force, and against which no legitimate delega-

tion of authority can exist, our venerable brother the Bishop of Nancy, the subject of the present inquiry, is absolutely incapable of the function of vicar, or capitular official of the Metropolitan Church of Florence, inasmuch as he has been nominated archbishop of that church.

But what renders him especially incapable is, that he has contracted with another church a spiritual marriage, which cannot be dissolved but by an express dispensation from the Apostolic See, which has declared that no bishop of one church can be transferred to another, without a special favour of the Holy See, a favour never granted but for the most lawful and weighty reasons.

Such being the case, you will be doubtless convinced that you would be guilty of temerity, and be highly culpable, were you to resign your functions in order to open to another that path which the Church has closed against him; you will understand that all delegation of this kind, if made by the Chapter, is not only blameable, but that it is moreover null and void; as for greater precaution, and in case of need, we, by virtue of our authority, declare it, now and henceforth, null and invalid; for by that means, the most holy laws and the usual discipline of the Church would be invaded; and the principles of its legitimate mission

would be obscured and destroyed, and the authority of the Apostolic See despised and annihilated.

This is what we have considered it our duty briefly to communicate to you, solely because you have asked our opinion, and not that we could suspect any thing of this nature could be likely to happen either on your part, on that of the Metropolitan Chapter of Florence, or on the part of our venerable brother the Bishop of Nancy. We indulge so high an opinion of you, that not only we do not fear that you will hold in contempt the regulations of the holy canons; but, on the contrary, we are persuaded that you will ever be ready to observe them, to make them known, and to defend them, in defiance of menaces and flattery.

Therefore, in our name, and by our order, you will make known this declaration of our sentiments to our dear sons the dignitaries and the canons of the Metropolitan Church of Florence; and we give you all from our heart our apostolic benediction.

Given at Savona, 2d of December, 1810, in the eleventh year of our Pontificate.

PIUS VII. Pope.

## DECREE

### Of the 13th of January, 1811.

NAPOLEON, &c. &c.

UPON the report of our Minister of religion, our Council of State being heard, we have decreed, and do decree, as follows:

Article 1.—The brief of the Pope given at Savona, the 30th of Nov. 1810, and addressed to the capitular vicar, and the chapter of the Metropolitan Church of Florence, beginning with these words, *Dilecte fili, salutem*, and ending with these, *Benedictionem perma nenter impertimur*, is disallowed as contrary to the laws of the Empire, and ecclesiastical discipline: we in consequence forbid its publication and its execution in any manner, either directly or indirectly.

2.—Those who shall be found to have, by secret and clandestine means, transmitted, communicated, or made known the said brief, shall be prosecuted before the tribunals, and punished as guilty of a crime, tending to disturb the state by a civil war, in the terms of the 91st article of the code, *des delits et des peines*, titre 1, chap. 1. sect. II. § II., and article 103 of the same code, same chapter, sect. III.

3.—Our ministers of justice, of police, and of religion, are all charged, each in his respective functions, with the execution of the present decree, which shall be inserted in the bulletin of the laws.

(Signed,) NAPOLEON.

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## DECREE.

THE Concordat signed at Fontainebleau, which regulates the affairs of the Church, and which was promulgated as a law of the State on the 13th of February, 1813, is obligatory upon our archbishops, bishops, and chapter, who shall be required to conform to it, as soon as we shall have nominated to a vacant bishopric, and shall have communicated it to the Holy Father in the form required by the Concordat. Our Minister of religion shall forward an account of the nomination to the metropolitan; but if the nomination be that of a metropolitan, the account shall be sent to the senior bishop of the ecclesiastical district. The person whom we shall have named shall appear before the metropolitan, who shall make the necessary inquiries, and shall forward the result to the Holy Father. If the person nominated be under any ecclesiastical disability, the metropolitan shall immediately inform us of it; and in case of no cause of ecclesiastical

exclusion existing, if the institution has not been granted by the Pope within six months from the notification of our nomination, according to the terms of the fourth article of the Concordat, the Metropolitan, assisted by the bishop of the ecclesiastical district, shall be required to grant the said institution. Our courts shall take cognizance of every circumstance coming under the heads of appeals and abuses, as well as all those which may result from the non-execution of the laws of the Concordat.

Our Grand Judge shall present a project of law to be discussed in our council, which shall determine the mode of procedure, and the penalties to be inflicted in these cases.

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## Letter from the Prince Royal of Sweden to Napoleon.

(See page 231.)

Stockholm, 23d of March, 1813.

Sire,

So long as your Majesty confined yourself to direct hostility against me, I merely opposed to such conduct calmness and silence; but as the object of the Duke of Bassano's note to M. D'Ohsson is to

throw the same torch of discord between the King and me, which facilitated your Majesty's entrance into Spain, all the ministerial relations being interrupted, I address myself to your Majesty direct, in order to recall to your recollection the open and ingenuous conduct of Sweden, even in times the most threatening. To the communications which M. Signeul was ordered to make, by command of your Majesty, the King directed this answer to be returned, that Sweden, convinced that she owed the loss of Finland solely to you, Sire, could never give credit to your friendship for her, unless you gave her Norway as an equivalent for the loss your policy had caused her.

As to that part of the Duke of Bassano's note which alludes to the invasion of Pomerania, and the conduct of the French privateers, facts are the best answer; and upon comparing dates, it will be seen, Sire, whether your Majesty or the Swedish Government is in the right. It was not before 100 Swedish vessels had been captured, and more than 200 Swedish sailors had been put into irons, that the Government saw itself under the necessity of causing the pirate to be seized, who, under the French flag, entered our ports, for the purpose of capturing our merchant-vessels, and insulting our confidence in treaties.

The Duke of Bassano asserts, that your Majesty has

not provoked the war; and yet, Sire, your Majesty has passed the Niemen, at the head of 400,000 men. From the moment that your Majesty penetrated into the heart of this empire, the event was no longer doubtful. The Emperor Alexander and the King foresaw, even at the commencement of August, the termination of the campaign, and its prodigious results. All military combinations gave the assurance that your Majesty would be made prisoner. You have escaped that danger, Sire; but your army, the flower of France, Germany, and Italy, no longer exists. There lie, unburied, the warriors who saved France at Fleurus; who conquered in Italy; who withstood the burning climate of Egypt; and who secured victory to your standards at Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Halle, Zubech, Friedland, &c. Let this afflicting picture, Sire, soften your heart, and, if necessary, recall to your remembrance the deaths of more than a million of Frenchmen, who have fallen on the field of honour, the victims of the wars undertaken by your Majesty. Your Majesty appeals to your claims upon the friendship of the King: permit me, Sire, to remind you of the little value you attached to it, when a reciprocity of such sentiments might have been advantageous to Sweden. When the King, after having lost Finland, wrote to your Majesty, entreating that you would preserve to

Sweden the isles of Aland, you answered:—*Apply to the Emperor* Alexander, *he is great and generous;*—and to complete the measure of your indifference, you caused to be inserted in an official journal at the moment of my departure for Sweden, (Moniteur of the 21st of Sept. 1810, No. 264) that there was an interregnum in that kingdom, during which the English traded there with impunity.

The King retired from the coalition of 1792, because that coalition intended to dismember France, and because he would not be a party to the dismemberment of so fine a monarchy. He was induced to that act, the monument of his political glory, as much by his attachment to the French people, as by the necessity which existed of healing the wounds of the kingdom. This wise and virtuous conduct, founded upon the principle that every nation has the right of governing itself by its own laws, usages, and will, is the same which actuates the King at the present moment. Your system, Sire, is that of prohibiting nations from the exercise of the rights they have received from nature, of trading with each other, affording mutual assistance, of keeping up a friendly intercourse, and of living in peace; and yet the very existence of Sweden depends upon an extension of commercial relations, which are indispensable to her.

Far from a change of system being observable in the King, all enlightened and impartial men will only discover in it the continuation of a sound and constant policy, which developed itself at the time when the sovereigns coalesced against the liberty of France, and which is prosecuted with vigour at a moment when the French Government continues to conspire against the independence of all nations and the liberty of sovereigns. I know the good wishes of the Emperor Alexander and the Cabinet of St. James's for peace. The calamities of the Continent demand it, and your Majesty should not reject those demands. Possessed of the finest monarchy in the world, will your Majesty always be extending its confines, and will you leave to an arm less vigorous than your own the sad inheritance of interminable wars? Will not your Majesty devote yourself to healing the wounds of a revolution, of which nothing now remains to France but the remembrance of her military glory, and real internal evils? Sire, the lessons of history repel the idea of universal monarchy; and the feeling of independence may be blunted, but not effaced, from the hearts of nations. Let your Majesty weigh these considerations, and for once really devote your thoughts to a general peace, the profaned name of which has caused so much blood to flow.

I was born, Sire, in that fine France which you now govern; her glory and prosperity can never be indifferent to me. But while I continue to wish her happiness, I will defend with all the energies of my soul, both the rights of the people who have adopted me, and the honour of the sovereign who has deigned to call me his son. In this struggle between the liberty of the world and oppression, I will say to the Swedes: *I fight for you and with you, and the wishes of all free nations accompany our efforts.*

In politics, Sire, there is neither friendship nor hatred; the duties which we owe to those whom Providence has appointed us to govern, are alone to be considered. Their laws and privileges are the property so dear to them; and if, in order to preserve them, the sacrifice of old ties of friendship and family affections be required, a prince who is desirous of fulfilling his vocation should never hesitate as to the course he should adopt.

The Duke of Bassano declares that your Majesty will avoid the publicity of a rupture; but, Sire, is it not your Majesty who has interrupted our commercial relations by ordering the capture of a Swedish vessel in the very midst of peace? Is it not the severity of your orders, which for three years has interdicted us from all communication with the Continent, and which

since that period has caused the detention of fifty Swedish vessels at Rostock, Weimar, and other ports of the Baltic?

The Duke of Bassano adds, that your Majesty will not change your system, and that you will discountenance a war which you must consider as a civil one; which indicate that your Majesty wishes to retain Swedish Pomerania, and that you do not abandon the hope of giving the law to Sweden, and of thus debasing, without running any risk, the name and reputation of Sweden. By the word civil war, your Majesty doubtless designates the war against the Allies; for whom the fate reserved is well and generally ascertained. But your Majesty will recollect the displeasure you testified, upon learning the armistice which I granted that brave nation in April 1809; and you will there find the necessity to which that country saw itself reduced, of doing all that it now does to preserve its independence, and of preserving itself from the danger into which your policy, had it been less understood, would have precipitated it.

If the events which have taken place within these four months have laid the blame upon the Generals of your Majesty of disarming and sending into France, as prisoners of war, the Swedish troops of Pomerania; there will not be found, Sire, so plausible a

pretext for justifying the refusal which your Majesty has always made to confirm the judgments of the Council of Captures *(prises)*, and the particular exceptions which your Majesty has made for these three years against Sweden, notwithstanding decisions of that tribunal in our favour. Finally, Sire, no person in Europe can misunderstand the blame which your Majesty throws upon your Generals. The note of the King's Minister for foreign affairs, and the answer returned to it by M. de Cabre, on the 5th of January, 1812, will prove to you, Sire, that his Majesty anticipated your wishes by setting at liberty all the crews of the privateers. Since then the Government has even condescended to send back the Portuguese, Algerines, and Negroes taken on board the same privateers, and who called themselves subjects of your Majesty: nothing, therefore, should prevent your Majesty ordering the return of the Swedish officers and soldiers, and yet they are languishing in fetters. As to the threats contained in the Duke of Bassano's note, and the 40,000 men which your Majesty will give Denmark, I do not consider it necessary to enter upon that subject; the more so as I doubt whether the King of Denmark could avail himself of such assistance.

As to what concerns my personal ambition, I own it is a great one; it is that of serving the cause of

humanity, and of securing the independence of the Scandinavian Peninsula. To attain which object, I rely upon the justice of the cause which the King has commanded me to defend, upon the perseverance of the nation, and the fidelity of its allies.

Whatever may be your determination, Sire, whether for peace or war, I shall not the less preserve for your Majesty all the sentiments of an old brother in arms.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME

OF MISCELLANIES.

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
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